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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
R. D.

TOBIN, ET AL.,

vs.
BoNn & FINANCE CoRPORATION, a corporation, ET AI..~.,

tTxiTED

App·ellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

This was a suit in equity, a derivative action,
brought by stockholders o~ the United Bond and Finance
Corporation holding about one-fifth of the outs'tanding
stock of said corporation. They brought the action on
behalf of themselves and all other stockholders similarly situated. The suit is against the said corporation, its officers and directors .and the Beckstead Livestock Company, a Wy~oming ·Corporation, the stock of
which is w·holly owned by the Financ-e Corporation. The
purpose of the action was and is to have a receiver
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
appointed for the Finance Corporation. The trial Court
appointed a receiver for said corporation and ordered
all of the defendants to account for certain items. The
appeal is from that judgment.
The appellant, United B,ond and Finance Corporation, under the name of United States Bond and
Finance Corporation, was organized as a Utah corporation on the 20th day of September, 1927, and immediately thereafter commenced business. The original
incorporators were W. R. Beckstead, who became President and Director, W. A. Green, Vice-President, Floyd
S. Bradshaw, Secretary and Treasurer, Leslie D. Spilsbury, Director, and L. C. Clive, D[rector. The principal
·place of business of said corporation was at Salt Lake
City, Utah. Stock was sold either £or cash or on an
installment plan in units, a unit consisting of one share
of preferred of the par value of $100.00 and one share
of common voting stock without par value. These units
originally were sold for $125.00, $100.00 going into the
treasury of the corporation and $_25.00 to the salesmen
for commissions. The greater part of the stock sold by
the corporation in units was sold at this price. As
originally provided in the Articles of Incorporation there
was but one class of comm~on stock, and this stock carried
voting privileges. Later on the Articles of Incorporation
were amended and provision made for another class of
non-par common stock known as Class B Common. By
this amendrnent the original voting stock was designated
as Class A Common. The Articles were subsequently
amended to provide for another class of common stock
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

designated as Class AA Comm.on. Neither Class B nor
Class . A..A. Con1mon Stock carried voting privileges.
After the a1nendments, units of stork ''"'ere sold consisting
of one share of preferred and one share of either Class
B Common or one share of Class AA Common. During
the course of the stock s-elling' campaign the units sold
variously for $125.00 a unit, $135.00 a unit, and $150.00
a unit. However, the commission paid to salesmen remained constantly at $25.00 per unit. On units sold for
any sum in excess of $125.00 a reserve £or common stock
was set up and maintained by the ·corporation.
Following the organization of the corp·oration interest bearing bonds were sold either for cash or on an
installment basis. ..A..t the outset
R. Beckstead and
Floyd S. Bradsha\v were the leading figures in the corporation's affairs. Bradshaw remained with the corporation but a few months when he withdre\v and sold
his stock interests to Beckstead. From the first vV. R.
Beckstead \vas the chief promoter and organizer and the
chief sales1nan of the corporation. He org&nized its
stock selling campaign, using his own automobile and
his own resources to finance the venture. He received
from the corporation the usual commission of $25.00 per
unit on the units he sold. From the commission of stock
salesmen ~operating under him a 21h% overwriting commission was "rithheld \vhich was paid to Beckstead, and
up until 1931 Beckstead received no salary whatsoever
from the corporation. As soon as funds began to accumulate in the treasury Beckstead proceeded to invest the
1noney in accordance with the corporate purposes. He

' T·
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4
looked after mortgages and s·ecurities acquired by the
c-orporation and made collections thereon, and did all
thing-s necessary to keep the assets of the corporation
invested in interest bearing securities. The stock selling
campaign ceased in 1931, and thereafter Beckstead re.
reived a salary for his services from the corporation.
In 1928 the corporation '\vas authorized to sell its secur.
i ties and do business in the State of Montana as a
foreign corporation. A very substantial amount of stock
was sold in the State of Montana, and at one time the
corporation had invested in that state approximately
$80,000.00. In N~ovember, 1936, the corporation withdrew from that state and its charter to do business there
was officially cancelled. Prior to withdrawal from the
state all the property and assets of the corporation
therein were sold and disposed of s~o that at the time
of withdrawal the corporation had no property or assets
within the state whatsoever, neither were there any debts
or obligations due from it to citizens of that state .
.During the great depression which commenced in
1930-1931 and the condition of general unemployment
which prevailed throughout the intermountain. country
during that time, many of the investments of the corporation cea.sed to yield revenue. Mortgagors .could not make
payments of interest or principal on their 1nortgages, and
payments on other sec-uri ties like-wise becan1e delinquent.
As a result of this condition it was necessary for the
corporation to m-odify its business activities or to suffer
insolvency, and for that reason the corporation began
to acquire apartment houses and other income producing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property, and in acquiring these properties, Inortgages
and other securities and properties \Yhich were yielding
little ~or no revenue were traded and exchanged. At the
present time the corporation owns. and operates five
large apartn1ent houses in Salt Lake City and holds a
contract of sale on another. During this period of
depressi~on it was impossible for the corporation to pay
dividends, and the stockholders commenced trading and
exchanging their stock to stock traders for stock in other
corporations and other securities and selling it. for whatever price could be obtained. As a result of this condition a large amount of the stock of the corporation came
into the hands of stock traders and stock brokers and
these stock traders s~ought a market with the Finance
Corporation for stock coming into their possession.
They were \villing to sell the stock for ·a small percentage
of its par or book value, and it app-earing to the
corporate officers that the purchase on these favorable
terms was extremely profitable, much of the stock of the
corporation was repurchased. In fact, the audits (S·ee
Exhibit 15, page 4) which are a p.art of the reeo-rds of
this case on appeal, indicate that the corporation repurchased its own outstanding stock of the par value of
some $203,000 for a consideration of appr~oximately
$85,000.00. This practice terminated in 1936, with the
exception of a fevv sea ttered purchases in 1937, 1938
and 1939. No stock has been reacquired since October
1939.
.Since 1935 the corporation has acquired four large
livestock ranches in Wyoming, together with. a substantial
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amount of leased ground, Taylor grazing rights and
.summer grazing permits on the National forest. In connection with these ranches the ·Corporation owns and
operates ·over 2,000 head of sheep, a fine herd of approximately 55 pure bred registered Hereford cattle and 250
head of high grade Hereford cattle. These ranches are
being operated in a . successful and effi·cient manner.
The title to the property is in the Beckstead Livestock
Company, .a Wyoming corporation which was organized
in April of 1938. All ,of the capital stock of the Beckstead Livestock C·orporation is owned by the United
Bond and Finance Corporation. The ranches, grazing
rights, leased ground, sheep and .cattle are all free and
.clear of encumbrances with the exception of mortgages
·on two of the ranches, the total unpaid principal being
approximately $13,700.00.
According to the audit of the auditing firm of
Beesley and Wood, as of the 31st day of December, 1939,
the Finance Curporation is not only solvent, but has sufficient ass·ets to discharge all liability to stockholders in
full, to pay all debts and obligations of every kind owed
by the corporation, and still leave a balance of approximately $130,000.00.
These plaintiffs are minority stockholders from the
State of M~ontana. Their Complaint will be discussed
in detail hereinafter. Plaintiffs originally -commenced
proceedings in Montana for appointment of a receiver of
the corporation, and .a receiver was appointed. Subsequent to the appointment of receiver in Montana proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceedings ancillary thereto 'vere instituted in' Utah and
Wyoming and ancillary receivers appointed. The orders
appointing ancillary receivers were sulbsequently vacated
and set aside upon motion of the Finance Corporation,
and thereafter this action was commenced. Upon the
filing of the complaint the Court issued an order citing
the defendants to appear and show cause if any they had
why receiver pendente lite be not appointed. The hearing came on in the early part of September, 1940. After
approximately seventeen days of trial the parties rested
and the Court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter the matter was set down for hearing on its merits
and by stipulation the evidence received at the hearing
on citation was received as evidence on the trial. Other
evidence was offered and finally on the 6th da.y of
January, 1941, four minutes before the term of ~office of
the trial Judge expired the findings of fact, decree and
the order appointing the receiver were signed and filed
by the C'ourt. The Court in its decree, among other
things, ordered a purported accounting which will be
discussed in detail hereinafter.
D·efendants interposed a moti~on for a new trial .and
a motion to vacate, annul and set aside the order appointing receiver. Judgment was stayed pending the
determination of these motions, and both were by the
Court denied. Thereafter appellants perfected their
appeal, tl1e judgiuent heing superseded by a bond in the
sum of Fifty Thousand and no/100 ($50,000.00) Dollars.
We have given the foregoing merely as a preliminary statement to inform the Court in a general way of
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the background of this case and the structure of the
Finance Corporation. We do not intend to make a statement of all of the evidence· which appears in the somewhat voluminous record for the reason that much of it is
immaterial and irrelevant, but shall discuss the details
of the evidence

~only

in connection with the argument

which we shall hereinafter set forth.
Appellants contend that the judgment and decree
of the Court should be reverse·d and set aside for the
reason that said judgment and decree is unsupported by
pleadings, proof and findings, and is contrary to the law.
AssiGNMENTs

OF ERROR.

Appellants assign the following err·ors, which are
relied upon for a reversal of the judgment and decree
herein:
1. The trial Court committed reversible error in
making .and entering its judgme~t and decree on the
ground and for the reason:
(a) That said jndgii!ent and decree is not supported
by the pleadings.
(b) That said j-udgment and decree is not supported
by the evidence.
(c) That said judgment and decree is not supported
by the· findings and conclusions.
(d) That said judgment is contrary to law.
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2. The trial Court committed reversible error in
making its findings of fact on the ground and for the
reason:
(a) That the findings are not supported by the evidence.
(b) That the findings are not within the Issues
raised by the pleadings.
(c) That there is a fatal variance between the findings and complaint.
(d) That the trial Court failed to find on material
issues raised by the pleadings.
3. The trial Court committed reversible error 1n
the conduct of the trial:
(a) That by reason of the Court's personal prejudice against the Defendants and D:efendants' cause, Defendants were not given and afforded a fair and impartial trail, and that said prejudice ·of the Court influenced
it in making and entering its judgment against Defendants.
(b) By overruling Defendants' objections to irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial evidence.
(c) By denying Defendants' motion to dismiss made
at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case.
(d) By permitting Plaintiffs, over Defendants' ob:jection, to amend their Complaint.
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4. The trial Court committed reversible error in
overruling Defendants' motion to vacate and set aside
the order appointing a receiver.
5. The Court committed reversible erl'ior in overruling Defendants' motion for a new trial.

THE JUDGMENT AND DIDCREE OF THE TRIAL COURT
SH·OULD BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE FOR THE REASON
THAT SAID JUDGM'EN.T AND DECREE IS UNSUP·PORTED BY
PLEADINGS, PROOF AND FINDINGS, AND IS CONTRARY TO
THE· LAW.

POINT I.
RECEIVIDRJSHIP' IS PURELY AN AN'CILLARY REMEDY AND
I'S NOT AN EQUITAJBLE RIGHT, AN ACTION FOR A REC!IDIVER·
SHI!P BEING UNKNOWIN TO EITHER LAW OR EQUITY.

THE

J,URISDIGTION OF THE COURT DEPIDNDS UPON THE EXISTENCE
AND PENDENC'Y OF AN AC'TION FOR THE ENFOROEJMENT OF
A LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PRIMARY RIGHT TO WHICH RFr
CEIVERS.HI'P MAY BID NECESSARY OR IN AID THEREOF.

Section 104-20-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 19-33
provides:
"A receiver may be appointed by the court
in w bich an acti.on is pending or ha.s passed to
judgment, or by the judge thereof;''
and then sets forth ·six subdivisions, enumerating
grounds upon which receivers may be appointed. None
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of these are applicable to the case at bar except Subdivision No. 6 which provides as follows:
·'In all other cases \Yhere receivers have
heretofore been appointed -by the useages of the
courts of equity.''

Col·u.mbia Tt·ust Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank,
et al., 82 Utah 117, 22 Pac. (2d) 164, was an action
brought to recover for alleged conversion of crops.
A crop mortgage had been placed on the crops to

be grown on the premises, and prior thereto the premises
had been mortgaged to secure payment of a substantial
indebtedness. An action was brought to foreclose the
mortgage on the real estate and the crop mortgagee
was not made a party to the suit. In the suit to foreclose
the real estate mortgage a petition was filed requesting
the Court to appoint a receiver to take charge of the
crop, reciting the facts of the plaintiff '·s interest in the
property and its inability to care for the crop, and that
to preserve the same a receiver was necessary. The
receiver was appointed on the pe'tition. He went into
posses·sion of the property, harvested the crops, s.old the
rsame, but made no accounting to the crop mortgagee.
Hence this action. It was contended that the .appointment ,of the receiver was void.
From the opinion we quote as follows:
'''In support of its position plaintiff urges:
First, that the order of the court below appointing Mr. Dix~on as receiver was void and as such
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subject to attack in this proceeding; and, second,
t~at the delivery of the chattel or crop mortgag·e
constituted a constructive severance of the crop,
and vested in plaintiff a first lien upon such crop
which lien continued during the period aHowed
by law for the redemption, of the property, and
until the issuance of a sheriff's deed. In support
of its contention that the appointment of Mr.
Dixon as a receiver was void, appellant cites
the following cases : State v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435
2·5 S. W. 947, 23 L. R. A. 534; Zuber v. Micma~
Gold Mining Co., (C. C.) 180 F. 625; Hermann v.
Thomas, (Tex.. Civ. App.) 143 S.· W. 195; Continental Trust Co. v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App.)
179 S.
939; I-Iartnett v. St. Louis !!in. & :Mill.
Co., 51 ~Iont. 395, 153 P. 437; Price v. Bankers'
Trust Co., (Mo. Sup.) 178 S. W. 745 ~ Stockholders ,of Jefferson County Agricultural 1\ss 'n
v. Jefferson Agricultural Ass 'n, 155 Iov,ra 634,
136 N.
672; Gauer v. Voltz, 190 Ill. App. 189;
and Davis v~ Alton, J. & P. Ry. Co., 180 Ill. App.
1. The doctrine announced in the foregoing cases
is thus stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,.Vol. 4 (4th Ed.) Sec. 1539, p. 3613: 'Unless
authorized by statute, there is no such thing as an
action brought distinctively for the mere appointInent of a receiver; to justify the appointn1ent it
is essential that some proper final relief in equity
be asked for in the bill which will justify the court
in proceeding with the case. It follows that it is
error for the court to appoint a receiver. ,of a
corporation on its own _petition, alleging its insolvency, and it has been held that such a proceeding is void for want ,of jurisdiction.' "

' T·

' T·

·Clark in his "rork, '''The Law of Receivers", 1st
:Ed., Vol. 1, Pages 54-56, 1f 36, states that:
"The appointment of a receiver is not an
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fore the appointment of a rt>eeiver is not a cause
of action in itself but the appointn1ent ~of a receiYer is an act of the court ancillary to proeeedings for the establishn1ent of some right. The
appointn1ent of a receiver being- an interlocutory
decree is therefore a temporary expedient~ and
provisional to son1e other or final determination
of the Ina tter bY the court. It is not the office of
a court of equity to appoint receivers as a mode
of granting ultimate relief. They are appointed
as a measure ancillarY to the enforcement of some
recognized equitable· right." (Citing· many authorities).
Under statutes similar to ours 1nany Courts have
held that unless the receiver is appointed in an action
pending in which son1e relief is prayed other than the
mere appointment of a receiver, the Court is without
jurisdiction to n1ake such appointment. A leading case
on this subject is the case of ·Cook v. Leona Mills Lumber
Cornpany, 106 Ore. 520, 212 Pac. 785 (1923).
In that case action had been brought for the appointment of a receiver and no other relief was permissible
other than the appointment of .a receiver. The Court
held that the refusal to grant a motion to vacate the
appointment of the receiver was err~or. In the decision
it is pointed out that California, Montana, North Dakota
and Idaho have statutes like the one in Oregon, and which
are identical "~ith the Utah statutes above quoted.
~rhe

C·ourt cites and quotes cases from these jurisdieti?ns, holding that under statutes of this kind an action
must be pending for SOID·e other independent and primary
relief to entitle a party to a receiver. It is also stated
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that the law of receivership is peculiar in its nature in
that it belongs to that class of remedies which are wholly
ancillary or provisional, and that the appointment of a
receiver does not affect either. directly or indirectly the
nature of any primary right; that it is merely a. means
by w hi·ch ·such rights may be preserved, protected or enforced in judi,cial proceedings. ·The appointment of a
receiver does not adjudicate or determine the rights of
any party to the proceedings, and grants no final relief.
After reviewing a number of authorities the :Court states:
'·'Under our code the appointment of a receiver is an ancillary remedy, in aid of the primary
object of litigation, and such relief must be germane to the principal suit, and a. proceeding cannot
he maintained where the appointment of a receiver
is the ·sole, primary object. Neither at law nor
in equity is .an action permissible in which only the
appointment of a receiver is sought.''
In the ·ease of La.umeier v. Su.n-R;a.y Products Company (Mo.), 50 S. W. (2d) 640, receiver was appointed

on petition of plaintiffs \vherein, among other things, it
was alleged that the offi·cers of the corporation were
guilty of fraud and misma.nagemen t, the allegations being
general, that the officers had permitted certain people
to appropriate to themselves, "rithout right, large sums
of money and other property of great value \Vhich had
become lost .and wasted, and that the corporation was
drifting toward insolvency. Other general charges were
set forth in the complaint. The defendants moved to
vaeate the order appointing receiver on the ground,
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among other things, that the Court lacked jurisdiction
to appoint receiver, the allegations in the complaint being
insufficient to support any primary cause to which receivership would be ancillary.
·The Court held that the allegations with respect to
diversion of the property and general fraud were insuf, ficient and that the complaint stated a cause for receivership. only, and said:
"' \\:e find the · settled rule in this and other
states to be that a eourt of equity has inherent
power to appoint a reeeiver to take charge of the
property and affairs of a corporation only when
such appointment is ancillary to and in aid of an
action pending for some other purpose, and in
which there is a prayer for other and final or
ultimate relief which the court has po,ver and
jurisdiction to grant. We have recently reviewed
authorities so holding in State ex rel. Hopke v.
Mulloy, Judge, et al. (Mo. Sup.) 43 S. W. (2d)
806. Absent a .cause of action stated in the main
case, there is no main ease pending, and the court
is without power or jurisdiction to appoint a receiver."
·Citing·

many

authorities,

an1ong

them

being

Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (4th ·Ed) p. 3613, Par. 1;539·; Clark

on Receivers, P. ·69', Par. 45; Tardy Smith on Receivers
('2d Ed.), Par. 14, Pages 50, 51; 49 C. J., p. 13,2, Pa.r. 140,
and concluded;
''Absent a petition showing the existence of
and a clear purpose to enforce such independent
right against proper pa.rties defendant, the court
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is without power to grant the ancillary relief of
a. receivership.''
It was held in the Montana case of Ha.rtnett, et al., v.
Sa.int Louis Mining a;nd Milliln.g Company of Montana,
et al., 15·3 Pac. 437, that there was no such thing in the
tState of Montana as an a,ction for the appointment of a
receive!·, that receivership is a provisional rem·edy of
ancillary

chara~cter,

allowable only in an action pending

for so1ne other purpose. Citing Rev. Codes, Paragraph
66'98 (Identical with our Utah section on receivership
.hereinabove quoted) ; and First T. S. Bank v. District
Cou.rt, 50 Mont. 259, 146 Pac. 539; Lyon v. United States

F. arnd G. Co., 48 Mont. 591, 140 Pac. 86.
The 'Court expresses the rule :
''The action pending must. be one for relief
that could be litigaled between the parties evrJn
if the application for the appointment be denied,
and presupposes a. c'omp.Zain.t sufficient to w'arrant
swch relief.'' (Italics supplied).
In the .case of Marnn v. German--American lnv . Co.
(,Neb.), 97 N. W. 600, a complaint was filed wherein certain relief was sought, part of the prayer being for the
appointment of a re-ceiver. No demurrer was interposed,
but an obje.ction was made to the introduction of evidence
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action. The objection was overruled; the cause tried
and a receiver appointed.
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The Court invoked the liberal rule of construction
in construing· the pleadings, but held that they failed to
state a cause of action and stated: ·

''By seetion 2'67 of our ,Code of Civil Procedure 'No r-eceiYer shall be appointed except in a
suit actually commenced and pending;' and it is
a familiar rule that the a.ction pending must be
an action for sam~ relief or to enforce some right
other than the mere appointment of a receiYer.
In the case hef.ore us no action "~as commenced by
the plaintiff which can support the receivership
as a proceeding ancillary thereto. The prayer of
his petition conclusively shows this. 'A suit actually com·menced and pending' that will support
the appointment of a receiver must he one for
relief that could be litigated between the parties
even if the application for 'the appointment be
denied. See Hottenstein v. Conrad, 9 Kan. 438.
"In Vila Y. Grand Island Electric Light, etc.,
136, recently decided ·by this
Company, '94 N.
court, it is said, 'The suit which must be ''actually
commenced and pending'' as a condition precedent
·to an appointment of a receiver must be one in
which the main relief sought is independent of the
receivership.' And from Barber v. International
Co., 73 C·onn. 593, 48 Atl. 7·58, the following language is quoted with approval: 'It is not the office
of a ·court of equity to appoint receivers as a mode
of granting ultimate· relief. They are appointed
as a measure ancillary to the enforcement of some
recognized equitable right.' ''

' r·

It was held in the case of Simplw Paper Corpora-

tion v. Sta.ndard C. Box Co. (Mo.), 97 .s. W. (2d) 86'2,
:that the appointment of receiver is no part of the cause
of action. It is merely incidental to it.
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A rather interesting .case which pointedly illustrates
the proposition that receivership cannot be the ultimate
and primary relief in aetions wherein a receivership may be sought is First Na.t. Bank & Trust Co. v.
York Petroleum Co., et al., 4 F. ~Supp. 16'9.
In that .case an action was commenced in the State
·Court of ·Oklahoma against a corporation doing business
in Oklahoma but chartered under the la.ws of the State
of New York. The directors were all residents of Oklahoma and were served with process in thrut state. The
action was brought for the purpose of procuring a judgment on a promissory note in an amount in excess of
$124,000.00. Receivership was sought, the directors
being eha.rged with fraud, mismanagement, dishonesty,
diversion of assets, and other wrongful conduct. The
corporation removed the cause to the Federal Court on
the ground that there was a separable controversy and
diversity of citizenship, the ·plaintiffs being residents of
Oklahoma and the defendant corporation being a resident
of N ~w York. The plaintiffs filed a motion in the F·ederal
C'ourt to rem-and, insisting that the individual defendants
were residents of ~Oklahoma, and therefore· the ne~c.essary
diversity of citizenship did not .exist. The plaintiffs
insisted that the primary eause was for the appointment
of a receiver, and that the collection of the promissory
note was incidental thereto.
1

In considering this argument the Court stated:
"Such an .a:rgument is tantamount to saying
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"

ment of a receiYer to recover dissipated assets,
and that the recovery upon the promissory note
is merely incidental thereto. It is \Yell established
that a. receivership is not an independent rem·edy,
but is purely ancillary to other relief sought .
. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. 'S. 491, 43
S. Ct. 454, 67 L. Ed. 763; Superior Oil·Corporation
v. Matlock (C. C. A.) 47 F. (2-d) 993; ~~l'artin v.
Ha.rnag·e, 26 Okl. 790, 110 P. 781, 38 L. R. A. ( N.
S.) 2'28 ~ ''; agoner Oil & Gas Company v. Marlow,
137 Okl. 116, 278 P. 29·4. There ·can be no doubt
but that plaintiff's p-etition is primarily based
upon its right to recover upon the promissory
note.''
The motion to remand \Yas denied.

The fundamental importance of the proposition above
- set forth is further illustrated by a consideration of the
., many cases wherein a receiver ha.s been appointed upon
a petition wherein no primary relief is prayed, the prayer being merely for receivership, all parties consenting
- thereto. The Courts have held that even the consent of
the defendants to such procedure does not confer jurisdiction, and that
~

~the.

'Court is "\Yithout any jurisdiction

whatsoever to appoint a receiver where su·c:h is the primary relief sought.
·The following language in the case of Zwber v. Micmac Gold Mining Company, et al., 180 F'ed. 625, is per~
tinent:
~"Before

passing upon these. questions it is
the duty of the ~court to eonsider the character
of the bill no \tv before it. Its whole purpose is
manifestly to obtain a reeeiver. · In this district,
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in Hutchinson v. American Palace-Car Co. (C. C.)
104 Fed. 18'2, 185, Judge Putnan1 has stated the
three essential .conditions·, compliance with which
is _necessa1·y to justify !the appointment of a re.
ce1ver:
" 'First, that the case he fairly ·within the
jurisdi·ction of the court having in vie·w both the
limited jurisdiction of federal tribunals and the
true nature of proceedings in equity; seeond, that
some proper final relief in equity he asked for in
the bill which will justify the .court in proceedinO'
with the case; and, third, that the circumstance~
calling for a receiver be of a clear and urgent
character.'
''Judge Putnam further ·Observes that upon
application. for rec.eivership, even though the
parties have .already agreed upon a re·ceiver, the
court is not relieved from looking at the question
of jurisdiction, and the view of obtaining final
relief, or merely for the purpose of securing a
receivership for the n1ere sake of a receivership.
H·e adds that, when the suhje.et-matter is of itself
of an equitable nature, certain conditions which
might be .availed of to defeat jurisdiction 1nay be
waived, .citing Hollins v. Iron Company, 150 U. S.
3Z1, 14 .Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113. But I find no
conditions stated in that case '\vhich affect in any
way the ·questions no'\v before me. I~ the case at
bar there is no final relief asked for in the bill.
A receivership cannot. he held by this ·court to be
final relief; and it rcannot be n1ade ·:final by the
suggestion that the receivers may bring suits,
and in that way obtain some ultimate relief. The
purpose of a receivership in equity is to be ancillary to, and in aid of, the primary object of the
litigation. It cannot be the primary object of the
litigation. The final relief sought by the bill cannot be made contingent upon the incidental relief
of a. receivership.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
To the san1e effect see Uni.ted Ceme,teries v. S~tro~ther
~" (Mo.), 119 ,s. ,V. (2d) 7·63, "~herein ,the question of jurisdiction was not raised until the cause was presented on
a.ppe·aL The Court found and held from a consideration
lt of the .complaint th~at the Trial·Court was ·without jurisr· di,ction to appoint a receiver.
\'

In McCu.tcheon v. Su.perior Court ('Cal.),, 24 Pac.
('2d) 9i1, one of the judges on his own motion vacated an
~ order theretofore made appointing a receiver and dis-·
charged said receiver, on the ground that the Court in
said 'action had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.
l The petitioner sought redre1ss against ·the :Court by1 mandamus. The receiver was appointed upon a petition
~
praying for the appointment of a receiver of a corpora- tion, and the ·corporation ·and its directors consented
thereto in open Court. [t appeared from the complaint
that the primary relief sought was the appointment of a
receiver. ·Th~ Court therefore held that there was no
jurisdiction to app·oint a receiver and the appointment
was void. Mandamus w:as denied.
The Court stated:
'''''here a complaint fails to state a cause of
action an order by the court ·by .which a receiver
is appointed therein is of no v.aliditr."
In the case of Nolan v. Guardian C oaZ, and Oil Compa;ny (W. V·a.), 194~8. E. 347, the prayer of the complaint
prayed that a receiver be .appointed to preserve the property of the corporation, and that the corporation be
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required to furnish a true and correct list of all the
present stockholders. A demurrer was interposed which
w;as overruled and receiver appointed.
After holding that a stockholder could not maintain
a bill in equity to enforce his right to inspect the books
and docunien ts .of the ~company, whether the right was
conferred by statute or regulation, the Court held that
the primary purpose of the action was receivership, and
therefore the Court was without jurisdiction to grant
the pra.y·er of the complaint.
Th~

judgment of the Trial Court was reversed, and
the cause remanded, with direction to dismiss the bill.
A case which is almost on all fours with the case at
har is Frenoh ·v. ~c. F. & T. C·o. (Ore.), 265 Pac. 443. In
that .case the Court held that .a receivership could not be
tiie only relief prayed for. Apparently the primary relief that the plaintiffs desired was an accounting. How·ever, the Court points out that ,the plaintiffs made no
claim tha.t they had ever attempted to see the hooks of
the corporation, or that an accounting had ever been
demanded ·Or refused. Hence the rem,edy for accounting
failed for these reasons, and the only thing left was tlie
appointment of a receiver, and the Court refused to uphold the .appointment of' a receiver made by the lower
Court.
Another fine discussion of the principle here set
forth is found in H oiles v. W a.tkins (Ohio), 157 N. E. 557,
wherein under statutes exactly like those in the State
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of lTtah the 1Court held that there \Yas no a~ction for the
appointment of a receiYer, and that it is not the offiee
of a Court of equity to appoint a receiver ars a. mode of
granting ultimate relief. Many .cases are cited therein
upholding this principle.
That case is also interesting in that the Court discusses .the fact that it is necessary in any event that there
be some evidence of insolvency or imminent danger of
insolvency, in order to justify the appointment of a. receiver.
· The Court observed that no ·ereditor was a party
to the action; that no judgment had been taken against
the corporation, and that no levy had been made upon

any of its assets, and that there was no execution in the
hands of the officers. The ·Court therefore ~concluded
that there was no necessity f.or the appointment of a reeeiver to preserve the property of the .corporation or to
prevent its destruction.
A discussion of this same principle is also contained
in the case of Myers v. Oxiden.tal Oil Corpor,a;tion, 288
Fed. 997.
The case of Parker v. American ~Svulphur & Fertilizer Compamy, (Tex.), 3 ·S. W. (2d) 124, was a.n action
instituted by minority stockholders wherein receivership
was sought. Among other things it was alleged that the
corporation liad little property and no money, and was
in imminent danger of insolvency; that its right to do
busineg.s had been forfeited for non-payment of franchise
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tax, and that the majority stockholders in violation of
law and their duty, and in fraud of the rights of the
corporation and s~ockholders as established by former
judgment of the Court, had entered into contra~ts on
behalf of said corporation in which they had a personal
interest, and from which they hoped to derive a personal
benHfit to themselves. The only prayer was for the appointment of a· !eceiver, and the Court found that the
primary purpose of the action appeared to be the appointment of a receiver. The ·Court held that even though
fraud was alleged and proved, .and accepting all other
allegations as true, still .the Court was without jurisdiction to appoint a reeeiver.
· In the case of Prairie Lea Production Cornpany v.
Tiller (Tex.), 286 S. W. 63B, an action was brought by
minority stockholders against a corporation and its directors and offi.cers, alleging fraud upon and mismanagement of the corporation, praying for an injunction, the
appointment of a re,ceiver and general relief.
Among· other things they charged:
refusal ·Of the president and

hoar~

1. Fraudulent

of directors for inore

than two years to render an accounting to the plaintiffs
or call a stockholder's meeting. 2. Fraudulent sale of oil.
3. Conversion by the directors to their own use and benefit of a large amount of the ·c-ompany's assets. 4. Fraudulent misappropriation :by the directors of $20,000. 5.
F'raud upon the ·corporation in the exe-cution of a corporation note to a brother of one of the directors. 6. F'raudulent increase in capital stock.
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Upon these allegations plaintiffs prayed for an ac-.
counting and a·ppointment of receiver, temporary injunction, and for dissolution of the corporation and distribution of its assets.
Defendants filed a plea in abatement, the same being
overruled. They answered by general 'and special acceptance ap_d by general and special denials. Upon he~r
ing receiver was appointed and the appeal_ perfected.
Upon appeal -defendants .contended _that the complaint was not sufficient, and tl!a.t the p-rimary relief
sought was that of receivership. ·
In passing the C-ourt remarked:
''It cannot be seriously questioned but that
the principle purpose of appellee'·s suit was to
secure the appointment of ·a receiv-er and to take
the management and control of the corporation's
property and affairs out of the hands ·of its president and board of directors.''
The Court discussed the general proposition discussed hereinabove, and held that Texas was in accord
with the general rule.
After expressing grave doubt a.s to the sufficiency
of. the complaint the 'Court proceeded with the dis-cussion
of the ·evidence and h-eld that the plaintiffs had not discharged the burden of proof, and that the direct allegations of fraud and misappropriation had been disproved,

a.nd the .action of th~ board of directors with regard thereto reasonably explained.
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The \action of the ·Trial 'C.ourt in appointing a receive·r wa,s reversed and the cause remanded.

To the same effect see Rex Refining Compamy v.
Morris ('Tex.), 72 S. W. (2d) 687.
An excellent note illustrating and further supporting the propositions hereinabove discussed is appended
to the opinion in the ease of Porter v. Brown, et al.,
(iSouth Carolina), 146 S. E. 810 at page 814.
It thus appears from the ·authorities cited that the
burden rests upon the plaintiffs of pleadings, proving
and esta~blishing an i?dependent cause ·Of .action for some
primary relief to which receivership 'Can b.e ·ane!illary,
necessary to, or in aid thereof, before .a receiver will be
appointed~
This they have failed to do as will more
fully appear.

POINT II.
THE PRiiMARY REMEDY D:IDGRE:ED HEREIN TO

WH~CH

T:HE RECE!IVE!RSHI'P IS ANCILLARY IS TH·E REM.EDY OF AC·
COU·NTINO, BUT TH'E!RE fS NEI'THER PLEADINGS, FINDINGS
NOR PROOF TO SUPPORT, SUSTAIN OR WIARRANT THE AC·
COUNTING DE!GREfEiD.

We submit that under all the authorities, plaintiffs'
cause must stand or fall on their independent suit for an
accounting. If they have not alleged or proved an independent eause for an accounting the Court is without
jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. Therefore, it is
necessary to earefully . examine the pleadings, the
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- proof, the findings of fact and the law to determine
whether or not an independent, final and primary cause
for an aecounting, to 'Yhieh receivership may be ancillary
in this case, has been alleged, proved or found.
Clark states the rule in his work on R.eceivers (2nd
- Edition) in Volume 1, Paragraph 51, Page 58, as follows:
· ''Such matters as the appointment of a receiver and the issuing of a. preliminary injunction,
cannot per .se be the su.bject of .a suit at law or an
action in equity. ·One who prays for any preliminary or -ancillary relief, such as a receivership,
may always be challenged as to his alleged cause
of action, the eause of action being stated in hi·s
primary suit. If his primary cause fails, his receivership proceedings must also fail.''
That part of the decree whi.ch relates to the accounting provides as follows :

"IT Is F'uRTHER !ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants, United Bond and Finance ·Corpora.tion, a corporation, W. R. Beckstead,
a.s president of said corporation, B-oyd Evans, a·s
Secretary of said corporation, W. R. Beckstead,
Boyd Evans, Leslie. D. Spilsbury, as directors of
said corporation, W. R. B-eckstead, individually,
and ~Stella C. ·Beckstead, his wife, and Beckstead
Livestock Company, a. corporation, be, and they
are hereby required within thirty days from date
hereof, to render a full, true and -c-omplete ac•Counting for all transactions had respecting the
forfeiture of installment sales, contracts or stocks
and bonds and investment units of said corporation, and for the transactions involving the purchase of the insurance agency and the purcha·se
of the controlling stock ·of Edward E. Jenkins in
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the Ashton-Jenkins Company, and for all transactions and money advanced to Beckstead Livestock 'Company and for all money and property of
said corporation used by the defend:ant, ""\Y. R.
Beckstead and his asso.cia.tes in the acquisition of
any outstanding· stock of said corporation, and for
any and all sto-ck cl'aimed to have been issued bv
said corporation to the said defendants or any o'f
them.''
There are six items for .which the defendants, and all
of them, are ordered to account. We will eonside~ each
item of the accounting. sep'arately 'Yith relation to the
findings, the pleadings and the proof, and will then discuss these i terns and show ·beyond all doubt that this de•cree for aceounting must fail, and that the judgment
must be reversed.

1.

F'o;aFEITURE OF INSTALLMENTS.

By the de.c.ree the defendants are ordered to account
''for all transactions had respecting the forfeiture of
installment sales, contracts or stocks and bonds and investment ·units of said corporation.''
(A)

FINDINGS OF FACT.

It is found that during the early years of the existence of the said United Bond and Finance ~Corporation,
stocks tand ~bonds of said corporation were sold under
installment contracts. · That some of the subscribers defaulted and the amounts paid by them were forfeited.
Thait the a.udits p·roduced itn C our:t do not diSialose what
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happened to the payme'nts so forfeited, and no books were
produced from which the dis·position of said forfeited
payments .eould be ascertained. (Finding N-o. 47)
(lB)

PLEADINGS •

.

There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint on
this phase of the accounting order, nor is there any _pleading whatsoever that presents any issue on these installment contr.acts. .

The audit of 1935, Exhibit_ L-3, at page 7, states as
follows:
'·'·Capital surplus has been created by the forfeiture through cancell'ations of installment payments made on stock and bond subscriptions. It
is our understanding that should a subseriber
whose account has been so cancelled desire to com·plete his payments he would be permitted to do
so and receive full credit for the amount cancelled \\Then his subscription is paid in full.''
·The audit ·Of 1988, Exhibit 14, shows the amount paid
in on installment payments of all types of stock.
The audit of 1939, Exhibit 15, states as follows:
"~Capital

surplus of $14,819.55 shows no
change since 19·36 except for a $25.00 adjustment
which has been created by the forfeiture through
cancellation of installment payments made on
stock and bond subs.criptions. It is our understanding that should a subscriber whose account
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has been so cancelled desire to complete his payments he would be permitted to do so and receive
full credit for the amount can-celled.''
This exhibit also dis'Closes:
'·'Installment payments were examined with
the individual a~ccount cards kept by the company and were reconciled therewith.''
These audits, and ·all of them, show very .clearly that
in all ·cases \vhere there has been a cancellation of contracts for the installment purchase of stocks that those
i terns have been entered in the capital surplus.
The audits certainly disclose what happened to all
payments made on installment eontrac:ts, those· cancelled
and forfeited as well as those still ·carried on the books
of the company as capital liability.
This matter was not mentioned in the .complaint and
was first developed on the ·cross examination of Beckstead. (R. 1457)
Beckstead testified in effeet that during the time the
corporation was engaged in selling its securities a plan
was followed whereby purchasers could purchase stocks
and securities on .an installment pl'an. He testified that
they kept an office card for each such purchase and as
the money was paid the pa.ymen t \Vonld be recorded on
the .card and that stock was not issued until the payment~
were completed and that a few of these a·ecounts were
cancelled off for nonpayment. He testified also that the
hooks and records of the company would . indicate all
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payments n1ade on such contracts and that the corporation's records \Yould sho'v the amount of money so collected on installments, those that were cancelled and
those for 'vhich stack 'vas issued. (R. 1~57-1458)
·This testimony is uncontradicted, unquestioned and
unimpeached and is directly contrary to the finding of
the Court.
In the face of this testimony th~ Court then makes
the further finding that no books were produced from
whieh the disposition of said forfeited payments could
be ascertained.
. There is no evidence to support this finding, in fact
the evidence is to the contrary, the books do sho\v the
amount .and disposition of this money, and th,ey were
in court and available for inspection by eourt and counsel.
(D)

DISCUSSION.

There is no ~vidence in the record, and counsel for
the plaintiffs have never -contended that there wa.s any
evidence showing tha-t the individual defendants or the
Livestock ~Company ever wrongfully received or diverted
any funds ·Of the corporation resulting from these forfeitures. The evidence heretofore referred to shows
beyond any question of a. douht that there has been no
diversion or eonversion of these funds by any of the
defendan ts.
This evidence is uncontradicted and unquestioned,
and we are at a loss to understand how the ·Court could
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ni\ake this a matter of account. We say frankly to the
·Court that no accounting whatsoever of these funds can
be made ·except as· heretofore made, shown, and indi-cated
by the books and records and ·audits of the corporation.
Attention of the Court is called to the fact that the
Court made no finding whatsoever to the effe-ct that any
moneys received on these installment contracts had ever
been diverted, misappropriated- or unlawfully used by
any of the defendants. There is no allegation, proof, nor
finding to ·support this -order to account.
No- demand was ever made for the production or inspection of ·any of the .company's hooks with reference
to these transactions ; all parties seemed to r.ely, and did
rely upon the various audits introduced in evidence, and
now to make this finding ·and this order of accounting
one of the essential pillars upon which this receivership
is supported is positively unfair and unjust, and shows
the extent to which the Court was willing to go in order
to find some final ·primary remedy to support the order
appointing a receiver.
On this first item of account we desire to particularly ·call t~ ~Court's ·attention to the fact that the defendants are not ordered _to account for any money or for
any property, but are ·Ordered to a.ecount for, of all
things, ''transactions.'' Just what form of property or
money .these '' transa·c.tions'' ·Consist of, we .are unable to
determine. Certainly the Court erred in making this
order.
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We cannot understand the finding that the audits
produced in Court do not disclose what happened to the
payments so forfeited, and that no books were produced
from \vhich the disposition of said forfeited payments
could be ascertained. This finding '"e believe .eonclusively confirms the f.aet that all they are seeking is information, and no judgment could be rendered on such basis.
Withou.t nz.aking any sho1.uifng of money misappropriated
or tcrongfully diverted ~or that the books and records
of the compa;ny are inaccurate, or inadequate, the C ourl
makes this order. It .ca'YI/YI)ot be jwstified nor supp-orted.
To allow it to u-phold the appointm.ent of a receiver does
- violence to every sense of justice and right.

2.

PURCHASE oF AsHTON-JENKINs INSURANCE AGENCY.

The second item for which the defendants are
- ordered to account is ''for the transactions involving the
purchase of the insurance agency.''
(A)

FINDINGS OF FACT.

It is found that Beckstead exchanged property of the·
< Finance ·Corporation for an assignment of an insurance
·con tract taken in the name of B-eckstead, said contract
being assigned to B·eckstead by the Ashton-Jenkins In.
surance :company. It is ·stated that large sums and
am·ounts of money of the Finance iCorporation were used
for t~is purpose. It is found in .connection with this
.. transaction that the ·evidence does not disclose whether
profit was gained ·or a. loss sustained by said venture, or

·'

~
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whether an accounting was ever made to the Finance
Corporation. (1See F'indings Nos. 17 and 47)
(:,B)

PLEADINGS.

There is no allegation in the complaint which raises
any issue whatS'oever upon this matter.
· (rC)

PROOF.

The evidence disclosed (R. 1657-1658) that Beckstead
1

as the manager of the United Bond and Finance ·Oorpora tion

be~came

in teres ted in the purchase of the Ashton-

Jenkins Insurance Agency before the agency was transferred .to Lauren W. Gibbs, and that an audit was made
of the affairs -of the insurance company which disclosed
that they were doing a large and prosperous insurance
~business, and that Beckstead consulted Mr. Grut and Mr.
Cosgriff of the Continental Bank with respect to this
matter and was advised by them to purchase this agency
and that the Bank was willing to make a. loan to the Finance Corporation in the am·ount of $50,000.00 for that
purpose. Later on the United Bond and Finance Corporation pur·chased the Ashton..,Jenkins Insurance Agency
and immediately thereafter sold and assigned it to the
Investors Thrift Company. The Finance Corporation
paid $12,500.00 f.or this agency.
Exhibit Y-4 evidences the transaction. It .show~
that on N ovemher 14, 19,3:2 this .busines was assigned to
W. R. Beckstead. It also shows that a consideration of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
$12,500.00 wa.s paid therefor and that on the same day
\V. R. B·eckstead assigned this business to the Thrift
Company. The -consideration of $12,500.00 was paid
with checks of the Finance Corporation. The Thrift
Company paid to the Finance Corporation $14,000.00 for
this assignment, the Finance Corporation realizing a. pr.o-fit of $1500.00 on the deal.
B~eckstead

testified that he '\\ras -a. mediator for the

three companies involved in the transa.ction and that was
the reason the assignment was first taken in his own
name. Before the purchase the Thrift Company agreed
to pay $14,000.00 to ·the Finan-ce C·orporation for the
agency providing the Finanee Corporation \vould purchase it for $12,500.00. The Thrift Company gave $3,-

000.00 in paid up building and loan certificates in the
Colonial Building and Loan Company of Ogden, Utah,
which .certificates were later .cashed, and in addition the
Thrift Company agreed to pay to the Finance ·Corporation $11,000.00 with interest at 7% to be paid in one year.
The Thrift Company put up $20,000.00 worth of securities and pledged them with the contract of purchase to
the Finance Corporation. Later on the $11,000.00 w.as
paid off by the Thrift ~Company to the Finance ·Corporation. The assignm·ent \vas made to Beckstead personally
and he had the advice of c-ounsel during the transaction.
He never claimed any interest in the contract and did not
personally receive .any benefit as a result of the transa.ction. (R. 1561-1571 and 1 67'1-1673)
1
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(D)

DISCUSSION-.

This entire matter was fully explained, and the evi.
dence conclusively established the fact that no loss or
. detriment was suffered by the Finane~ Corporation in
the transaction. In fact, it made a profit of $1,500.00.
We have never understood the action for an accounting to be for ''transactions.'' An accounting is awarded
where 1noney or property has been 1nisappropriated to
his own use ·by a fiduciary and for which he has refused
to aecount. The finding itself destroys any right which
plaintiff has to require an accounting from the def.end·
ants, or any of them. The finding is to the effect that
the evidence does not disclose whether a profit "ras gained
or a loss sustained by said venture or whether an accDunting was ever made to the Finance Corporation.
An aecounting is never ordered unless it be necessary
to disclose facts not other\\rise available. A finding that
the evidence does not show whether or not an accounting was ever made is in effect a finding that the plaintiffs
have not sustained the burden of proof "rhich rests upon
them to show that they were entitled to an ac-counting
order.
Appellants' testimony that the books of the Finance
Corporation .contained a con1plete record of this transaction was not disputed or questioned. If that is true
the books themselves will show whether or not a profit
or loss ·was sustained, and for this. reason as "rell as
others this accounting order is c.learly ·erroneous. Even
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though it should appe.ar fron1 the said books tha.t a. loss
was sustained there "\Vould ~be no occasion for an accounting, proof ·Of loss is no part of an action for an accounting. \V e submit that the findings do not sustain an order
of accounting on this gTound. It is not supported by any
evidence introduced in this cause and as heretofore
pointed <>ut there is not one "\vord in the pleadings about
·- this subject.

.

~

There never was even the slightest intimation raised
that Beckstead qerived any personal gain whatsoever as
a result of this purchase. There never was any proof
that he diverted or misappropriated any of the property
of the United Bond and Finance Corporation to his own
us~ by reason of these transactions.
There is no matter concerned with this transaction
which in any way involves an equitable accounting, there

,.

is neither allegation nor proof to the effect that there
is any balance· due to the -corporation or to these plaintiffs from the individual defendants resulting from the
purchase and sale of this insurance agency. Nothing is
sought by this order ·of accounting ex-cept information,.
and the lack of information has never been considered
grounds for an equitable accounting. No demand was
ever mad~ upon the United B·ond and Finance Corporation, .or any of its officers, either before the commencement of this action, in the -complaint, or during trial, for
information concerning this transaction th.a t was not
readily given either by oral testimony or from th-e hooks
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speet fo the accuracy or adequacy of the books and reeords of the corporation wherein theg.e trans.actions are
recorded.
The Court refused to find that any information had
ever been withheld from any of the plaintiffs or any other
stockholder of the United Bond and Finance ·c:orporation.
3.

PuRCHASE OF ~CoNTROLLTING 8TOCK IN AsHTONJENKINs CoMPANY.

The third i tern for which the Court orders the defendants to account is ''for the transactions involving
the purchase of the controlling stock of Edward E·. Jenkins in the Ashton-Jenkins Company.''
(A)

FINDINGS OF FACT .

. Tn this eonneetion it is found that Be·ekstead traded
and exchanged property owned by the Finance Corporation, including a ranch ne.ar Ogden, U tRh, to one, Edward
E. Jenkins, for stock owned by said Jenkins in a corporation known as Ashton-~J enkins Company, which said
stock represented the controlling stock in said corporation, and that thereupon Beckstead became an officer
tand manager of the said Ashton-Jenkins Company, and
it is found that the evidence does. not disclose. whether
a profit was gained or a loss sustained by said venture,
or whether an aooounting was made to the Finance
Corporation. It is further found that the purchase of
said stock in the Ashton-·Jenkins Comp'any wa.s made at
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~

a time when said latter compa.ny was In financial dif-

~~~· nculties.

(Findings Nos. 16 and 47)
(13)

PLEADINGS.

·,_
There are no allegations in the complaint which pre- sent any issue whatsoever on this matter. It is not mentioned or suggested by any pleading within the judgment
r~ roll.
(C)

PROOF.

The undisputed evidence is that the only property
-- which \Yas transferred to Jenkins was this ranch. (R.
r. 1666)
This transaction was gone into in detail by counsel
for the plaintiffs and we believe that the following is a.
fair statement .of the testimony given on this suhject.
The Finance Corporation traded a ran.ch in ~Ogden,
"' Utah, to Edward E·. Jenkins for the controlling sto-ck
interest owned by him in the Ashton-Jenkins Company.
(IR. 1653) Thereafter, Beckstead had an audit made of
,_ _ the said company and it was discovered that ·there was
·a deficit in the E·quitable Dif.e Assurance ·Society accounts ·and to pr,ivate investors and mortgage purchasers. This whole transa:ction was rescinded in the
- spring of 1933 and the United Bond and Finance ·Corpofi ration received back the ran.ch. ('R. 1563-15·67, 16-6-6)

The testimony discloses that this rescission was
tf worked out as follows: Mos~ Miller bought _a. home in
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Normandy Heights with a $7,500.00 mortgage on it. He
gave J. H. Backman the money to pay this and Backman
took the money to the Ashton--Jenkins ·Company and paid
the mortgage off.

The Pacifi,c N a.tional Life held this

mortgage and the Ashton-Jenkins Company_ kept paying
the interest and

othe~

requirements payable on the mort-

gage and never did release it.

Miller thpught that the

mortgage was paid off and the Pacific National Life Insurance c·ompany thought that the mortgage was still
in existence.

This matter came up at the time of the

above audit and was one .of the irregularities discovered
by Beckstead.

Miller through an attorney threatened

J.~nJrins

with taking this before the county attorney and
so Jenkins came to Beckstead and said he would rescind
the transaction relating to the a·cquisi tion of the AshtonJenkins stock with the unders'tanding that the United
Bond and Finance Corporation would place a mortgage
of $5,000.00· on the Ogden ranch and give Miller a third
mortgage on the Crestholme Apartn1ents for $2,500.00
and. in consideration Jenkins would credit the second
mortgage which he held on the Crestholme with $7,500.00. The Finan·ce Corporation was paying 81Jt% interes·t
on this second mortgage. The mortgage to the Pacific
National Life Insurance C·ompany on the Ogden ranch
and .the third mortgage to Miller carried 6% interest.
(R. 16,67)
. This is the only evidence on this subje·ct, and henre
the evidence discloses that a res-cission of the whole
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t~

transaction \\·as effected and that the company suffered
no loss or detriment because -of this exchange. (R. 1670)

~~

As to the finding that the evidence does not disclose
whether an accounting 'Yas made to the Finance ·Corporation

\Ye

submit that the above evidence shows that the

transaction

"~as

rescinded, and it does n-ot appear that

an accounting was necessary.

As far as the evidence

_ goes there is nothing to account for now, and as hereto- fore suggested even a showing of loss would not justify
~ or require an accounting.
The finding that the evidence did not disclose whether or not an account·...·
ing was made to the Finanoe C-orporation ·~s tantamount to finding that the pl~intiffs did not sustain
·-- the burden of proof which was upon them to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that an accounting
--- should be had. No mention was made of this stock transaction in the complaint. It was first brought into the
case by questions addressed to B-eckstead on cross exgi
•
am1nation
ot after plaintiffs had rested. There was no
~ showing or suggesti!on made that any evidence or testi~~ mony was ·being wi.thheld and every request for facts or
Jli.
information was complied with and the_ t~stimony was
that the hooks of the company contained a complete rec~·
ord of this transaction. The Court also found that the
a: purchase of this stock was made at a time when the
Ashton-Jenkins Comp~ny was in financial dl.ffi~ulty. W-e
cannot prophesy what couns-el for plaintiff w.ill contend
for this finding. The evidence dis_closed with certainty
that Beckstead entered into the transaction in good faith
r

1{
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and that it was upon a subsequent audit that the irregularities were discovered and immediately thereafter a
rescission of the tr'ansaction was effected.
The Court evidently had a private opinion with respect to this rna tter as is indica ted by the proceedings
s'et forth on pages 1657-165'8 'Of the record. Appellants'
counsel was examining Beckstead with respect to the
payment for the audit of the affairs of the Ashton-Jenkins 'Company made by Beesley and Wood. The Court
interrupted and on his ·Own moti·on ·examined Beckstead
as follows:
'''Q. You knew .at the time that·you made
that transaction that Ashton-Jenkins was very
shakey, just on the verge of receivership~
A. I can answer it this 'vay. That before
that time B'eesley and Wood made a certified audit
of the brokerage business of the Ashton-.J enkins
Company and 'l took this matter up with Mr. Joe
Grut of the C'ontinental National Bank and Mr.
·Cosgriff and they advised me to buy that brokerage business and make a loan to the United Bond
and Finance ·Corporation for $50,-000.00. That
they were going to pay for this brokerage business of Ashton-J·enkins Company.
The Court: I asked you ahout the AshtonJenkins Company and not the Ashton-Jenkins
Insurance Oompany.
A. W eH I was going to say this, that due
to that audit I believed that the Ashton-Jenkins
:C'ompany was in pretty good sha·pe. ''
At page 1659 of the record Beckstead testified in
effect that bef·ore he purchas·ed the controlling int~erest
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~ in the Ashton-Jenkins ,C·ompany he had a eonversation

with Mr. Grut and Mr. Cosgriff of the ·Continental National Bank, and that they thought it \vould 1be a good
- buy and adYised him to buy it. These transactions took
place in the fall iof 1932~eig·ht years prior to the commencement of this lR\Y suit.
(D)

DISCUSSION.

i",

Exactly the same finding was made in connection
.r.. with this matter as was made \vith r·elation to the insurance business, and we submit that the argument made
_ above with relation to the finding applies t.o this item of
- accounting. Here again the finding upon which this item
- of account is based wholly disregards the proof which
J~

- was to the effect the transaction was rescinded and tha.t
_ the corporation lost nothing.

This evidence has also

- been heretofore pointed out.
We submit to the

~Court

that the findings do not sup-

' port an order of accounting ·On this item.

The proof

-· completely and thoroughly goes into the transa·c:tion and
-

again not one word is said with respect to this rna tter in
the pleadings.
Again it should be n·oted that the defendants are not
ordered to aecount for any property or any money, but
are ordered to account

!~

f~or

''transactions.''

The only

·evidence with resp.eClt thereto wa·s elicited from W. R.
B·ecks tead ·On ·cross and re-direct examination.
1

No evi-
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dence with res.pect to this was introduced on the main
case of the plaintiffs, and when Mr. Be-ckstead was asked
about this matter he related the details fully, and from
his evidence it conclusively appears that he did not personally benefit fr,om this transa,ction in any way; that
the defendant United ·Bond and Finance C·orporation
suffered no detriment from said purchase. As we have
said on other items heretofore m·entioned, what more
accounting ean be rendered with respect to this transa-ction than was made during the trial of this

cas-e~

A

full statement was made concerning it, and it was further
testifi·ed that the books of the company refle-cted the entire transaction.
Plaintiffs did not show enough interest during the
trial of this case to ask that the books of the ·Company be
produced showing . this transaction.

Again there has

been no demand for an ·a.ccounting, and there is no evievidence that if there should be an accounting any balance could possibly be round owing to the United Bond
and Finance Corporation. No money was ever involved,
property was traded for stock, and later the deai rescinded and the identical property returned to the corporation.
Furthermore, how or in what manner could a receiver be of aid or benefit to the ·Corporation, its stockholders or these plaintiffs in this rna tter?
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4.

ll~VEST::\IEXTS IN ,,.,.YOMING RANCH PROPERTY AND
BECKSTEAD LivESTOCI{

t,l•

CoMPANY.

The fourth item for 'vhich the defendants are ordered
to account is '{for all transa.ctions and m·oney advanced
to Beckstead Livestoek Company.''

In setting forth the findings upon which this order
is based it will be necessary to set forth the findings on
- the "Thole subject of investments in Wyoming property
- and the Beckstead Livestock Company.
(A)

FINDINGS OF FACT.

In this connection it is found that in furtherence of
the scheme of gaining control and ownership of the as~

sets of the

13

stead traded assets of that corporation for ran.che-s and
property in \\T yoming and caused the deed and: hill of
sale to be made and delivered to him, and that said deed
was placed of record June 5, 19'35, and the property
stood of record in the name of Beckstead until April 19,
1938. On th·at date Beckstead caused to be organized
the Beckstead Livesto0k Company, and he, Evans and
Benjamin L. Rich, were made directors of said company,
the capital of $50,000.00, \\Tas represented by 50,000 shares
of stock at $1.00 par value per share. One share each was
issued to Evans and Rich and 49,998 to Be.ckstead, all
without consideration. All .of thes·e shares were then
returned to the Beckstead Livestoc~ Company and they
were then all issueq to the United Bond and Finance

-·~~

··
..
...

~
~;

~nited

Bond and Finance c.orporation Beck-
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Corporation. It was then found that the said Livestock
Company is dominated and controll·ed by Beckste:ad. On
April 19, 19·38, a deed from Becks·tead and his wife to the
Livestock Company was placed of record conveying all
of said Wyoming property to 'the said Livestock Company. It is fuund that Beckstead cla.i~med and asserted
that said Wyoming properties were his own and were
being handled and developed for his own personal use
and benefit. It is then found that large sums and amounts
of money of the United B,ond and Finance Corporation
have been invested in the Becks tead Livestock Company.
That other properties of the said corporation have been
ex1changed for property now in the name of the said
Livestock Company, and the amount invested being in
ex·cess of $70,000.00. To finance the opera.ti~on of the
Beckstead Livestock Company sums and amounts of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation have been loaned
to the Livestock Company, the principal of which is in excess of $28,000.00, and which is owing and unpaid to the
said United Bond and Finance C~orporation. The finding is made that Beckstead used the assets of the said
Rinance C'orporation as his own, and that he is personally interested in ranches. It is found that no proper
books were kept between these t\vo eompanies until after
the incorporation of the Livestock Company, and that
a1ccording to the 1939 audit the Finance Corporation held
a note for $28,000.00 of the L~ivesto·ok Co~mpany, and that
on the witness s'tand B·eckstead and Evans were uncertain as to whether this $28,000.00 represented the total
indebtedness. It is found that the funds ~of the two com·
1
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- panies have been coming·led, and the income of the Finance Corporation has been used to pay the expenses of
- the ranches, and that the ""ool and lamb crop of the
Livestock Company have been used to pay taxes and
other obligations of the Finance Corporation, and that
because of the jumbling of the a~.eounts it .cannot be as~ certained whether the Finance ~Corporation or the Livestock Company are being operated at a profit or a loss.
.. Findings are made that the stock certificates and stubs
covering the original issue of stock are missing from the
stock books of the Livestock Company. It was found that
at the time of the order to show cause all of the stock
stood in the na·me of the Finance Corporation, and that
there were no directors. who had qualifying shares, and
that between then and the trial three qualifying shares
~ were transferred to Beckste-ad and his associates without consideration, and that they were then surrendered
back to the United Bond and Finance Corporation. (:See
_ Findings Nos. 18, 23, 24 and 47)
(B)

PLEADINGS.

It is alleged that the Finance Corporation entered
into a contract with Marks for the purchase of Wyoming
property, and that said corporation turned over about
$50,000.00 for this purpose. That Beckstead to ok title
to tne Wyoming property so a;cquired and entered into
possession and appropriated it to his ow1'1.A use, a;nd has
~ failed to accownt therefor. It is further alleged that to
prote·ct himself in said fraudulent acts and to place the
1
1
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assets of the Finance 'Corporation beyond the reach of
the stockholders, Beckstead incorporated in Wyoming
the Beckstead Livestock Company, and took all of the
50,000 shares of stock, and now claims all of these shares
as his own ·exeept dire·c.tor qualifying shares. It is alleged that all ·Of the Wyoming property was transferred
.to the Beckst~ad Livestock c·ompany and the assets of
the Finance Corporation were used to purchase further
Wyo·ming ranches, title to which was taken in the name
of the Livestock ·Company or of Beckstead. It is als·o
·alleged that B·eckstea.d received the shares of stock in
the ,Livesto1ck Company ~in consideration of .the property
of the Finance Corporation, and that t~ey are now being
held subject to being negotiated beyond the reach of the
Finan-ce <;.;orporation.

B·eckstead testified that he took the title to the
Wyoming property in his own name f.or. t~e reason that
the Finance Corporation was not qualified to do business
in Wyoming, and he did not care to domesticate that corporation in Wyoming. On the witness stand he stated
that he took title as a trustee; that his attitude at all
tim·es was that all qf this property belonged to the Finance Corporation, and that he never had any intention
of appropriating any of it to his -own use or benefit. He
stated that he never did claim any of this property to
be his, and that he had always recognized it as being
property of th~ Finan-ce· Corporation. He stated that
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:~he may

haYe spoken of the raneh as "my ranch'' but it
l was not 'Yi th any intent to confiscate it. ( R. 1390-1391)
l

It is submitted that the overwhehning weight of the
evidence corroborates this testimony of Beckstead, and
· that the· finding made by the Court that Beckstead
~ claimed or asserted title to this property cannot be sus.: tained in equity and good conscien-ce upon any theory
or premise.
~

'Ve will atte1npt to point out wherein the evidence
~ eorr~oborative
~

of Mr. Beckstead is so conclusive that this
finding of .assert~ion of t-itle must be disregarded.
From Beckstead's testimony it app-ears that immedi-

- ately after the purchase of. the Wyoming property, be
and his wife made a deed and bill of sale t.o the Finance
Corporation conveying all of said Wyoming property to

~

~
li

the Finance :Corporation. This deed was kept in the
files of the company and upon incorporation of the Reekstead Livestock Comp,any a new deed was ma:de and
executed .by Be-ckstead· and his wife conveying title to
this property to th~ Beckstead Livestock Company, all
of whose .capita~! stock w.as and is owned by the F~inance
Corporation.

The audits corroborate this testimony of B-eckstead.
~ In the audit of 19"35, E~ibit L:-3, is found the following
at p·age 5:
''The Loan Tree Ranch property is registered
in the name of W. R. Be·ckstead on the tax notices
from the Treasurer of Uinta County, Wyoming.
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

There is on file, however, in the office -of the company ·an unrecorded warranty deed dated Mav
218, 1935, .eovering this property, from W. R.
Beckstead and Stella Beckstead, his wife, to the
United ·Bond and F'inance Corporation. Assignments to the company of the Federal Fa:flm Lnan
and Union Telephone Company stock and bills of
sale f.or the livestock and equipment from ~Ir.
Beckstead and his wife are a~lso on file.''
The next audit is the aud~t of 1938, Exhibit 14. On
page 3 is found the ~oll·owing:
',,'On April 18, 1938, a corporation known as
Be,ekstead Livestock Company was organized under the laws of the State of Wyoming. Certain
assets and liabilities carried on the books of the
United B·ond and F'inance ,c·orporation, and ha.v·ing a net hook value of $54,938.54, were exchanged
for the entire -capitol stock of the Wyoming corpora ti~on. This s.tock has been indorsed in full
to the United .Bond and Finance Corporation and
stock certific:a tes have been examined by us as
well as articles of incorporation, assignments and
other documents necessary to the consun1mation
of this deal.''
The 19·3'9 audit, Exhibit 15, at page 3 states as follows:
''The company held at date of balanc.e sheet
the ·entire issue of capital stock of the Beckstead
Livestock Company, a Wyoming ·corporation, as
evidenced by ce.rtifica te N·o. 6 issued under date
of March 29, 19·39-, in the name of the United Bonrl
and Finance ~Corporation.
''As payment for this stock certain ranch
properties, together with livestock and equipment
thereon, were transferred to .the Beckstead LiveSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stock Company by proper .conveyances at book
values, as sho,vn by United B·ond and Finance
Corporation records, of $54,129.77, as indica ted
in the S·chedule above.''
:~

Then follows a balance sheet of the Beckstead Live: stock Company.
.,.,

)!r. Wood on the "~itness stand confirmed the state~:

ments made in the two audits made by him in Exhibits
L-3 and 15. ( R. 1234)
Exhibit 27 furnishes further documentary proof cor-

- roborating Mr. Beckstead and destroying any evidence
which supports the findings here being discussed.

This

exhibit consists of the statements of financial .condition
- mailed to the stockholders each year from 1933-1938, in- elusive. The Wyoming property it will be recalled was
-[ purchased in 193'5. The statement for that year lists as
assets of the Finance· C-orporation, ranch property and
:: ranch livestock, equipment and supplies. The statements
for 1936 and 1937 also list this same property as assets
· of the corporation. It will be recalled that in 19·38 the
B·eckstead Livestock Company was incorporated. Therefore in the statement for 1938 sent to the stockholders
the Wyoming property does not appear as r.anc.h property and livestock but appears a.s an asset of the corporation in an invest1nent account called '''bonds and
stocks,'' this being the stock ·of the Beckstead Livestock
Company which was held at that time as an as'set of the
Finance Corporation.
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At R. 1689 Beckstead \Yas asked as to why the statement for 1'938 did not contain a reference to ranch property, and he stated· that after the org-anization of the
Beckstead Livestock C·ompany the Finance Corporation
owned the Livestock Company stock and not 'the ranch
and for that reas-on the Wyo1ning- property had been put
1n the ''stocks and bonds'' invest·m·ent account.
The statem·ents, Exhibit 27, for the years 19:35, 1936
and 19·37, \Yere sho'\vn to Mr. Beckstead and he identified
the reference therein to the ranch property a.s the \Vyoming property. purchaS'ed by the corporation. (R. 1693
et seq.)
Mr. Beckstead is further corroborated by the testimony of A. Ezra Gull, commencing at R. 702, '\vherein
Mr. Gull stated that he had a number of .eonversations
with Mr. Beckstead regarding the Wyoming prop-erty,
and that he asked him about the purchase of this prop·erty .from Mr. Marks in Wyoming. Mr. B-eckstead acknowledged the deal and Gull asked hin1 whether or not
this '\Vas a 'vise d·eal and Mr. Beckstead ·stated that he
thought ~that it ''Tas. Gull asked Beckstead if the property belonged to the Finance Corporation and B·e·ckstead
said that it did. This conversation according to Gull
took place in May or June of 19:35. About six weeks
after th.is Mr. Gull again talked with Mr. B eckst.ead
and told him that their best information w:as that the
property was ·not in the na1ne of the Finance Corporation, and ·Gull asked hi·m in whos·e name this property
was. Beckstead stated that it was in his own personal
1
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name and explained that the ~ina nee Corporation 'vas
not chartered to do business in the State of Wyoming;
that for it to hold title to pr·operty '"'ould ·be in violation
of the \Y·~·oming laws, and for that reason he had recorded the property in his own name and had then properly deeded it to the Finance C·orpora.tion, and those
deeds were in. the files of the .corporation and at the
pr9per time would be recorded. (R·. 705-706)
Mr. Beckstead testified that his father before him
had been in the livestock business and that he· himself
had worked with livestock a large part of his J,ife~ and
that he wa.s familiar with the L·oan Tree Country in
Uinta County from his father's operations there, or near
there. This showed :Thfr. Beckstead's qualification for
managing this business. (R. 1384-1385)
Starting at R. 1386 Beckstead told the reasons for
his purchase of this Wyoming property. He stated tha.t
some of the corporation's property was not paying very
W·ell and that it had some building and loan certificates
which were fully paid but could not be then liquid,ated
without a large discount, that the corporation had a
mortgage on property in the south end of Salt Lake
County that \Yas not paying and other property that
wasn't yielding :any in.come, and this property was exchanged for the Marks Ranch, including 2HO head of cattle and other personal property. Mr. Beckstead stated
that he thought a good trade or exchange had been made
by the Fina.11ee Corporation., At R. 139·2 Be-ckstead
testified that he ·Considered the Marks ranch worth a lot
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more than had been paid for it and said that he had had
several offers to sell it a~d the Finance ·Corporation eould
have made about $10,000.00 profit on its sale. It is
significant to note at this point that plaintiffs made no
effort whatsoever to. pr.ove that the ranch property in
Wyoming together with the

l~ivestock

operated in con-

nection therewith was worth less than the .eonsiderati<>n
paid. Mr. Beckstead stated that he thought it was a good
venture and pointed out that p-revious to the time this
was p~urchased in 19·35 the government had gone into
the mortgage loan business and the Finance Corporation
was forced to find som·e other business field to enter for
the reason that the Finance Corporation could not loan
its money on mortgages and that this ranch investment
appeared to be a good husiness venture. (R. 139·3)
The Court finds that on the witness stand B·eckstead
and Evans were uncertain a.s to 'vhether the $'28,000.00
indebtedness indicated by the 1939 ~audit was the total
indebtedness of the Livestock C'ompany to the Finance
~Corporation. We are unable to find any such statement
by either Beckstead or Evans in the transcript.
At R. 1631 Mr. Be·ekstead 's attention was called to
this $28,000.00 item and w1as asked whether or not that
wasn't the note that was owing to the Finance Corporation by the Livestock Company. Mr. Beckstead said
that he did not know whether that represented one note
or s;everal notes, and then stated that he didn't see how
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thing he hadn't seen, and Mr. Adair agreed with him and
said: ''I 'vill ask ~lr. Evans about this."

Mr. Beekstead then stated that :this $28,000.00 item
included advances and ex.penses that the Fina,nce C·orporation paid for and on behalf of the Livestock Cnmpany.

This item also includes money \advanced for

capital investment in very substantial amounts.
The very audit which counsel for plaintiffs showed
Mr. Beckstead indi!cated that accurate records were being
kept.

Counsel at no time asked that these records be

produced, but seemed to be satisfied with the response of
Mr. Beckstead.
It was found that because of the jumbling .of accounts it could not be ascertained whether th-e F'inance
Corporation or the Livestock Company are being operated at a profit or loss.

Counsel f.or the plaintiffs re-

quested a profit and loss statement of the Beckstead
Livestock Company for the year 1939. This was furnished
to him in very c.oncrete form and exact terms by Exhibit

38. This exhibit is explained commen,cing with R. 1713.
We again eall the Court's attention to audits and
other ·exhibits introduced in evidence from which it appears that ·Complete and eJract records were kept with
respect to items of profit and loss and all other items con~erning the Finance Corpor:ation and the Livestock Company.
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(D)

DISCUSSION.

In p-resenting this fourth item of accounting we have
discuss-ed fully the findings, the allegations and the proof,
~-ealizing that many of these matters are perhaps but
incidental to the a:e:counting order made by the Court for
the reason that a large part of the trial was devoted to
this particular phase of the case and !or the further reason that the whole of the transactions involved in the pureha·S·e amd operation of the Beckstead Livestock Company
involves transactions as between these two corporations.
The ultimate thing which the Court found with respect to these rna tters was that all of the Wyoming properties that were pur·cha!sed with Finance Corporation
assets now rest in the Beckstead Live·stock Compooy, and
all of the stock of that eompany is now owned by the
Fiinance c·orporation. Certainly this finding is contrary
to the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint.
Apparently the eriticism that the Court has registered o;n this Wyoming~situation is that funds and assets
of the Finance Corporation have b~en used by the Livestock Company, and that he ·could not determine just
exactly how much \vas due from the Livestock Company
to the Finance Corporation, and therefore he wants an
accounting as between the Finance ~Corporation and .ib
wholly owned subsidiary. This matter upon which the
Court bases the decree _for an accounting by the Livestock
Company is not made an issu·e by the complaint and then\
is absolutely no allegation upon said subje·ct.
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We .submit that the finding of the Court that Beckstead and Evans were uncertain as to whether the $28,000.00 indebtedness indicated by the 193'9 audit was the
total indebtedness of the Livestock ·C·ompany to the Finance Corporation is not supported by the evidence. In
·any event the fact, if it be a fact, that Beckstead and
E·vans while on the \Yitness . stand without the re·cords
before them were uncertain as to the exact amount of the
indebtedness !Certainly is of no materiality in this case
as long as the books a.nd records of these companies were
certain and accura t~ in this regard, and the evidence is
that they were.
·One of the most surpr1s1ng findings made by the·
Court was that no prop.er books were kept petween these
bwo eompanies until after the incorporation of the Livestock ·Company. Just how proper books could he kept
as between these companies before there were two companies we wil.l l~t counsel explain. The audits introduced
in evidence and the m·any exhibit)s indicate that the Finance ·Corporation before the incorporation of the Live...;
stock Company kept accurate records o.f the ran·ch operations. Undroubtedly there were .separate accounts as
to these ranch operations as indicated by the ·~xh'ibits
and audits. Any que·stion tha.t counsel desired to ask
in connection with the records was promptly answered
and records furnished and offered to him during the
course of this trial.
Mr: Evans was asked ·on cross examination whether
or not he had a .sheet showing what the Loan Tree Ranch
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operation had cost, what had been paid out on the- operation, and what had been received from it since it was
acquired 'by Beckstea~d, the Livestock Company or the
Finance Corp1oration. Mr. ~Evans replied that he had
not prepared a sheet along that line in regard to the
Livestock Company but he stated that the books showed
these items.· He was then asked if it would be much of
a job to get tha:t information and get it to counsel, and
he said he did not know. l-Ie had all the records with him.
(R. 1727)
The finding in this .case is that no proper
kept; that the accounts w·ere jumbled.

boo~s

were

Not that any

money w.as appropriated or misappropriated. What plaintiffs' counsel wanted

was~

some information.

AU they

asked for was .furnished, and neither they nor the Court
apparently understood the evidenee. No judgment could
possibly be rendered on this item of account reg·ardless
of the accounting or lack of accounting.
Again we ·suggest that appelloants should not be
penalized either because respondents or the Court or
counsel had failed to appreciate and understand the evidence produced or have been disinclined to take advantage ·of offers made in good faith to produce books, records and accounts which would ~supply the information
required by this order.
No demand wa.s made either p.rior t~o the commenc.ement of this action, in the complaint, or during the trial,
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ing the intercorporate transactions of the Finan·ce Corporation ·and the Livestock Company.
If it should appear upon an accounting that the Livestock 1Company is indebted to the corporati,on would the
Court enter judgment in favor of the United Bond and
Finance ·Corporation against the Beckstead Livestock
Company for ·any halan:ce found d·ue, and if S10 would the
receiver then lev·y execution upon the property o.f the
Beckstead Livestock Company and isell- it at sheriff's
sale in .satisfaction of any judgment rendered~
1

The mere statement of this question shows the absolute absurdity of this item 'Of accounting. Here again
there is no pleading, no proof, no finding that Beckstead
or any of the other individual defendants benefited by
these transactions, or that they have now or ever have
had any of this money •or prop.erty or ''transactions''
in their possession and have at any time diverted and
dissipated the sam~ to their own use.
The Court also makes a finding that the obtaining of
the Wyoming property ·by Be.ckstead was in furtherance
of the scheme of gaining control and ·ownership of the
assets of the Finance ·C·orporation.

The findings them-

selves destroy a.ny ·such inference or ·conclusion.

The

property was purchased with eo.rporate ,assets.

The

Court ·fiound that the property was taken in Beckstead'~
name and was later transferred to the Beckstead Livestock ·Company; that the Finance Corporation holds all
of the stock issued by that company.
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Just how this is in furtherance of a scheme to gain
personal ·contr,ol and ownership of as-sets we leave to
res·pondents' counsel for e~planation.
The Court made the finding· that Beckstead used
the assets of the Finance Corporation as his own,
and

that

he 1s personally interested 1n ranches.

How thi-s latter eould support an order appointing are-eeiver or for an accounting is not apparent.

How or

wherein Beckstead used the assets as his own is not dis.closed or explained by the findings, and there is no evidence that he did use these assets as his own. It must
he remembered that Mr. Beckstead was the general manager of the Finance ICQrporati·on and the Livestock Company. In his judgment the pur.chase of this Wyoming
.property was a good investment, as he stated on anumber of occasions during the time he was on the witne~ss stand and there is nothing in the evidence to show
either that his judgment was not good or that he acted
in had faith. There is no evidence that he appropriated
any of the corporate assets to his own use. The most
that ·can be claimed from the evidence is that Beckstead
managed the assets of the corporation, as any general
manager would do. We submit that a. finding that he
used these assets as his own cannot be sustained if by
that is n1eant misappropriation, wrongful diversion, em·
bezzlement or lar~ceny. The finding that Beckstead is
personally interested in ranches is undoubtedly based
on something that .counsel tried on a number of occasions
to get in the record, that is, that these ranches were a
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hobbv of Beckstead. Judge ~Schiller, eYidently influenced by counsel's repeated reference to the ranch venture as a hobby, states in his decisi,on that W. R. 'Beckstead was interested in ranching~ as a hobby.
tl

'V e refer the Court to ~- 1620, vvherein on cross
examination of ~Ir. Youngberg, plaintiffs' counsel
brought out the faet that ~I r. Beekstead spent better than
half his time at the ranch and that Beckstead \Yas interested in these cattle and this ranch. He then asked
Youngberg if it was not quite a hobby with Beckstead
and YDungberg's reply \Yas: "I dron't know it is a hobby;
it is business.''

If Beckstead \vere not interested in these ranches
and in the welfare of the livestock he "\Yould not be performing his duty as a director. -\Ve sincerely hope 'that
counsel, because of this interest indicated by Beckstead,
will not ~claim that he is '~yrongfuily interested in the welfare of this very important investment of the Finance
Oorpora tion.
The records and exhibits show that the company now
operates four ranches in Uinta ~County, Wyoming. That
in addition to the ranches the company has a. large
amount of leased gra~ing grounds, important Taylor
Grazing rights and sun1mer grazing permits ron the National F·orest·for 2,000 head of sheep. That the ranches
are stocked " 1th 2,000 high grade sheep and approximately 350 head of pure bred and high grade Hereford cattle,
and that the entire indebtedness on this large enterprise
is less than $14,000.00.
7
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W·e feel that the ~Court should take judicial knowledge of the fact that the livestock industry is now coming into a period of splendid prosperity; that wool, lambs
and beef are commanding what might be termed high
and exorbitant prices on the market, and that the foresight and wisdom of Beckstead in investing the as·sets
and money of the United Bond and Finance Corporation
in this business is now fully shovvn and his judgment
justified. There is no justification here for accounting or
reeei ver.ship.
5.

PuRCHASE OF THE ·OuTSTANDING SToCK OF THE
UNITED BoND AND FINANCE 1C0RPORATION.

In the fifth i tern of the aecoun ting order the defendants, ·and each of them, are ordered to account' within
thirty days for ''all money and property of said corporation used by the defendant, W. R. Beckstead and his
as'sociates in the a·cquisitiron of any outstanding stock of
said corporation.''
(A)

FINDINGs oF FA.cT.

From a reading of the findings of fact it vvould appear that the pur·chase of the outstanding stock of the
United Bond and Finance ·Corporation by the said oorpora tion is the main thing that the C:ourt found wrong
about the ·conduct of its affairs. It appears in the findings time and time again that the purchase of this outstanding stock was a part of a plan or scheme of Beckstead to acquire domination and control .of the ·corporation and its assets. It appears from the findings that
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from 1931 to the filing of the ·eompl·aint in this action
that Beckstead ha·s caused the United Bond and Finance
Corporation to enter into a plan and scheme to use its
assets in order to acquire its outstanding stock, and that
substant~ally all of its voting stock "\Vas thereby acquired.
It is further found that in this manner Beck·stead acquired all the assets of the corporation ''through the
use .of'' ·and for the benefit of the stock o'vned and controlled by him. That to .further this plan in which Beckstead was to increase his domination and ultimately take
over the corporate assets, B·eckstead with the a.s·sistance
of t'he other two directors, Evans and ~Spils bury, has
used the earning~s and assets of th~ United Bond and
Finance ·Corporation which has been ac0umulated for
the payment of dividends, the amount used being ·upwards of $85,000.00, in purchasing the said outstanding
stock of the said corporation. It is further found that
he has paid this amount to .stockholders and has acquired
therewith upwards ·Of $211,000.00 of outstanding stock.
The use of this money and property is described as dis·sipation, diversion, etc., and Beckstead's purpose is de.g.cribed as that ·of freezing out the stockholders. It is
also found in this ·connection that this stock has not been
cancelled ·On the books of the ,company and remains indorsed in blank under the ·control of the defendants.
(Findings Nos. 11, 14, 19', ·22, 3i2 and 36)
(B-)

PLEADINGS.

The oniy specific allegation in the entire complaint
wherein it i~s alleged that any corporate assets were used
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for the purpose of purchasing the outstanding stock
'Of the corporation is contained in the second paragraph
of paragraph ( 10), wherein it is alleged that the purpose of the defendants has been to divert and convert
the assets and income of ..said ·corporation to their own
use, and among other schemHs used to accomplish said
purp:ose V\ras the procuring of Finance Corporation stock
held by Montana stockholders in exchange for certain
alleged interests in the Tri-Base Oil ·Company, and that
to aceon1plish that purpose the defendant Beckstead
caused money of the Finance Corporation in a sum in
excess of :$100,000.00 to he turned ·over to the defendant
Pandolfo, and that the 's-cheme was for the .benefit of
Beckstead and to further his purpose of decreasing the
outstanding stock and to per.petua te himself in control
of the ,0orporation, ·and to permanently deprive the
Montana stockholders of their investment. .
It is alleged, however, in the first paragraph of paragraph (10) of the complaint that the defendant W. R.
Beckstead sinee prior to 1936 entered upon a plan and
program to advertise the business of the United Bond
and Finance Corporation among its stockholders so as
to discourage them and induce them to part. with their
stock for a nominal·or no consideration, or to ex·change
the same for stock in other corporations and enterprises
which he had caused to be ·set up, ''all so that the said
stock ·Or investment u.nits would -come under his control
and could be used so as to ena hle him to take over to
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himself the assets held by'' the United Bond ·and Finance Corporation.
That after 1nany of the stockholders had exchanged
their stock for stock in the Investor·s Thrift Company,
Beckstead fraudulently caused ·s·aid company to be dissolved as a corpoi. ation 'vith no assets and Beckstead
took and appropriated for his own personal use the Finance ·Corporation stock ·so exchanged by said stockholders; that he in a similar ,yay exchanged stock in the
American Keene Pl·aster and ·Cement ·Company, 'vhich
was without value, for units in the Finance Corporation,
and he likewise took and appropriated these units to his
own use.
(C)

PROOF.

The records of the Finance ·Corporation disclosed
that $85,158.84 had heen paid out by the c·orporation to
purchase $203,087.11 par value of its outstanding stock
which included preferred stock and all .classes of common
stock (~Exhi·bit 15, page 4). $78,09·5.34 was paid out for
this stock between 1933 and 193!6, inclusive. Exhi:bit 16
shows that $2,097.50 "ras paid for stock in 1937; $3,991.00
in 1'938; $97 5.00 in 193'9; totaling $7 ,063.50. The last
purchase ·of ·stock was in October, 1'939.
1

The first purchase by the Fin~ance Corporation o.f its
own stock came about as a result of the refinancing operations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Mr.
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ous to the ere a tion of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation the Finance Corporation had made loans secured by
mortgages. In ·some instan-ces the ·corporation would
also sell to the borrowers units of investment. In these
instances the amount of the mortgage would include the
sum loaned plus the purchase pri,ce of the units. The
units would a.lso be pledged to the Finance Corporation
as .collateral. When the Home Loan refinanced these
loan·s it demanded that the Fin a nee ·Corporation give
some consideration for the repurchase of the-se units as
a ·credit on ·the mortgage. In accordance with the demand
the Finance Cor.por,ation· took hack these units, crediting
the mortgage with a repurchase price thereon which was
satisfactory to the Home Loan, and the Finance Corporation w·ould then receive Home Owners' Loan Corporation bonds for the balance of said mortgage.
It was further explained that occasionally a. stockholder would eome to the corporation and offer to sell
his stock outright at a.ny p.riee.

T'he ·corporation had

money -coming in because of the.se refinancing operations
of the H. '0. L. C., and the .eo·rporartion used some of this
money to buy the offered stock. (R. 1274) About 90%
of all stock repurchased was purchased from stockbrokers
and a num,ber of these were named. ( R. 127'5 et seq.) This
latter situation developed as a. result of the depression.
Stock and bond salesmen lost their !business and so start·
ed to engage in stock and bond trading. As a result of
this tvading a number of them ·came into possession of
stock in the Finance ·C·orpora.tion. ('R. 1205 et ·seq.) This
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stock was offered to the Finanee Corporation and it was
··~

k

purchased by said eorpora tion.

Ray S. Wood, a certified public accountant, testified

·. that it was .a common practiee for corporations to pur- chase their

·O'\\'n

stock. He testified that he

h~ad

had oc-

: ca.sion to become acqua-inted '\Yith this practice and had
:. been familiar with it over a period of twenty years. He
:: stated that he had wa te.hed the balanc.e sheets of large
1

corporations like General ~Iotors, etc., and he had ob-

.: served that they often purchased their own stoek.

He

further testified that this practice was followed hy corporations in th~ ·State of Utah. (R. 1231 et seq.) Mr.
Beckste~ad also testified that he \vas familiar with this
practtce of corporations in the State of Utah.
The records disclose that very complete and accurate
acc.ounts were kept of all of this. stock that vvas repurchased by the Finance C'orporation. An examin,ation of
the audits will disclose this tD be true. In the audit of
1935, Exhibit L-3, at page 5, is found the following:
'·'As shown on the Balance Sheet a considerable portion of the Company's issued capital stock
is now held in the treasury. Prior to 1935 it was
the practice upon acquisition of any of the outst~anding stock to cancel the certificates brought
in and reduce thereby the number of shares issued. During 19:3·5, however, all shares of stock
which had been purchased by the ~Company were
re-issued in the name ·of the ·Company, s-et up on
the books as ah investment at the cost price, and
held for re-sale.''
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The audit of 1938, Exhibit 14, at page 4, states as
fo1lows:
Some of the·capitalstock of the corpol!ation
as disclosed by the Balance Sheet, has .from tim~
to time been re-acquired by purchase. Shares
purr based since 1935 have been held as treasury
stock and either reissued in the na1ne of the United B·ond and Finance·!Corporation or held without
being cancelled. The .shares so held are listed at
cost price, namel)T $84,15:8.84.
1

"

''The certifi·cates ·evidencing these shares of
stock have be~n examined by us. All shares rearqui red have been aceoup.ted for and none have
been sold.''
·
The audit of 1939, Exhibit 15, at page 4, cont,ains the
following. statement 'vith respect to this stock:
''As sho,vn on the Balance ,Sheet, a considerable portion of the 'Con1p,any 's issued capital stock
is nowr held in the treasury. Ptior to 1935 it was
the practice upon· acquisition of any. of the outstanding stock to ·Cancel the certificates bought in
and reduce thereby the number of shares outstanding. During 1935 and since, howeve~r, all
shares of stock which have been purchased by the
·Con1pany have been re-issued in the name of the
Company, set up on the books as an investment
at the ·Cost price, and held for re-sale."
Mr. \Y'. ood testified that the manner of setting this
stock up on the hooks of the company was in accordance
with good accounting practice. ('R. 1225)
Mr. Beckste,ad explained the reasons for carrying
this stock in this manner. He stated that the first stock
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~

purchased was carried in ·an investment account. Later
on the corporation started to retire the stock and the in- .come tax people assessed the corporation between $1,, 500.00 and ,$1,:800.00 on the difference bet,veen the par
_ value of the stock and its eost to the c.orporation on re- purchase. The Finance ·Corporation had to pay a little
over $700.00 to compromise the clain1. As a result of
- this and under the advice of accountants the corpor~ation
decided it had better carry this stock in an investment
- account. No attempt has been made to resell this stock.
_ (R. 1383, 1140)

At the time this stock was purchased the certificates
- were indorsed to the Finance Corporation and placed
in its files. It was not the custom to leave the certificates
indorsed in blank but at the time they were acquired the
name of the corporation was stamped on them. The shares
of the preferred stoek purchased were tra.nsfer,red on the
books of the company to the Finance Corporation on
January 9, 19·40, and a certificate issued in the name of
the Finance C·orporation. The delay in the transfer on
the books of the company was mainly to secure enough
shares so that there would not be numerous certificates
issued to the Finance Corporation. (R. 1274 et seq.)
Exhibits D-5 and E-5 contain a detailed list of the
stock, both common and preferred, which was transferred
on the stock hooks of the .corporation to said corporation
on January 9, 1940. These E·xhi1bits show the person from
whom the stock was pur.chased, the person who own~d the
stock as a matter .of record on the corporate books, the
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amount ·paid by the corporation for such stock and the
date the corporation acquired it.
(·D)

DISCUSSION.

The findings with reference to the alleged practice
of the 0orporation in the pur·chase of its outstanding
stock are not definite and 'certain but from a careful consideration of all of them we have construed the findings
to mean that the Court intended to find that the stook
was acquired with the use of .corpor,ate money and assets
for the corp?ration, and that Beckstead personally did
not appropriate either the stock nor any part thereof,
nor the money and assets used in its acquisition, such
:being in ac-cordance with the evidenc~ ~and proof. H·owever, -certain language found in the findings might lead
to a different conclusion.
In Finding No. 19 the Court found that Beckstead
while dominating the- affairs of the ·corporation and using it for his -own personal benefit has by various and
sundry means, directly and indirectly, diverted property
and assets of the Finance C'orp.ora tion and has used the
same in attempting to and in freezing out other stockholders and acquiring the outstanding stock of s~aid corporation. That he has used upwards of $85,000.00 of
the assets of the said defendant ,corporation. It is then
found that the stock has not been cancelled on the books
of the ·corporation and remains indorsed in blank under
the c.ontrol of the defendants. The Court does not find
that Beckstead appropriated this .stock to his own use.
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Neither does the Court find that the

~inance

C'Orpora-

tion obtained the stock. In this particular it is our contention that the finding is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible, but in any event cannot support the judgment
and decree of the ·Court. If the Court intended to :find
that· Beckstead \Yas guilty of wrongful diversion or
misappropriation of the corporation's assets, then we
say the finding is ·without the support of any p.roof whatsoev·er. If the ~Court intended to find th,at the purc.ha.se
of this stock wa.s made for the purpose of perpetuating
Beckstead in the domination and control of the corporation and freezing out the stockholders, then we say the
finding is of no ·effect whatsoever because it is at variance
with the allegations of pl,aintiffs' complaint and not
within any issue presented by the pleadings herein and is
likewise unsupported .by the evidence and P!Oof produced
at the trial. If the Court intended to find that the corporation obtained the stock, then we say to this Court
that it wa.s for the benefit and re:dounded to the benefit of
the remaining stoekholders of the Finance Corporation,
including the.se plaintiffs and cannot be of assistance to
them here.
A eonsideration of the findings generally would
seem to indicate that the most serious complaint which
the Court found against the corporation was the practice
of buying its own stock. The ~Court even found that this
practice had ·Continued up to the time of the filing of the
complaint. This, in spite of the evidence which clearly
indicated that the practice had ceased in 1936, with the
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exception of a few purchases since then, the la.st of which
oc~curred in ~October of 1939. The evidence indicates that
the practice had ce~ased prior to the filing of the complaint entirely. The Court also found that the purpose
of said stock purchase activities "ras to freeze out the
stockholders and thait in accomplishing this purpose
earnings and assets of the United Bond and Finance
Corporation vvhich had been accumulated for the payment of dividends was used.
There was no proof whatsoever to support this finding. It is much more rea.sonaible to believe that the real
purpose behind the ·stoCJk pur·chase plan was to gain profit for the corporatiOn itself. The only evidence on this
question is to. that effect. We refer to the testimony of
Wesley R. Beckstead. This conclusion is further supported by the undisputed fact that the stock repurchase
plan has resulted in very ·substantial profit and gain to
the c.orporation, and of course this conclusion finds further support in the fact that the praCJtice was general
among ·corporations in .this particular territory at that
time.
In considering this phase of the -case the Court must
bear in mind that the corporation at all times was solvent -and that the purchase of this stock did. not in any
wa.y endanger its solvency or curtail its reg'ular busines~
a~ctivities. ·
The practical aspect of this part of the ca.se n1ust
not b~ lost sight of. · According to the evidence approximately 907o of this stock was purchased from
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stockbrokers and stocktraders and \Yas not purchased
from the stockholders. These stockbrokers are not seeking any remedy at the hands of the C'ourt.

They were

satisfied eYidently with the bargain \Yhich they 1nade with
the corporation, and as Beckstead remarked to Mr.
Adair during the course of his cross examination if
this stock had been allowed and permitted to remain in
the hands of stockbrokers, no doubt expensive and serious litigation would have been commenced long prior to
the filing of the complaint herein.
That the corporation benefited from these transactions cannot be denied, and for that reason and the added
reason that there is no evidence of any plan or scheme
to freeze out stockholders, a finding to the effect that this
stock repurchased was part of a plan to freeze out stockholders is positively unfair and wholly unjust under the
evidence. We call the Court's attention to the fact
that the record is void of any testimony whatsoever that
any stockholder was ever ''squeezed out'' of this Corporation by this or any other plan.
We submit that the purchase of this stock by the
management under the ·Conditions sta.ted, and as to which
there is no dispute, was entirely justified, was advantageous to the. c.orporation and thes-e plaintiffs, and it cannot
in fairness be branded as mismanagement of corporate
affairs.
·The Court's finding that the stock repurchased by
the company rem.a'ined indorsed in blank and under the
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control -of defendants does violence to the undisputed
evidence in this case, and in making this finding the
·Court was either unmindful of the evidence or wholly
disregarded it.
Heretofore we have called the Court's attention to
all of the evidence in the record on this subject. This
stock did not remain indorsed in blank, hut was lawfully,
properly and adequately transferred at the time of its
purchase to the corporation, and long prior to the commencement of these proceedings, to-wit, January 9, 1940,
was reissued to the corporation, and the ·old .stock cancelled.
The defendants are ordered to account for all money
and property of the •COrpora.tinn used by the defendal)t
Beckstead and his associates in the acquisition of outstanding stock of said corporation in order that upon
said accounting the ~Court might render such judgment as
required thereby.
We say frankly that we have never been ~ble to
understand the purport of this order. All of the money
and property so used is fully accounted for in the audits,
in the books of the company and :by the testimony of the
witnesses. In fa~ct, the. Court finds in finding No. 19 the
exact number of shares of stnck which have been purchased and the money which has been used in the acquirement thereof. It ap.ears no1W from this or-dered accounting that the Court was not satisfied with its own finding
and is therefore placing the ·bur.den on appellants of
supplying the imagined deficiency.
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We sav to the Court as we did to the trial Court
"'
that every detail 'vith respect to these transactions are
recorded in the books of the ·COrporatiQn. They were
produced at trial. They "~ere unquestioned and as far
as appellants "-ere advised were accepted as .complete
by all parties and the ·Court in this litigation. Needless
to say, this accounting' in view of the finding and the proceedings of the trial e.ame as a complete surprise.
Supposing that upon an accounting it would appear
that $87,000.00 of the corporation's money had been ns·ed
in the acquirement of this stoek, what judgment would
be rendered and against whom 1
The Court at the conclusion of the evidence had all
the facts necessary before it to render a judgment on this
subjeet on the amount of money and property used for
the purpose of purchasing outstanding stock. If a judgment should be rendered against Beckstead and the other
individual defendants for, say, $85,000.00, what is the
Court going to do about the $203,000.00 par value ot
stock purchased with this money~ Turn it over to Beck~tead and his .so-.called assnciates ~ All tha:t in equity
and .good faith can be ordered is for the corporation to
be placed in status quo. Finally if a judgment in any
amount can be rendered on an accounting why did the
Court when it had all parties before it after it had made
.definite findings of fact not render a judgment against
somebody for $85,000.00 ~

We again submit to the Court that the findings do
not suport this ite-m of a.ccounting; that the evidence
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does not support it, and the pleadings as heretofore
pointed out were on an entirely different theory than for
the a.ccoun ting of· this money to the corporation.
The difficulties with this accounting order further
appear when it is reealled' that from the record it conelusively appears that all this money was used for the
purpose of acquiring stock f.or the corporation itself,
and that the ~corporation now owns all of this stock. That
none of it was ever wrongfully diverted or misappropriated by Beckste-ad, and that there is no elaim or eontention made that Beckstead personally ever misappropriated or vvrongfully diverted any of the money or property
used in the a.equirement of this stock. No judgment
therefore could be rendered against Beckstead personally.
It is difficult to conceive just what the nature of the
-corporation's cause of action would be. Certainly it
could not he based upon any injury or damage suffered,
because the evidence would conclusively show that these
transactions resulted in corporate benefits. If the purp·ose of the accounting or.der, as we understand it, is to
require additional information, then we say that the
accuracy of the audits and accounts of the corporation
offered in evidence have never been

quest~oned

or

doubted.
The -complaint is void of any allegation to the effect
that plaintiffs have ever n1ade any demand upon the
·Corporation for information -concerning these transactions or for· an accounting. The complaint ·OOntains no
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t

fused. There is no allegation in the complaint and no
proof was offered 'vhic.h \vould indicate in any 'vay that
any of the personal defendants eYer gain.ed any individual
profit by these transactions or eYer procured, in their
own behalf, any of the outstanding stock of the corporation, and the Court o.f course refused to find that any
of the personal defendants 1nade any ·gain 'vha t.soever
a~ a result of the corporation's dealings in its own stock.
The defendants have by their 'vitnesses and testimony placed before the Court all the information demanded by this order, and that evidence and testimony
stands unquestioned, uncontradicted and unimpeached.
\Ve respectfully submit that a receivership could not
be in aid of, ancillary or he1p.ful to this order of accounting-.
At various times during the progress of the trial
counsel for defendants demanded and insisted that counsel for plaintiffs state to the Court their position with
regard to these transactions.
The plaintiffs have never declared their position
upon these transaetions, and \Ye believe they never will,
but we feel in fairness to the ·Court and in fairness to
appellants, they should state either that they approve or
disapprove of these transactions. They should tell the
Court 'vhether they intend to accept the bene.fits of the
transactions or reje.ct the·m. Regardless of their position
they are not entitled to an acounting or receivership. If
the plaintiffs intend to accept the benefits of these transactioJlH, and \Ve believe· they d·o, then they have no gTound
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to complain nor grounds for an accounting or receivership.
Receiverships are granted to preserve property and
to prevent waste, fraud and injury, but never on the
ground that the acts of the directors have resulted in a
benefit. to the corporation. Now, of course, the plaintiffs
cannot reject these benefits, and we believe they have no
intention of so doing. It seems apparent that no Court
would allow a receiver or permit the corporate officers
to institute suits against the stockbrokers fron1 whom
90% of this stock was purchased to bring a1hout a rescission of the sales, and we confidently assert that no such
action would lie. Certainly the stockholder who sold
his stock to the stockbroker ha.s no cause of action
against the ·corporation, and under no circumstances
could such original -stockholder~ "Tho had a perfect right
to sell his stock, mortgage it, give it a\\Tay, or dispose of
it in any manner to his liking, obtain a rescission as
against the corporation \vhen his dealings were with a
stockbroker or trad_er and not \Yith the corporation. We
confidently assert that the plaintiffs have no intention
and have never had any intention of rejecting the benefits of the.se transactions. They -cannot rescind the contracts through which the corporation acquired this stock.
The following interesting language is taken from
the opinion in Johnson v·. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis
(Mo.), 127 S. W. 63:
''As under the scheme of the bill the right
to an aceounting depends upon the right to a
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rescission, and goes as a remedy to rehabilitate
and build up the corporation pulled down, it
would seem that with the denial of rescission the
right of a stockholder to an accounting for the
stocks and bonds of Transit Company alleged to
be wrongfully converted falls. Clearly plaintiff
may not repudiate the sale and yet take under
the sale. He ma.y not run with the hares and hold
with the hounds. He n1ay not sue in the name of
Transit Company and get relief to which Transit
~Company in equity was not entitled.''
We respectfully 11rge that this item of accounting,
in view of the pleadings, the evidence, the findings, and
the law, cannot be supp-orted, and that a. judgment and
decree :based hereon should not be sustained.
6.

STocK

IssuED BY

FINANCE CoRPORATION.

Item No. 6 of the aceounting order decrees that the
defendants account ''for any and all stock claimed to
have been issued by said corporation to the said defendants or any of them.''
(~A)

FINDINGS OF FACT.

The United Bond and Finance c·orporation wa.s incorporated .Se·ptember 20, 1927, and W. R. Beckstead
and ],loyd Bradshaw were among· the incorporators. The
two named individuals each subscribed for forty share's
of prefe-rred stock of said corporations, and it is found
that the only consideration given was a promis.sory note
iby each for $4t000.00, w'hich notes so it is found w·ere
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never paid and were later cancelled and destroyed. (Finding No. 2)
Soon after the organi~a tion ·of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation Beckstead and Bradshaw caused
two hundred shares of voting stock to he issued to each
of them, and it is found this w~as done without considerar
tion. Bradshaw there-after transferred his two hundred
shares to Beckstead, and Beckstead since said time has
as-serted ownership of the four hundred shares, and he
or his wife under his directions, has at all times held
and exer·cised the voting control of the United Bond and
Finanee Corporation. (Finding No.6)
At all tin1es Beckstead has had in his name, or in
the name of his wife, considerably more than one~half
of the voting stock, and has at all times controlled and
dominated the managem·ent and board of direc~ors.
(Finding No. 14)
In 1933 Beckstead .caused to be transferred from
himself to his wife 511 .shares of common voting stock,
and the certificate therefor was issued and is in the possession and ·Custody qf Beckstead in his safety deposit
box. (Finding No. 29)
The total :outstanding stock of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation is 572 shares, and other than the
3 shares iss~ed to directors and the 511. shares in the
name of Beckstead's wife, there are 58 shares outstanding, and B-eekstead, his friends and relatives have complete ·control and selection of the offieer.s of the eompa.ny.
(Finding No. 30)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

81
(B)

PLEADINGS.

There is no allegation in the com·plaint \vhatsoever
that presents any issue on the question of the stockholdings of the defendants, or any of them. The only allegation in the complaint which in any way refers to stockholdings or stock ownership is found in paragraph (5),
wherein it is alleged that Beckstead ever since the organization of the corporation has been, and now is, assuming to O\vn and control a -substantial amount o.f the outstanding stock of the said corporation. Nothing· is
mentioned in the prayer of the complaint \Vhich could
in any way refer to the stockholdings.
(C)

PROOF.

The decree does not specifically point out _what stock
is meant by the Court to be included in this accounting.
While it appears from the evidence that Beckstead and
his wife own 512 shares of the .Common Class A Voting
Htock of the Finance Corporation, the evidence like,vise
conelusively shows that there has heen transferred by
the corporation to Beckstead the followi:t;1g stock only:
:39 shares of Common Class A Voting 'Stock and 40 shares
preferred stock at the ti·me of incorporation, and 200
shares of Common Class A Voting Stock \vhich was
transferred some months after the organization of the
corporation. (R.. 1875, 19'56)
Beckstead testified that his promissory note in the
an1ount of $4,000.00, made payable to the corporation,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

82

was given in payment for the stock that was issued to IIIII
him at the time of the incorporation of the Finance Cor. IIIII
poration, and that thereafter the stock was placed on the ·IIIII
market and sold to various subscribers to whom it was
transferred upon sale. That this stock was all paid for
and that the payments were made directly to the corpo.
ration, and as the payments were made the note was
credited with the amount and finally paid and discharged:
That all of this stock \vas sold and that none of it now
stands in the name ·of Beckstead or his wife, and that
the same was true with respect to the .stock issue to
F'loyd S. Bradshaw mentioned in the Court's finding.
('R. 19!5,6)

Beginning at R.

19~31

the witness, Boyd Evans, com·

mences rather extensive testimony in connection with
the matter of handling this stock._ He testified that both
B'eekstead and Bradshaw re-ceived 40

.share~s

of pre·

ferred stock each, and that he did not find any minutes
which authorized this transfer of stock to them and no
records of either of them having paid anything for the
said 40 shares of stock.
At R. 1938, Evans testified that he knew the corporation got all the money that was paid in on preferred
stocks and knew that all ·common stocks were commission
stocks. In connection with the preferred stock which
was held by John L. Wilson and Mayme Wilson i't appeared that it was tra~sferred to them from some of
these original issues to Beckstead and Bradshaw, and
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; Evans testi·fied that the corporation received the money
~ for this preferred stock. (R. 1939)
Evans at R. 19±0, testified that he kne\v that the pre' ferred stock money "rent into the company and not into
-~ the pockets of Bradsha\Y or Beckstead, and \Vhen asked
~ bow he knew that, he stated that he had the records to
- verify it.

"

Evans at :&. 1942 was asked whether or not Brad- shaw· and Beckstead gave a note for this preferred stock.
: He said that the records indicated to him that may.be
: they did give a note, and that as this 40 shares of preferred Btock was s.old .and the money came in, it was
: credited on the note and the principal of the note wiped
out. He then testified that the note 'vould be returned
_ to them; that the -corporation did not have it. He \vas
then challenged that he did not have rec.ords to show
· whether Beckstead and Bradsha'v received the money
on these transactions relating to the sale of the 40 shares
of preferred stock, and Evans replied that he could show
every dollar on the preferred stock. Mr. Evans brought
two sample cards to ·C'ourt (R. 1943), one of which was
on the sale of this stock originally issued to Beckstead
to one, Edwin C. Speck, and the entire transaction and
records were gone into by the witness. This covers several pages of the record, and in brief is to the effect that
five shares of this preferred stock was s-old to Edwin C.
Spe-ck, together \vith five shares of -common stock, making five units, each unit selling at $125.00. The records
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indicate that the company received $500.00 for the preferred stock; that $125.00 \Vent for comn1issions.
The .39 shares of eom1non stock rece.ived by Beckstead and Bradshaw " ere handled in the same manner
as was the preferred stock except as \vas usual the money
received for. this stock was used to cover costs of sale,
including commissions to agents.
7

The evidence is uncontradicted that the common
stock issued to Beckstead was transferred to him for
services rendered. The evidence is to the effect that the
defendant Beckstead and his associate, Floyd Bradshaw,
performed pron1otional services for the corporation in the
way of preparing the articles of incorporation, advanced
money and fees, made advances to individual salesmen
when they went out to sell securities for the corporation, drew up applications for the sale of stock and
securities and prepared certain things whi'Ch went along
with the general line of business to be conducted by the
corporation, and after the money cam·e in from the sale
of stock Beckstead rendered services by managing the
assets and property of the corporation, and Beckstead
testifie.d that he was spending all the money he was
making trying to' build the co1npany and the organization and that he didn't draw a salary for such services
but took the co1n1non voting stock for said ·services and
moneys advanced. This evidence is uncontradic~ed in
the record and appears time and time again. It appears
in perhaps more detail at pages 1872 and 1873 of the
record. Other statements with relation to this matter
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may be found in the record at pages 1466, 1461, 1420
and 1558.
In considering the testimony on this phase of the
case the Court must not lose sight of the fact that the
common stock was a service stock.
At R. 1957, Beckstead testified that the purpose
of the corporation \Vas to raise capital through the sale
of preferred stock, and that to prevent a ·capital deficit
a common stock of no par value was issued and sold
to cover the sales and operation expenses. He explained
that if they had sold preferred stock alone and had paid
a 20% commission the corporation would have received
only $80.00 and would have had a liability of $100.00
on each share of stock and that was the reason that
they issued this no par value common stock, and used
the money derived through its sale for costs of operation.
Throughout the transcript it appears ·conclusively
that the Class A common voting stock was what might
·be termed a service stock and the corporation at no time
received any money for this class of· stock and no part
of the corporation's capital was raised or procur~·d
from the sale of it. An examin~tion of the audits introduced in this case discloses. the fact that on the books
of th~ company no .capital lialbility has been set ·up for
this ·Class A common voti~g stock.
At R. 1954 Beckstead testified that immediately
after the incorporation of the Finance C1orporation the
matter of the issuance of the common· voting stoc~ was
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discussed at meeting of the Board of Directors and it wa.s
decided that there. would ~be no salaries and that the
directors would receive common stock for services and
that the issuance of this stock was approved at those
meetings.
Beckstead testified that the first salary he received
from the company was in 19.31, his salary being fixed at
$200.00 per month. (R. 1'8169, 142'4) That prior to that time
he managed all the properties and mortgages which were
procured by the company and that he received no salary
for that· work. He stated that he put money into the
corporation and used his own car and re-ceived no compensation for use of hi's car, and that he did not receive
any money to recompense him for the money he had
spent.
(D)

DISCUSSION.

The stockholdings of the defendants assumed a
position of importance in this ·case for the first time
when an accounting therefor was ordered in the decree.
This ·came as a comp'lete sur~pr~se to counsel fior appellants as they had not anticipated· or believed that this
was an issue in the case. The evidence with respect to
this matter was received without question and apparently to the satisfaction of Court and counsel.
The Court's finding that the stock 1originally issued
to Beckstead and Bradshaw was never paid for is hard
to understand. There is no evidence whatsoever in the
record to support such a finding. All of the evidence
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on the subject is ·contrary to the finding, and from

this evidence it clearly appears just bow this transaction
was handled.

There can be no question that the stock

transferred to Beckstead and Bradshaw· was sold and
was paid for and that the payments were received by
the corporation, and that the payments were sufficient
to and did disc barge these notes. There was never
any disposition op. the part of the defendants at the
trial 10f this case to 'vithhold any information on this
subject from Court or Counsel. The records of the corporation 'vere present in Court; fu'll and complete statements with respect to these stoekholdings were given
both by ioral testimonr and in the form of exhibits.
Appellants can conceive of no other manner or method
of accounting for this stock ·except as made during the
progress of the trial. We .are at a loss to kllJow just
what information the Court desires that is not contained
in the records of this cause. Appellants have shown
what was done with the stock. They have admitted the
possessiion of the 200 shares that were issued in January
of 1928, and have stated in full what the consideration
paid therefor was. The plaintiffs have never sought
and do not now seek a rescission of this transfer, and
the Court decrees none. Even though the stock was
issued to Beckstead without consideration we do not
understand that the remedy of accounting would cover
the right or rights of the. plaintiffs. Rather there should
have been a request for rescission and the return of the
stoek to the corporation fior ·cancellation. The proof on
this matter bas heretofore been set out.
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In view of the undisputed evidence in this record
there is no doubt whatsoever concerning this stoek inter.
est. Each share 'Of stock which now stands in the name
of either Beckstead or his wife was traced during the
progress of the trial. The Court inquired of Beckstead
concerning consideration paid. All those matters are
before the Court. If the Court upon an accounting
could make any judgiP.ent whatsoever with respect to
this stock interest the trial Court can now do so. There
is· nothing to be gained by further hearing or by an
accounting. B·eckstead can do no more than he has
already done. The most that he could do is to appear
and declare to the Court the stock interest of himself
and "rife; state where and when he purchased the stock
and under what circumstances and for what consider.
ation as he did at the t:rial herein.
There is no need nor necessity, i:ri fact, there is no
purpose for the intervention of a receiver.
We submit to the Court that this item of accounting
is not sustained 'by the pleadings, the findings, nor the
proof, and that such order is not supported or justified
under the ·circumstances shown. There is no place here
fior either an accounting nor receiver. If by any stretch
of the imagination a j11dgment could be rendered at any
time on this matter of accounting, certainly such judgment ·could have been rendered by the trial Court which
had before it all necessary parties.

It had before it

such pleadings as ar~ now before this Court and all
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the proof that is capable :of be'ing produced on this
subject.
~

\Ve have not set forth our com1nent on the matter

t of laches, but will reserve that for future dis·cussion.
~

The accounting order of the Court, resting as it
does upon six pillars, no one of which can bear its own

,- weight 'vhen considered in connection with the pleadings, the findings and the proof must likewise fall.
The authorities which we have heretofore and shall
hereinafter cite we believe ·conclusively establish the
proposition that upon a failure of the primary phase of
_ the cause of action the ancillary and re-ceivership phase
must likewise fail. We, therefore, earnestly contend
that the receivership decreed herein must fail with the
failure of the primary cause for accounting.
Before leaving this subject we desire t<? demonstrate
to the Court that no other .accounting order .can be made
upon the allegations of the complaint and the proof
produced in the trial of this ·cause, and for that purpose
- we desire to .c.all the Court's attention to the complaint
and the proof.
Paragraph (1) alleges the corporate existence of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation, and the conclusion that it i~ being dominated by Beckstead.
Paragraph (2) alleges the corporate existence of
the Beckstead Livestock Company, and conclusion. that
it was organized to p·ersonally benefit Beckstead.
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Paragrap·h (3) alleges the ·corporate existence of
the Investors Thrift Clompany, and the conclusion that it
was organized for the personal benefit of Beckstead.
Paragraph ( 4) alleges the compliance of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation 'vith the laws of Montana
for the purpose 1o.f engaging in business therein.
Paragraph ( 5) alleges certain -conclusions with respect to the purpose of the organizers of the Beckstead
Livestock Company, and representations made to stockholders with , reference thereto, and that investors in
Montana paid ·certain sums of money for stock, and
that certain loans were made by the ·Corporation to residents of Montana.

The establishment of branch offices

in M1ontana is .alleged.

The nature and value of prop-

erty procured by the corporation since its organization
is alleged. It is alleged that certain p-roperty stands in
the name of de.fendant Beckstead and his wife, which
property is the property of the United Bond and Finance
Corporation, and that Beckstead is n'OW engaged in systematic diversion of the assets of the corporation, and
that Be·ckstead -controls and dominates the corporation,
and assumes to own and control a substantial amount of
the outstanding stock of the ·corporation. These allegations with respect to the diversion of assets by Beckstead were denied and proved to be false and no finding
was made by the Court to that effect.
Paragraph ( 6) alleges a purp,orted connection between Pandolfo and Beckstead.
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Paragraphs ( 7) and ( 8) pertain to stockholders and
amount of stock issued.
Paragraph (9) alleges that the corporation agreed
that it \vonld not diYert property from !1,outana.
The first nine paragraphs of the complaint contain
no allegation 'vhatsoever upon "~hich an accounting could
or should be based. The 1only allegations with respect
to diversion of assets or property holdings are so general as to be wholly insufficient. They have been denied
and disproved and no finding \Yas made by the Court
to the effect that these allegati ons had been proved.
1

ParagTaph (10) alleges in the first section thereof,
a plan to dis·courage ~lontana investors in order to bring
about an exchange of stock for valueless corporate stock
and other securities, and that Beckstead took and acquired and appropriated for his personal use, stock in
the United Bond and Finance Corporation so procured
from Montana Investors. The charges with respect to
wrongful diversion w·ere denied and proved utterly false
and no finding was made by the ·Court on these allegations.
In the second section .of paragraph (10) the Tri~
Base Oil deal is set forth, and charges that through these
transactions Beckstead procured stock of Montana investors on his own behalf. These charges were denied
and were proved false and untrue. In fact, there was
no evidence produced by plaintiff which in any way
supported these charges. N.o findings were made sustaining this allegation.
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The third secti'on of paragraph ( 10) makes certain
allegations with respect to the Marks and the Carter
property in Wyoming, and alleges that Beckstead procured these properties with funds of the corporation,
and now owns and controls the stock 0.f the Beckstead
Livestock Company, to which these properties have been
transferred. These charges were likewise denied; no
attempt was made by plaintiffs to prove them, but
defendants' testimony established that they W·ere false
and untrue, and that Beckstead personally has never
held, and does not now hold, any of the property of the
Beckstead Livesto-ck C·ompany, or any of its stock, but
that .all of such stock and property is owned by the
United Bond and Finance Corporation and the pleadings
are in accordance with this evidence.
1

The f,ourth section of paragraph (10) alleges that
B·eekstead owns 50,000 shares of stock in the Beckstead
Livestock Company. These charges were denied. The
plaintiffs made no attempt to prove them, but defendants proved them to he fals·e and untrue.
By no stretch of the imagination ·could the allegations in the. fifth and sixth secti10ns of paragraph (10)
be considered as pertinent to or material in an action
for an accounting.
In the seventh section of paragraph (10) it is
al~·eged that Beckstead has diverted income from the
properties of the corporation to his own use and benefit,
.and that he has failed to pay expenses and taxes on the
properties. These allegations are of a general nature,
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there being no allegation as to 'vhen the diversion was
n1ade or fro1n "~hat s·ourees it "~as made, nor the amounts,
nor any other faets or circumstances, the allegation
being simply that Beckstead has failed to account to
the corporation for such income. -\~rhat the income was
is not disclosed. _These alleg·ations are likewise denied.
~o attempt was made by plaintiffs to prove them, but
their falsity 'Yas clearly established by defendants' evidence and no finding was made by the Court on these
charges.
In the eighth section of paragraph (10) it is charged
that Beckstead has

~aused

numerous sales and transfers

of real estate and personal property of the said corporation to be made, and the proceeds to be received by
others than the defendant. These charges are general
in nature. The properties alleged to _have been sold
are not described. The time of sale is ·not indicated.
The amount received and alleged to have been diverted
is not stated. These charges were denied. The plaintiffs ·who had the burden of proving them, introduced
no evidence wha.ts·oever in support thereof, but defendants' testimony proved their falsity· and no finding was
made by the Court on these charges.
The ninth section of paragraph (10) charges the
destruction 'Of co1npany books, and is not material or
pertinent to an action for ac-counting.
The tenth section of paragraph (10) merely complains of the denial of opportunity to examine the co~~
pany's books. · There was no evidence introduced to
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support this allegation and the Court refused to find
that there had been such denial.
The eleventh section of paragraph (10) deals with
the salary of Evans and Beckstead. The amounts of
these salaries are all refle-cted on the books of the company, and the accuracy of the books is not denied. The
evidence shows that good and valuable consideration
was given for these salaries, and under no theory ·of
the law could these salary accounts be the subject of
an accounting. The findings do not question that these
salaries were properly paid.
The twelfth section of paragraph ( 10) is a general
rehash of the previ1ous sections ; ·charges diversion generally, without stating any facts or particulars whatsoever, and has no meaning except as connected with
the other sections. · All these general allegations were
denied. No a tten1pt was n1ade to prove them, and the
testimony of the defendants sho"\\ring their falsity stands
uncontradicted and unquestioned.
Paragraph ( 11) refers only to insolvency and necessity f9r receiver. It is not pertinent in any way to
an action of accounting.
Paragraph ( 12) charges merely a failure to comply
with the Montana law with respe-ct to the filing of reports
and is not in any way pertinent or rna terial to an action
of accounting.
Paragraph .( 13) refers to purposes and pending litigations, charges Beckstead with having fraudulently
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taken large sums as salary and expenses, and realleges
that Beckstead and his "~ife are now holding large and
substantial assets of the corporation, and that the company is employing divers and sundry attorneys.
It thus appears that if there are allegations Ill
the complaint which would support an independent ·action by the corporation or any interested stockholder
against Beckstead or any other defendant for an accounting, a proposition which we are not willing to
admit, then we say that such allegations as there are
stand in the record either undefended or unproved or
positively disproved, and that such independent action
as is alleged stands before this Court with,out any .positive support "Thatsoever.
\Ve challenge the Court's attention to the proposition that not one single allegation in the complaint which
by any stretch of the imagination could support an
independent action for accounting, "\Vas found to be established as matter of fact by the Court.
There are no specific allegations whatsoever in the
complaint charging Beckstead, or any other individual
defendant, with the wrongful ~or fraudulent diversion
and misappropriation of any particular p·roperty whatsoever belonging to the Finance Corporation or the
Beckstead Livestock Company. The general allegations
eharging misappropriation and wrongful diversion have
all been denied and have been entirely disproved.

' re inquire of the Court and of counsel for respondent, what allegation is there in the ·Complaint, when
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

96
considered in 'the light of the evidence, upon which a
finding of. fact could be based, justifying or supp,(}rting
any decree of accounting whatsoever~ This is an action
for Receivership only. The pleadings and the findings
bear out this proposition. The accounting is nothing
but an afterthought. It is s-ought merely because the
law will not tollerate an action for the primary purpose
of obtaining re·ceivership.
The plaintiffs have wholly failed to establish a cause
for any relief whatsover to which receivership can be
ancillary. They seek receivership only.
The opini on in the case of· B o·wman v. Gum, Inc.,
et al., (Pa.) 184 Atl. Page 258, contains a precise statement of the law as we understand it:
1

''The pleadings determine the relief that may
be afforded: 'Neither allegations without proof
nor proof without allegations, nor allegations and
proof which do not substantially correspond, will
entitle complainant to relief, unless the defect be
re1nedied by amendment.' ''
Under the authorities there are two well established
principles which in any event will defeat the plaintiffs'
right to an accounting.
essary to

.~oth

In the first plac.e, it is nec-

allege and prove that a demand has

been ·made for an accounting· before a. Court of equity
will d·ecree that a party make such accounting. The
other principle is that there must be allegation and proof
that something will be found due from the defendant in
the accounting suit. This is based upon the fundament~}
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proposition that a. Court of equity will not do a vain
thing such as ordering an aecounting when there is
nothing alleged or proved sufficient to indicate that
, something will be found to be due if an a-ccounting is had.
tin relation to the necessity of a. demand as a condition precedent to ·the maintaining of an action for an
accounting, it is stated in 1 C. J. ~s. ,660, as follows:
~'·The

right to an accounting in e·quity has
been held to be dependent on a previous demand
and refusal; but it has also been held that such
demand and refusal are not necessary 'vhere tbe
accounting is eomplicated, or where an a'Ccounting
is merely ancillary to the main purposes of an
action.''
The case at bar obviously did not come within either
of the exceptions to this rule.

. French v. C. F. and T. Compa.ny, sup·ra, held that a
demand for an ac-counting was a necessary condition
precedent to an action for an a-ccounting. In that case
the Court held that there \vere no grounds for an accounting because of the failure to make the necessary
demand, and because of the failure of the plaintiff in
this respect the .appointment of the receiver was held
to be ~n ·exces-s of the power of the Court.
To apply this principle to the case at bar it would
certainly seem to be a necessary prerequisite that the
plaintiffs give to the defendant corporation and its dil'eetors the opportunity to explain or account for any
and all matters which the plaintiffs " 7ere entitled 'to
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know about, and then, upon a refusal of the defendants
to give this account, or upon their failure to render a
correct account, the defendants would be advised of the
claims of the· plaintiffs and would not then be subjected
to a ''fishing hill,'' as this case developed.
The other principle which is well established by the
cases is that there must be something in the hands of
the defendants belonging to the eorporation or something
owing by the defendants to the corporation, and the burden of showing this rests upon plaintiffs, who are seeking the accounting.
In a·ctions for a~ccounting a. common pr-ocedure is,
:firs·t, to detern1ine whethe-r or not the defendants are
liable to account, and upon the determination of that
proposition in favor of the plaintiffs, then the Court will
go into the various items of the account.
In the case at bar under the decree the Court has
ordered

tha~t

the defendants ac:eount.

However, it is

submitted that there is neither pleading nor proof to
show that there is anything for which the defendants
should or can account.
With respect to this n1at ter it is stated in Tra·vers
v. Dyer, Federal Cas. N·o. 14,150, as follows:
1

'''The action of account is some·what peeuliar
in its proceedings, but the peculiarities· will supply no lack of statement of a cause of action, a~
thos-e in the action of 'book account, in the states
of Vermont and Conne~cticut, do, to some extent.
The action is for an account by the defendant to
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the plaintiff for money of the plaintiff received
by the defendant by son1e privity of authority or
appointment, or of estate, or of la\Y; and for the
recovery of the balanee due. There are two judgments in the action-one, that the defendant do
account "\vith the plaintiff; the other, after the
accounting, for the balance found due. The plaintiffs, in his declaration, n1ust set forth enough
to entitle him to both judgments. The privity,
by which he is entitled to an account, and proceedings under or pursuant to it, raising a halanee
in his fa YOr to be reocovered, must both appear. If
a plaintiff has not these he is not entitled to maintain the action. If he has them but does not set
them forth, he does not show himself en ti tied to
maintain it. These are simple and just rules, by
which these counts must be tested.''
In Oskaloosa Sav. Barnk v ....Mahaska Cownty State
Bank, (Iowa) 219 N. W. 530, the Court states:
'' Th_e burden was on the plaintiff to aver and
prove that there was something due it before it
\vas entitled to an accounting. 1 C. J. 629; Gould
v. Barrow, 117 Ga. 458, 43 ~s:. E. 702; C;a.mpbell
v. C·ampbell, 8 N. J. Eq. 738; Hunt v. Gorden, 5~2
Miss. 194; In Baker v. Tennent, 108 Wash. 663,
185 P. 576, that court said:
" ·''There will be no accounting, without sh·owing that son1e one, either the appellant or creditors of the p:artnership, are going to be benefited
by it.' "
In Bowman v. Chapmatn, (Va.) 175 S. E. 214, the
Court stated:
''In a. proceeding to obtain an accounting the
com'Plainant is not obliged to show how much is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

100

due. But the law will not do a vain thing, and
order an .aceounting, "'..hen the petitioner does not
aver facts suffrcient to indicate that somethinO'
will be :Bound to lbe due to hin1 hy the defendant.'~
·To the sa·me effect see Gould v.
S. E. 702.

Barro~v,

('Ga.) 43

In Sottthworth v. Smith, 27 Conn. 335, 71 Am. Dec.
72, the C'ourt held that to maintain an action in acc.ounting it is neeessary that the plaintiff allege that the defendant has become lia·ble to account by having in his
possession property belonging to the plaintiff, or that
something is due the plaintiff.
In the case of Childs v. ·Missou.ri, K. & T. Ry. Co.,
(iC. C. A. 8) 2'21 Fed. 219, it was stated:
'''The allegations in the bill requiring an accounting- are 'vholly insufficient to justify the
interposition of a court of equity. They are not
sp~cific, and that part of the bill n1ay properly be
ealled a 'fishing bill,' which cannot be maintained.''
It is submitted that there are no allegations in the
complaint in the case at bar alleging either a demand
by the plaintiffs for an accounting or a. refusal by the
defendants, or any of them, to render any requested
accounting.
It is further subinitted that there is no allegation in
the complaint setting forth any particular property now
in the possession of the defendants for which an acc.ounting can or should be rendered, and there is no allegaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion that anything- is due froin the defendants to the
plaintiffs or to the corporation.

Neither is there any

proof of such den1and, refusal, or of property in the
possession of the defendants belonging to the plaintiffs
·Or the United Bond and Finance Corporation, or that
any money is due from the indiVidual

defendant~s ~to

said

defendant corporation.·
'The rule is well established in the law of this country that the burden of proof to
~ount

esta~blish

the duty to ac-

and that up<;>n an accounting there will he found

a balance due from the person against whom the accounting is sought rests upon the party who seeks the accountIng.

In the case of Paulm.er v. Manville, (Iowa., 1929) 2'28

N. W. 20 the Court states:
"We are ·Of the opinion that the claim of appellants (plaintiff) has been fully paid, but if
this is not true, the correct ·balance due is not a.s
·claimed by him and cannot, with any degree of
certainty, be as·certained from the evidence. The
burden was on appellant to prove the aecount and
to show a balance and the amount due.''
In Nichols v. Ma.rtin,
(19·36)' the c·ourt states:

2~27

Mich. 305, ·269 N. W. 183

'·'!The proof does not show plaintiff's right
to an accounting nor the amount to be accounted
for. The burden of this proof is upon plaintiff.
Melconia v. F'raan, 265 Mich. 378, 251 N. W. 574. ''
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It was held in the case of La;nk Kidde Company v.
Keystone Leather, 3'25 Pa.. 5'29, 1'90 A. 910 (19 37), that
it was incumbent .on plaintiff to esta'blis·h duty on the
party of defendant to account.
1

'The case of Fretwell v. Gillette Safety Razor Com~
pany, 106 Fed. (2d) 7'28 ( 4 C. C. A. 193:9), was a suit for
an injunction. Defendant -counterclaimed and prayed
. for an aecounting. 'The Court stated:
'''The burden was on defendant to establish
that there was s-omething due him before he was
·entitled to an accounting. Oskaloosa Savings
. Bank v. Mahaska County !State Bank, 205 Iowa
13'51, 219 N. W. 530, 60 A. L. R. 1204; Gould v.
B:arrow, 117 Ga. 458, 43 S. E. 702.''
1

In 1 C. J. · 8. 675 .A.caowntmg, Paragraph 39, it is
stated:
''Where the right to an ac:eounting is put in
issue by the answer, th·e burden is on plaintiff
to p~rove that he is entitled to the relief sought
and * * * if he fails t.o do so the bill will be
dismissed.''
The ;C'ourt 's attention is called to the fact that every
allegation in plaintiffs' complaint which could in any
way furnish grounds for an a'Ccounting was denied by
defendants in their answer. The burden was on plaintiff to allege and prove their cause of action for an accounting, including the burden ·Of alleging and proving
tha,t there was money due from the pers-onal defendants
to the Finance Corporation, and that upon an aecounting the amount thereof could be determined.
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THE RESPONDENTS ARE BARRED BY THEIR OWN LACHES
FROM OBTAINING THE ACCOUNTING DEOREEID BY THE COURT.

The Court found in finding No. 48:
'~·That th~

plaintiffs herein have not been
fully advised or given any information as to the
acts, conduct, manipulations and business practices of \Y-. R. Beckstead and his dummy direetors,
and until shortly prior to the filing of this action
did not know of the said practices and things com--l{>lained of in their ·complaint, and prior to that
time could not be ·Charged with knowledge_ or information sufficient to require them to institute
or pros·ecute any action to protect their rights.''
From that finding the Court made the following conclusion of law:
'''That the plaintiffs herein, or any of them,
have not been guilty of laches in the assertion of
their rig~ts and the filing and prosecution of this
action."
No issue on this rna tter was raised on the pleadings.
'The defendants, of course, did not plead laches becaus-e
they were not advised as to any contention made by plaintiffs based on transactions occurring so many years ago
until the Court permitted plaintiffs over def.endants' objection to introduce evidence of these ancient transactions. ·The finding is nevertheless contrary to the
evidence. Rich testified that in 193'5, he, together with
Art 8mitb, organized the Montana. Stockholders ProtecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive Co1nrri.ittee, and from the exhibits in the recovd it
appears that several of these plaintiffs· were officers of
this committee. All the stockholders were advised of
the committee's activities, the purposes of its organization and solicited to become rriem.bers, and many of them
contributed funds to promote its activities. These activities consisted largely of circulating, diserediting
·charges of every kind against the corporation and its
officers to all of the stockholders. There is no doubt
but wha't every stockholder was advised of the activities
of this eommi ttee and were also advised of many matters
which V\rould naturally put them on notice. ·
We are .aware that the Court in finding ·Of fact No.
48 finds facts from whi;ch conclusions could be made that
plaintiffs are not barred by their own laches, but as
herein pointed out this finding is not based upon the evidence but was m.ade as many other findings, without the
support of any evidence whatsoever and apparently was
made for the purpose of supporting the decree regardless of the fa!cts.
The
required
will take
them the

six items for which the defendants have been
to aecount have heretofore been set out. We
each one ·Of them in their order and apply to
principles of laches.

!The first item of account relates to the transaction
respecting the forfeiture of installment sales, contracts
or stocks and bonds in investment units of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation.
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As heretofore explained in this brief, this matter
relates to -bookkeeping en tries 'Y hich \Vere made on the
, books of the United Bond and Finance Corporation in
\\Titing off the sales of their investn1ent units and bonds
where the purchaser failed to make the installment. pay- ments as agreed.
The uiieontradicted evidence in this case is that there
were no sales of stocks, bonds or investment units after
1931, either for cash or on installment payments. 'There
was introduced in ~vidence by the plaintiffs in this case
- (Exhibit G-4) annual statements which were sent out to
the stockholders of the company. This Exhibit inc1udes
those statements sent out for the years 1931-~9~34, inclusive. Other annual statements for the years 19331938, inclusive ('Exhibit 27) W·ere introduced ·by the defendants. These also were sent out ea.ch year to the
stockholders.
It will be noticed that in the statements for 19:33,
1934, 1935 and 1937 a statement was made conc.erning
capital surplus to the effect that it was created. from
inactive accounts and stock and bond subscription caneella.tion. In the statements of other years the item was
carried on the financial statement as .capital surplus
without any explanation. The audit for 1935, the audit
for 1936 to 1938, inelusive, and the audit of 1939 shows
these caneella tions (Exhibits L-3, 14, and 1:5) and a full
explanation is made of these items.
The only thing that we can suggest here is that apparently the contention is that the m·ethod of setting these
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up is questioned. It a.p.pears that the plaintiffs, and all
other persons similarly situated, have known of this
method since at least the year 1933. No complaint has
been ~made ·Of this, either before the commence·ment of
this pr.esent .a~ction or during its pendency until the plaintiffs .filed their reply brief in the trial Court and the
Court incorpor·ated this subject in its findings of fact and
decree. We contend that a mere disagreement on the
method of bookkeeping is not a ground for an equita-ble
accounting, but even if it were a delay of at least seven
years cannot be excused, and a C·ourt of equity should
certainly consider it a stale claim within the eases hereinafter to be cited.
iT he second i tern for aec.ount consists of the ''transactions'' involving the purchase of the insurance agency.
·The evidence on this ma:tter dis-closes that the insurance
agency was purchased in November, 1932, by the United
Bond and Finance Corporation and sold in about a week
thereafter to the Investors Thrift c:ompany .at a profit
of $1,500.00 to the Finance Corporation. This involves
a transaction eight years old, and under no theory of law
could justify or require an accounting, and if any question could :be cast upon it or claim made with reference
thereto, the claim without doubt is stale and cannot now
be raised, and as heretofore pointed out in this brief a
full a.c.count thereof has already been made during the
trial of this ease.
The third item for acc.oun ting is the purchase of the
controlling stock in the Ashton-Jenkins Company. That
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stock was purchased in N ove:mber, 1'93:2, and the transaction was rescinded by February, 1933. Hence plaintiffs are here seeking an accounting for a purchase made
between seven and eig·ht years before the commencement
of this action, and '""hich within that time had been fully
and com~pletely rescinded, and no loss resulted therefrom
to the corporation.
'The fourth item contained in the decree requires an
accounting as to all transactions and money advanced to
the Beckstead Livestock Company. This of necessity
must relate to transactions occurring during and since
April, 19·38. This accounting is between th~ two corporations, does not involve the individual defendants, and
requires nothing more or less than 1a sta tern en t of accounts as between the subsidiary corporation, Beckstead
Livestock Company, and the defendant United Bond a.nd
Finance Corporation.
We have heretofore pointed out the reasons why we
do not think this is a proper matter for an order to account. We maKe no claim that such transactions are
stale.
The fifth item <>f accounting relates to all money

and property of the United Bond and Finance Corporation used by the defendant Beckstead· and his associates
in the acquisition of the outstanding stock of said eorportion.
E·xhibit 16 introdu.ced in this case dis·closes that no
stock at all has been purchased since 1939 and only
$975.00 was paid by the ·Corporation for stock in 19;39.
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We have heretofore set out the reasons why we do
not believe this matter is one for an accounting. \Ve
desire, however, in ,connection with the question of laches
to call the C.ourt 's a ttentlion that a.t least since the year'
1935 the stockholders have been advised by the annual
statement o~ the fact that the corporation was purchasing its ·Own stock. We refer to the financial statement
set out for the year 193~5 wherein it clearly appears that
certain ·stock of the corp.oration was held as treasury
stock and set forth as an asset of the company .at cost.
Beckstead testified that the corporation began to
purchase its own stock following the com1nencement of
the opera:ti'On of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation,
when many of their loans and mortgages were liquidated
through the acceptance of Home Owners' Loan Corporati~on bonds. The Home Owners' Lotan Corporation commenced to make loans in the late summer or early fall
of 193,3.

The sixth item is for a.n accounting of all the stock
claimed to have been issued hy the United Bond and Finane~

C'orporation to the defendants. The only stock issued by the ·Corporation to the defendants wtas issued in
1'9'27 and 1928. This involves a claim which at the commencement of this action was between twelve and thirteen
.years of age, and was certainly a stale cltaim if there ever
was one, and espec,ially in view of the fact that there was
no a.ttempt · m~ade to cancel the issuance of this stock.
The first issue of stock in 19'2:7 was shown in the articles
of ineor~poration of the U:nited .S:tates Bond and Finance
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~

Corporation, and th~ issnanee of the stock in 1928 to the
defendant Beckstead was placed in the stock hook of the
company "·hich w·as produced at the time of the trial of
this ease. It had been open and available for inspection
during all the years since the stock '\\7'as issued by any
stockholder of record, including· thes·e plaintiffs.
So far as other matters
evidence

"'~ere

"~hich

'vere introduced 1n

concerned the plain tiffs never got any

eloser thlan the early part of 1936.

These matters in-

volved the sale of United Bond .and Finance Corporation
sto~k

by the Hoffmans, \V.ilsons, Jacksons and the Thur- rnans \\Thich occurred in 1931 and 1935 ; the purchase of
the ranch property in ''Tyoming \vhich took place in 1935.
In connection with this ranch property and the contention that Beckstead cliaimed to own it, we call the Court's
attention to the fact that the annual financial statements
mailed to the sto~kholders of the United Bond and Finance Corporation from the year 1935 to the year 1937
show as an asset of the eompany the ranch property,
li\'estock and equipment.
In Grange National Barnk v. First Nationa-l Bank
(~P.a.), 198 Atl. 3'21, the Court states:
''It makes no differenee that laches were not
pleaded in defense. When the fact of laches appears in the ev.idence or ·on the face of the bill
the court mlflv in its discretion and on its own
motion deny -~elief on that ground. Sullivan v.
Portland & K. R. C·o., 94 U. S. 806, 24 L. Ed.· 324;
Calivad.a Colonization C·o. v. Hays, C. C., 119 F.
202; Akley v. Bass_ett, 189 Cal. 625, 209 P. 576;
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:Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,
286 Mass. 84, 1'90 N. E. 1; Taylor v. Slater, 21
R .. I. 104, 41 A. 1001. ''
Certainly the defendants under the circumstances of
this case should not be required to plead laches in their
answer, and under the foregoing authorities it is not
nece'ssary to do so.
Judge Sanborn in Kelly v. Boettcher, tO. C. A. 8)
85 F. 55, at page 6:2, has an excellent state.ment as to the
applica.tion of the doctrine of laches, and it is as follows:
'''In the application of the doctrine of laches,
the settled rule is that courts of equity are not
bound by, hut that they usu.ally act or refuse to
act in analogy to, the statute of limitations relating to actions at lal\v of lik~ character. ~ * ~
(jCnses e:ited). * * * ·The meaning of this
rule is that, under ordinary circun1stances, a suit
in equity will not be stayed for laches before, and
will be stayed after the tin1e fixed by the analogous statute of limitations at law; but if unusual
conditions or extraordinary circumstances make
it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit
after a briefer, or to forbid its maintenance after
a longer, period than that fixed by the statute, the
·chancellor mill not be bound by the statute, but
will determine the extraordinary c;ase in accord~
ance 'vith the equities vvhich c.ondition it. * * *
When a suit is brought within the time fixed by
the analogous statute, the burden is on the defendant to show, ei·ther from the face of the bill
or by hi,s answer,: that extraordinary circumstances exist which require the application of the
doctrine of laches ; and, 'vhen such a suit i~
brought after the statutory time has elapsed, the
burden is on the .complainant to show, by suitable
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averments in his bill, that it would be inequita'ble
to apply it t~o his ease.''
Under this common sense rule it would appear that
the plaintiffs are under the necessity ·Of showing why the
doctrine of !taches is inapplicable to the items of account
relating to the purcha'Se of the insurance agency, the ,purchase of the controlling stock of the Ashton-Jenkins Company, the stock issued by the corporation to the defendants, the installment forfeitures, and the great bulk of
the pur.c.hases of outstanding stock.

There is neither

allegation nor proof which would indicate any reason that
the doctrine of la{!hes does not· bar these alleged items
of account.
In the case of Smith v. Smith (Utah), 291 Pae. 298,
the Court applied the doctrine of laches. It there points
out that equity may refuse relief even if the time elapsed
without suit is less than the statute of limitations.

Foss v. Peoples Ga.s, Coke arna Oil Comparny, 241 Ill.
238, 89 N. E. 351, holds that laches is a complete defense
to a bill by a. stockholder to compel! an accounting by
the corporation.
The C·ourt also states that a shareholder must use
diligence in the assertion of his rights to entitle him to
relief in equity against a 'vrongful diversion of corporate funds or other mis.conduc.t on the part of the company, and that negligence on his part in instituting proceedings \vill deprive him of the relief desired.
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In Childs v. Mo. 'K. T. Ry~, 221 Fed. 219, it was held
that laches is a defense to an equitable accounting.
There are two cases which consider the question of
the cancellation of shares of stock in the hands of an
officer of a corporation, and where the doctrine of laches
was held to prevent a requested cancellation. Those cases
are Ca.ZiV'ada Colonriza1tion Company v. Hays, 119 Fed.
202, and Kimball, et al., v. Chicago Hydraulic Press Brick
Comp·arny, 119· Fed. 102.
We desire to point out that in the action at bar no
request is made for cancellation of this stock 'vhich was
issued to the defendant Beckstead in 1·927-1928. This
stock is-sued in 1927 and 19 28 was the only stock tha.t was
is-sued by the corporation to any one of the defendants
in this case. Here the plaintiffs and the ·C.ourt want the
defendants to account for this stock.
1

In the Calivada :case the plaintiff filed suit as receiver against one of the offic.ers of that ·Company to
cancel his .stock allegedly received without consideration.
The stock was issued on March 13, 1895, and this action
was -commenced on July 13, 1901, and the Court held that
the lapse of tin1e .would prevent relief, and stated:
1

"ITo let in ·.such a defense it is not ne-cessary
tha.t a foundation ·be laid by any averment in the
answer. .Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806,
24 L. Ed. 324. Where the evidence discloses laches
on the part of the complainant, a court of equity
will refuse relief. I d. Nothing can call a court
of equity into activity but conscience, good faith,
and reasonable diligence. Hayward v. Bank, 96
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U.S. 611, 618, 24 h Ed. S55. In Societe Fonciere
et Agricole des Etats U nis Y. j 1illken, 135 U. S.
304, 10 Sup. Ct. 823, 34 L.· Ed. 208, a delay of only
two yea.rs in eommencing proceeding~s to set aside
a judgment for usury was held to be laches and
fatal. In Evers v. Watson, 156 U. '8. ·5'27, 1·5· Sup.
Ct. 430, 39 L. Ed. 520, the delay of complainants
for four years to assert their claim w.as acc:ounted g·ood ground for denying relief. In the p.resent
case there \Yas a. delay of more than six years,
which was inexcusable under the circumstances.''
In the Kimball case the Oourt refused to cancel
stock issued eleven years before the action was filed.

In that case plaintiffs contended that the stock had
been issued unla"rfully and without consideration, and
for the purpose of the decision their position was accepted, and the Court then p;ointed out that the question
arose as to \Yhether they could he heard at that late date
to complain of that transaction or were they barred by
laches. The Court :pointed out that the record of the
issuance of the stock was on the books of the company,
and that between the time of the issuance of the stock
and the filing. of the present action, the plaintiffs, or any
one stockholder, could have found out about the issuance
of said stock, by the exercise of the slightest d~ligence.
The Court stated:
'• No reason is perceived nor is any sufficient
reason alleged why they did not discover the
alleg-ed "'Tong at an earlier period, since the bill
utterly fails to disclose any acts on the part of
the defendants or either of them which amount
to an actual concealment of the \Vrong.''
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The Court further stated:
''The case is one, therefore, where the com.plainants' want of knowledge ,of the objectionable
transaction was due to a lack of diligence in inquiring into matters in which they were deeply
concerned; and even if it were true that an
actual fraud V\ras intended, and that the wrong
complained of is something more than an ultra
¥ires act, con1nii tted by the directors of the Chicag.o Company, still it does not appear that the
wrongdoers concealed the transaction, for such
facts as are alleged do not amount to concealment, and cannot be .accepted as an ex-cuse fQr a
failure to discover the alleged violatiion of the
statute, or the fraud, whichever it n1ay be."
The Court then stated :
''Under these circumstances, it is well settled
by respected decisions that complainants are
barred of their right to relief. Courts of equity
are not disposed to upset business transacti:ons,
or to disturb titles, that have passed unchallenged
for years; and they will not do so unless at theinstance of a suitor who has been diligent and
persevering in the pursuit of his rights, and who
can and does show good ~and sufficient reasons
for not making an earlier application for relief.
This doctrine is elementary, and has been frequently reiterated and ap~lied, especially by the
federal courts.''
We respectfully submit that because of the length
of time the accounting for the transaction involved
in the purchase of the insurance agency, the purchase of
the eon trolling stock of Ashton-Jenkins Company and
for the stock issued by the corporation to the defendants,
are clearly barred by laches, and it would be inequitable
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for this Court to require an accounting- on these items
after the length of time above mentioned has expired.
The iten1s •of account relating to the transactions
on installm·ents, sales, etc., and on the purchase of stock
by the corporation should not now be considered qy a
Court of equity because ·of the _length of time which
- has expired since the -plaintiffs and all 1other stock- holders were notified of the method of the cortporation
~ in handling the forfeiture of installment S·ales, and the
fact that the· corporation was purchasing its own stock.
No complaint was made until the bringing of the present
suit.
We· call the Court's attention to the fact that the-re
is no evidence of any alleged misconduct or mismanagement since December of 19·3~5, no wrongfui acts on the
part -of the individual defendants are claimed, asserted
or proved since that time.

P.OIN·T IV.
THE PRIMARY OBYIDCT OF THIS SUIT IS RECE:IVERSHIP
:AND NOT AIOCOU!NTING AN·D FOR THAT R·E~A'SON THE: AOTION
MUST FAIL.

We respectfully submit that a fair, candid and reasonable consideration of this accounting order alone
will clearly reveal and surely convince that this purported prin1ary remedy is not genuine, is without merit,
and has no purpose whatsoever in this litigation except to
supply a. sin1ulated support to this receivership. A considSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eration of this accounting order clearly reveals that
the only purpose of this suit is receivership; that the
only primary and ultimate relief involved in this action
is receivership, and that the accounting decreed has no
other function except to supply, in a fe-eble way, a requirement n1ade necessary by the law. To say that this
pur·ported accounting is the primary final relief to which
the plaintiffs are entitled under their pleadings and
proof, and that in order to effectuate and make

effectiv~

this primary ultimate relief the appointment of a receiver is necessary, is to assume a positiiOn which is
contrary to the facts plead, to the testimony given, and
to the law of the land.
The overwhelming weight of authority supports the
prO'position that receivership will never be granted where
it is s10ught as the prim~ry remedy.
A ·concise statement of this principle is found in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana in Hartnett v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. of Montana, et al., 153
Pac. 437:

"It is also elen1entary, however, that the primary relief s!ought n1ust he such as will be aided
by the appoint1nent of a reeeiver. If the object
of the suit can as vvell be attained without a
receiver as with one, none should be appointed.
Forsell v. Pittsburg & Mont. C. Co., 42 Mont. 412,
113 P'ac. 479. A further analysis of the sugges. tions aboiVe set forth is therefore· required, with
a view to as·certaining whether~ under any of
then1, a receiver would be justified.''
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In the case of Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30,

79 L. Ed. 1282,

~lr.

Justice Stone of the Supreme Court

' discussed this proposition and stated:

"But there is ·no occasion for a court of
equity to appoint a receiver of property of which
it is asked to make no further disposition. The
English chancery court from the beginning declined to exercise its jurisdiction for that purpose. * * * ''
"\vnenever the attempt thus to extend it, by
using the receivership as an end instead of a
means, has been brought to the attention of this
Conrt, it has pointed out that a Federal -court of
equity will not appoint a receiver where the appointment is not ancillary to some form of final
relief which is appropriate for equity to give.''
(Citing numerous authorities * * *)
''Respondents' bills of complaint not only
failed to Heek any remedy other than the appointment of receivers, but they failed to disclose any·
basis for equitable relief by the appointment of
recei ~ers iOr otherwise.''
Clark in his excellent work on re-ceivers, paragraph

5, volume 1, states:
"The purp-ose of the app-ointment of a receiver after judgment is to satisfy the judgment
in one ~vay or another * * *. The appointment
of a. receiv·er is not granted as a matter of right,
but it is granted as a remedy to effectuate a;nd
work out the right granted to, the litigant in the
primary litigation.·
''The appointment of a receiver by an interlocutory decree is, therefore, a temporary expedient, and ,provisional to some other or final deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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termina.ti1o-n of the matter by the Court. It is only
ancillary and auxiliary to the main action except
in the rare cause of lunacy or infancy. It is not
the office of a court of equity to appoint receivers
as a mode of granting ultimate relief.''
In Central West PUblic .Service Co. v. Craig, (C. C.
A. 8) 70 Fed. (2d) 427, the Court states:
'' T'he appointment of a. receiver is an ancillary, incidental remedy ~only; and is not final relief
nor is it properly the end or ohjeet of the litigation, but is a remedy allowa hie only in connection
with a suit pending for some other purpose in
which theTe is a prayer for ultimate relief which
the eourt has jurisdiction to grant, and to which
the appointment of a receiver is an aid. Pusey &
Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra; Brictson Mfg. Co.
v. Close, (C. C. A. 8) 280 F. 297; United States
v. Sloan Shipyards Corp., (D. C.) 270 F. 613;
Zuber v. Micmac Gold Min. Co., (C. C.) 180 F.

625."
The case of Mason v. San-Val Oil & Water Comp1arny, ('Cal.) 36 p:ae.. (2d) 616, contains a very splenoid

illustratiion of this principle. In that case minority
stockholders sued the corporation, dire-ctors, officers and
other shareholders, seeking ''an accounting of all the
corporate transa·ctions from the ~date of incorporation,
cancellation of stock issued to defendant shareholders,
removal of the defendant directors and a de-claration
that their offices are vacant and the appointment of a
receiver.
Plaintiff charged failure of consideration for the
issuance of the stock, misappropriation of funds, fraud
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and conspiracy to defraud on the part of the defendants
as direct!ors and other,vise. The Court remarked that
the allegations are replete with generalities and conclu~ions of pleaders, as is true in this case.
After discussing certain propositions the Court addressed itself to the question as to 'v hether or not the
receivership could in any 'yay aid the cause of the com- plainants and the corporation in the cancellation of the
- stock fraudulently issued, and stated:
'·Finally, if the action be on behalf of the
corporation to have stock issued to certain defendants declared void and canceled on the ground
that it V{as not issued in compliance with the corporation commissioner's permit or because of
failure of considerati,on, assuming such an action
could be brought by the plaintiffs or by the corporation, no showing is made that it is such an
action in which the. ancillary relief by appointment of a receiver is necessary or ·desirabl~ to
insure to the plaintiffs, standing in the shoes of
the corporation, the fruits of the equitable relief
to which the corporation might hecome entitled.
See Loney v. Consolidated vVa ter Co., 122 Cal.
App. 350, 353, 9 P. (2d) 888. ''
Forquer v. Inland Finance Comp·any, (Wash.) 253

Pac. 1086, is a very interesting case and very similar in
many respects to the case at bar. In the complaint the
defendants were charged with fraud, conspiracy, mismanagement, and that the corporation was eontroll~·d
by a small amount of voting stock. At the close of
plaintiff's testimony the Court granted a non-suit and
judgment was entered dismissing the action. An appeal
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was taken. The Court in affirming the judgment of the
lower Court stated:
"The appellant says that the respondent is reeking with fraud, that it was created in iniquity
that it vvas organized for the benefit of Listn1an'
who has ·Caused it to be operated in his behalf'
that it is so organized and has been so developed
as that, in substance, the minority control the
1na.jority, and that if a receiver is not appointed
such of the assets as the company now has will
be frittered a way and nothing be left. There
would see1n to he some truth in appellant's
charge. ·For illustration, under the by-laws the .
10,000 shares at $1 a share, now held by Listman and the officers of respondent, can control
any stockholders' meeting and can practically
outvote the owners of all the preferred and first
common stock. In other· vvords, stock of the par
value ,of $10,000 can outvote stock of the par
value of $800,000. Under these circu1nstances,
the people vvho actually put up the large sun1s of
money to capitalize the respondent have very
little to say concerning its affairs, provided the
own·ers of the second common st1ock take advantage of the strong position in which they are
*
:J(::

:J(::

''If ~lr. Listman has heretofore .controlled
the company and its officers, as is cla.in1ed by
appellant, and if there has been fraud, misnlanagemen.t, ·or bad judgment, it must be remembered
that those are things of the past and cannot be
remedied by the ·appointn1ent of a receiver. R~
g'a.rdless of the cause or ~causes, the company ts
in its present financial plight, and we c-annot undo
what has been done. The appellant is but a ven·
small stockholder. He is not even a creditor, for
as such he would be in a stronger position to
ask for a receiver than merely as a stockhold~r.
Nor does be seek rescission for fraud or m1sSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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representations. lie only asks that a receiver be
appointed. The articles of incorporation and the
by-la\\·s plainly show the character of the organization, and those who became stockholders had
an opportunity, of course, to kno\v the structure
of the concern in \Yhich they were investing. In
cases of this kind we Inust look more to t.he future
than to the past.''

.Shearer v. Union ltlortgage Company, 28 Ohio Appeal 373, 162 North Eastern 696, was an action by a
minority stockholder :on behalf of all the stockholders of
the defendant corporation against the defendant corporation and all of its directors charging the directors
with malfeasance and misfeasance in ·office.

The com-

plaint alleges a diversion 10f corporate assets for private
use, a payment of dividends out of

ca~pital

stock, the

issuance of false financial statements., and that the business of the company had been conducted so neglig_ently
that its property and assets were· insufficient to pay
its debts or to afford rea8onable security to those who
might deal with said corporation. A. motion was made
on behalf of the plaintiffs for the appointment of a
receiver, which was denied by the Trial C:ourt, and on
this appeal the ruling ~of said Court· '\Vas affirmed.
The statutes of Ohio, are similar to those of Utah,
and the Court relies on H oiles v. Watkins, Supra, as
sustaining the ruling of the ~ower Court, pointing out
that the appointment of a receiver is merely ancillary
to the main cause of action.
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'' 'l1he ultimate relief sought in the petition
givi~g it the most lib~ral int~rpretation that
be given, and conee-9-~ng what counsel for plaintiff claims, is as before observed, first, an injunction; second, an acc;ounting; third, a dissolution of the corporation. There is nothing in the
fa·cts pleaded in support of the claim for an
injunction which in the slightest degree indicates
any necessity for the s~rvices of a receiver. If
the trial ·court ultimately grants the injunction
that is the end of that controversy and no further
~ction would pe necessary on the part of ~ny of
the parties concerned. The action for an accounting is not an acti:on against the defendant coinpany, p-q.t an actiqn for its benefit, ang against its
directors individually.''

may

The Court fp.rtber

bold~

that it is.

w~ll

settled

th~t

A Court of equity has no l>ower to dis.~olve a corpor-

fttion 1or winq -qp its
in the
of

absen~e

co-qr~e,

of

aff~irs

expre~s

and

~equestrat~

its property

statutory aut4ority.

Th~re

is,

no f3Ucb authority in the Sta:te pf Utah.

In Arcola Sugar Mills Company v. Burmho;na, 61
Fed. ( 2d) 981, the Court states :
~'An

account can be had just as well without
as with the appointment of a receiver."
One of
A

th~

r~·c~iv~rship

finest discussions of the pri:pciple that
will 11ever be

grant~~

p_nless necessary

pr beneficial i~ fqp.nq in the Penn~ylvania ~ase of McDougla v. Huntingdon & Brp(Jrr}; 'fpp

Mt. R. R. & C. Co.,
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143 Atl. 57 4, frpm wllich
gQ~ge i;s ta.k~n :

th~

following

i:pt~re~ting

lan-

''There is nothing, ho\Yever, \vhich affects a
~orporation with such serious con~equences as
does the appointment of a receiver; it is a severe,
and may be termed an heroic, remedy, and t:P.~
conditions that call it into action should be such
as would, if persisted in, ordinarily be, fatal to
corporate life. The ap:pointinent is a distress
sig·nal, and is immeqiately follovved py lowering
pf financi~l credit ~nd a genera,! readjustment.
It follows, beca11se of the intense responsibility
attached to the office, courts will not appoint receivers where there is well-fiounded suspicion it
would be followed by serious injustice or injury
to the rights of all parties interested. The court,
before any appointment is made, will act with
the utmost caution. Receivers will not be ap·pointed unless · the chancellor is convinced the
right is free from doubt (Howth v. Coulbourne
Bros. Co., 155 Md. 107, 80 A. 9~6), the loss irreparable, with no adequate legal remedy, and the
relief sought is . necessary. Receivers are appointed only in aid of s10n1e recognized, presently
existing, legal right, and will not be appointed
where receivership is the sole relief asked. * * *

''In order words, it must appear vn this, as
in all other cases, that the appointment of a
receiver will serve some beneficial purpose to the
stockholders. Sternberg v. Wolff, 56 N. J. Eq.
389, 39 A. 397, 39 L. R. A. 762, 67 Am. St. Rep.
494. ''
In R'ichardson v. Clinton Wall Trunk Mfg. Co., (1902)

181 Mass. 580, 6.4 N. E. 400, where minority stockholders
fJOUght the appointment of a receiver RlJ.d an injunction
a8'ains~t the officers and. directors of the company, who,
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it was alleged, had fraudulently used the property and
franchise of the ·corporation for their private gain, and
had misappropriated the assets in various w~ys, it was
held that, although the complainant had showed a proper
case for equitable relief, necessity for the appointment
of a receiver was not shown:
I

''The appointment of a receiver is not necessary or proper as ancillary to an injunction
against doing business ultra vires, oT to an order
for an account of p:voperty misappropriated by
· directors. Ordinarily a receiver will not be appointed in actions against directors or officers
of a ·corporation for a misconduct in its management. * * * nor ·will such an appointment be
made when receivership would amount in effect
to a dissolution of the corporation.''
The Court of Appeals of Maryland Tecognized this
principle in Polly v. Camden Bldg: & Sav. Ass'n, 175
Atl. 599, where a suit was brought for receivership, the
Court ·stating:
"It is shown by the evidence that dividends
'vere allowed in one or two years when they were
not earned, and that their payment tended to
reduce the capital. This was certainly bad judgment and illegal, and may have given rise to an
action at law 10n the part of the plaintiff if she
did_ not receive her portion of the dividends improperly paid. But there is no evidence of any
bad faith or fraud in connection 'vith thes·e payments. No good purpose would be served by the
appointment of a receiver in this connection."
The fact that the 1owners of a majority of the stock,
holding all of the offices, have .paid themselves larger
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salaries than they should, and have blended their private
business \\·ith the business of the corporation, and failed
properly to account for money of the corporation thus
comming-led with their

O\Yn,

is held in Enterprise Print-

ing d5 Pu.b. Co. v. Craig, (1924) 195 Ind. 309, 145 N. E.

309, rehearing denied in (1924) 195 Ind. 302, 144 N. E.
542, not .a ground for the appointment of a receiver 10r
dissolution, as these remedies are not necessary to obtain
an accounting on behalf of the corpora.ti,on, the business
being successfully manag-ed.
In the case of Miller. v. Albertina Realty Compa;ny,
190 N. Y. S. 407 minority stockholders brought an
action against the corporati,on and its directors seeking
a dissolution of the corporation, an accounting by the
directors, a sale of the p·roperty and distribution of the
proceeds. Among other things it V\ras charged that the.
defendant directors ''acting in collusion and conspiracy
with one another, have misapplied, nrisappropriated,
and diverted to their own use and benefit, or to the use
and benefit of other corporati,ons in which the personal
defendants are interested as stockholders or officers,''
the property, money and assets of the corporation, and
that the said personal defendants acted in had faith
and in breach ,of their duty as directors and officers of
the corporation, and for their O\vn personal benefit,
adYautage and profit, or for the benefit, advantage and
}Jrofit _of other corporations in \vhich they were pers,onally interested.
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The Cohft rioted that not a single fact was alleged
showing any diversion or misappropriation. In the
case at bar the eighteen hundred pages of the transcript
df evidence may be searched in vain for any single bit
of proof shoV.ririg that any of the personal defendants
have ever mi~appropriated, vvrongfully diverted or taken
any of the assets of the corporation.
In the New York case the general charges were
denied

as

"rere

the

charges

in

this

case.

The

defendants in the New York case stateq. by affidavit that
they had kept true and accurate books of account, and
that the books had been ·constantly kept in the office and
accessible to any and

all

of the stockholders, including

the plaintiffs.
Similar testimony was offered in this case and was
unquestioned~ No suspicion was ever cast by the testimony of any witness upon the accuracy and completeness of the books of this corporation or. their availability
to stockholders~
The Trial Court in the New York case ordered an
ac:countihg' and appointed a receiver, tliis order was
reversed.
Fron1 the ·opinion we quote as follows:
''Neither in his pleading nor in his affidavit
has the plain tiff ·ShO\Yli arty evidence of a misa ppropriation or diversion .of the property ~of. the
corporation and there were no conflicting statements of fact to be determined. Furthermore, a~
1
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we stated in Fenn v. Ostrander, 1:12 App. Div.
311, 313, 116 X. Y. Supp. 1083:
·' ',,~hether or not the court should in any
event, in an action like the present, appoint a
receiver of the assets of a corporation merely
upon the ground ·of n1isconduct of the officers or
direct:ors has been the subject of much discussion
and some diYersity of opinion. The rule now
generally aceepted seen1s to be that mere misc-onduct \Yill not justify the .appointment of a
receiver, unless such an appointment be necessary
to preserve the property or rights of creditors
or stoekholders. Phillips v. Sonora Copper Co.,
90 App. Div. 142; 23 Am. & Eng. ~ncy. of Law
(2d Ed.) 1023. It is also well established that a
receiver "ill not be appointed up!On loose and
general allegations of fraud and maladministration, made on information and belief and unsupported by anything that can reasonably be called
legal proof, especially when the answering affidavits deny the allegations contained in the moving papers. '
''In 011r opinion it was an abuse of discretid.fi
for the justice to appoint .a referee. The corporation is entirely solvent, no good reason appears
why a receiver should have been app·ointed, and
the motion should have been denied. ' '
1

We confidently assert that these authorities represent the overwhelming \veight of authority on the proposition stated at the outset hereof. We contend that
tinder no circumstaneeis could .a receiver beneficially aid
either the Court or these plaintiffs, or any o.f them, in
effectuating the accounting as orde~ed, granting Without
/ admitting that the accounting ordered is in any way supported by tlie pleadings, proof and findings in this case .
.A receiver ,could not aid or he beneficial in any aceduntSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing based upon the purchase of the insurance agency or
the cqntrolling stock in the Ashton-Jenkins c·ompany,
for the simple reason that the corporation has been at
all

ti,me~

willing to supply any and all information on

these subjects, and the Court has never found, and plaintiffs have never intimated, that any of this information
was being wit·hheld. These transactions hav-e been terminated for many years. A receiver could not in any way
aid or be benefici'al to an accounting of the forfeiture
of installment sales for the same reason.

It cannot be

conceived how or in what manner a receiver could aid
in procuring an accounting on the matter of funds of the
eorporation used in the procurement of its outstanding
stock. Even the Court did not find or intimat~ that any
information .on this matter was being. withheld by the
·corporation, or that there was any other evidence or
testimony whatsoever upon this subject which "ras not
produced at the trial.
As to the :matter pertaining to the intercorporate
relationship between the Beckstead Livestock Company
and its parent, the United B·ond and Finanee ·Corporation, nothing more or less than a matter of bookkeeping
is involved. A r·eceiver could do nothing more than bring
the books and records of these· corporations into Court,
and the corporate. offi·cers were not only willing, but
did bring these records to Court and offer full opportunity to examine and full explanation of the various entries
therein contained.
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-

.

·
-

How a rec.eiver could pe of any aid to the Court or
these plaintiffs in the Inatter of accounting with respect
to Beckstead's stock interests, we are at a loss to understand. No information has ever been \vithheld. No
finding \ras made that such information ''Tas not produced
in Court. It is all here, and the record in this case· discloses eYery detail with respect thereto. The conclusion
that a receiver cannot in any way aid in effe~tuating .this
accounting order is positively inevitable. ·The very fact
that this accounting order has and can serve no beneficial purpose whatsoever as herein demonstrated shows
that the sole and only purpose of his action is .receivership.

NO GROUNDS FOR RIDCEIVERSHI'P ARE ALLEGE:D, PROVED
OR FOUND.

Having heretofore fully discussed the phase of the
decree ordering and directing an accounting, and having
shown we think conclusively that said accounting ~order
is erroneous and is unsupported by the pleadings, findings and proof, we shall now discuss the phase of the
case ·pertaining to the cause for receiyership independent of the accounting o~der, and will demonstrate that
the cause for receivership as found by the Court is contrary to the purported cause for receivership alleged
in the complaint, and that there is a fatal variance
between the· cause as found and the cause as alleged,
and that the material findings as made stand in the
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record unsupported by pleadings or 1pr;oof, and that no
findings were made on the material allegations and
charges set forth in the complaint and we shall further
show that there is no useful or beneficial pu~pose whatsoever for the appointment of a receiver.

The Court in its decree after ordering an accounting
as the primary relief gran ted, then pronounced judgment
on the ancillary matter and appointed a general receiver
of all of the property of the defendant, United Bond and
Finance Corporation, of every kind, nature and description wherever located and by \vhomsoever held or claimed,
specifically including the carpital stock of the Beckstead
Livestock Company, and also all of the property, both
real and personal, of every kind and nature whatsoever
owned and controlled lby the Beckstead Livestock Company. There is nothing, however, in the decree from
which it can be determined how ~or in what manner, th~
receivership can be of any aid whatsoever to the ac~
counting.
The receiver so appointed, among other things, was
/

'

authorized to conduct and carry on the business of the

two defendant ·COrporations; to take charge of the income
and to ;op·er.a te and manage the business of these con~
cerns; to prosecute and defend actions and to do any
a.nd all things necessary to carry on said business enterprises. The corporate officers are .ordered to turn over
all books artd property of· the corporation in their
possession ai1d are restrained from iil any W:ay interfering vYith the receivers. It is also ordered that the
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receiver shall retain possession of said .property aiid
shall continue to dis-charge the duties of its trust urttil
further ordered by the Court.
It does not appear fron1 the decree how or in what
·manner the accounting and the judg1.nen t to he rendered
thereon, \Yhen such is made, shall affect the tenure of
office of the receiver. All that appears from the decree
is that there shall be an accounting· and that the receiver
shall take possession of the corporate property and
handle its affairs. In fact, it does not appear from the
decree that there is to be any relationship whatsoever hetween the accounting· ordered and the receivership
created.
This receive.rship must fail for the reason that the
decree creating and ordering said receivership is nitsupported by the ·findings, the proof and the pleadings,
and the receivership is without any useful or 'beneficial
purpose whatsoever.
In presenting our argument pertaining to the independent cause for receivership we do not 'vant the Court
to conclude that 've are in any way abandoning our
position that the receivership here must fail "\vith the
failure of the primary cause as hereinabove argued. In
this part of our brief "\Ve desire inerely to direct the
Court's attention to the phase of this case which is not in
any way concerned "\vith the accounting for the purpose
of indicating that said cause consists of general accusations and charges, and findings which are likewise gen-·
eral in nature, and unsupported by the evidence and for
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the further purpose of sho"Ting that this independent
caus-.e, such as it is, does not in any V\·ay indicate the necessity or need for a receiver.
The Court will realize that the findings of fact are
burdened with conclusions and excess verbiage; that they
overlap in many particulars; that they are in some instances contradictory; that they are ·carelessly and hurriedly drawn, and to say the least, confusing. Even
with a careful analysis and study it is difficult to clearly
understand either the theory upon which they are based
or the story they seek to tell. Many. of the findings
appear to have no materiality or relevancy whatsoever.
We shall set forth and discuss all ·of these finding·s a.nd
parts of findings which appear to have any n1ateriality
at all upon the question of receivership.
An accurate statement ·of the law governing in nlatters such as we are here ·Considering is found in 53 C. J.

38:
''It is a general rule that, in order to obtain
the appoint1nent of a receiver, applicant must
show that the possession of the property by defendant "·as obtained by fraud, or that the property itself, or the income .arising from it, is in
danger of loss from neglect, waste, 1nisconduct,
or insolvency. A si1nilar state1nent is that, aside
· from statutory provisions, a receiver will not be
appointed unless it appears that the appoinbnent
is necessary 'to prevent fraud or to save thP
property from irijury or threatened loss or destruction.''
"Receivers should not be appointed * * •
because a danger has existed in the past; the
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OCCasion and danger must exist \Yhen the appointment is n1ade.'' ·
\Ve direct the Court's attention to these general
statements in order to advise the Court of the point
- towards 'vhich the discussion W'"hich follows will be
· directed.
In presenting our discussion on this phase of the
appeal we shall refer in the order set forth to the
following subjects which a.ppelar in the findings of fact :
1. Discouragen1ent of stockholders in the. United

Bond and Finance Corl?oration.
2. Use of corporate funds 1n the acquirement of
outstanding stock in ·the United Bond and Finance Corporation.
3. Transactions relating to the Beckste.ad Livestock Company.
4. Beckstead '·s domination of the affairs of the
defendant ·Corporations..
5. Beckstead's financial relations with the defendant corporations.
6. Stock in the Finance Corporation as obtained
and held by Beckstead.
7. Investors Thrift Company.
8. Ashton-Jenkins Insurance Agency.
9. Acquiring of controlling stock interests in the
Asht.on-J enkins Company.
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10. Cancellation~ o.f partia,ll~ perform~d contracts
for the purchase of stock and securities on an installm~nt plan.
11. Legal actions pending .against the Finance Corporation.
12.
tion

~of

General charges and findings of
company's assets.

misappro~pria

In the fore&o~ng subje-cts we have attempted tp
cover all ·of the .rna tters :contained in the ,findings which
could have any ·possible relation to the claimed mismanagement of the affairs of the defendant corpor~ti~ops~ a,nd all rq.~tters which in any WflY pert~in to that
:phfl~e. -of ~b~ d~Gr.e~ wlH~r~in a rec~~v~r wa~ a:p:ppinteq.

I.

DISCOURAGEMENT

OF

STOCKHOLDERS IN

THE. UNITED

BoND AND FINANCE OoRPORA'J]ION.

(A)

FINDINGS

OF

FACT.

It is found that B·eckstead at or prior to September
2~, 19~1 ~ntered. upon
fl. s<::4~llH~ of ~(}qUlring
the out.
.
standing stock of the United Bond .and finance Corpor:~ti~on at a discount, and in that connection represented,
or caused to be represented, to .stockholders, that the
United Bond and Finance Corporation was in the course
of liquidation and wa~ closing. out its affairs and that
no dividends would ever be paid and that ~tockholders
would never receive any returns on their investments.
That the stockholders believed said representations and
became dissatisfied and ·disheartened, and Beckstead
.
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then

enter~d

·tnto the schPme of acquiring United Bond

and Finance Corporation stock in exchange for stock
and securities of little or no value, including stock of
, the Investors Thrift Company, . A.merican Keene Plaster
and Cement Company and certi·ficEl,.tes in the Tri-.Base
, Oil Company, a fictitious entity created :by one, Pandolfo. That Beckstead also caused to be represented
to the said stockholders that in order to a¥oid a complete loss of the investment to them he had caused
the company to or had personally acquired other stock,
including that -of the Investors ·Thrift ·Corporation, the
American Keene Plaster and Cement Company and whiskey warehouse receipts, which would he delivered to said
inve"Stors in eX!change for their stock. It is further found
that Beckstead has caused sales and brokerage agencies
to be organized and agents of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation to be licensed under other agencies
to ·make effective acquisition of the said United Bond
and Finance Corporation stock. It is further found that
Beckstead has represented, and caused to be represented,
to inquiring stockholders, that the United Bond and
Finance Corporation was in a failing ·Condition and that
he had further s-ent out financial statements of the
~ffairs of the corporation which did not represent the
complete ·financial condition of the said corporation.
l.t is further found that Beckstead gave lists .of names,
f1dQ.resses and amounts of investments of the investors
in the United Bond and Finance Corporation to his
a~sociates and agents in orger to carry out this plan
or scijeme .of acqu1r1n~ ·putstanding ~tock. T:Q.is plan
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according- to the findings has been carried out throughout
Utah and elsewhere and investors have relied upon the
representations and given up their stock. (See Findings Nos. 18, 21, 22, 2··3 1and '26).
(B)

PLEADINGS.

The. only allegatio~ in eonnection with this matter
is found in the first paragraph of paragr.aph (10) of the
complaint, and there it is alleged that Beckstead so
handled and advertised the business of the Finance
·Corporation as to discourage the investors, and in so
discouraging them· induced them to act on representations and reports and to surrender their stock for
nominal or no consideration, in exiehange for stock
in other corporations which Beckstead had caused to
·be set .up, including the Investors 'Thrift and the American Keene Plaster and ·Ce·ment ~c·ompany, and that Beckstead through the use of these means and in exchange
for these valueless se-curities was able to and did obtain
the stock of the Montana stockholders for his own personal benefit and advantage.
(C)

PROOF AND DISCUSSION.

The direct evidence with respect to discouragement
of stockholders came from the witnesses Rich, A. 'Y·
S:mith, Pearce and Petty. It wiH he reoolled that Pearce
had no ·Connection whatsoever with the ·Corporation prior
to the late fall of 1935, and that his connection with the
corporation terminated entirely in the month of January,
1936, this according to his own testimony. That his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1i~7

activities 'vere confined to contacts w·ith fe'v stockholders
and former stockholders in the State of Utah. Aceording to the undisputed evidence in thi:s case the
vast majority of the stock purchased by the corporation
had been purchased prior to the time when Pearce had
any connection with the corporatioll: whatsoever. The
same can be said concerning· Rich and Smith, with this
exception, that R.ic.h and 1Smith ·both admitted that they
never "\vere employed by the United Bond and Finance
Corporation. That they ~acted solely as agents of the·
Smith Brokerage Company, and that their connection
with the Smith Brokerage Company terminated prior
to 'Thanksgiving -of 1935, and that their contacts vvi th
stockholders of the Finance Corporation up to that time
had been very limited. Petty testified that in 1934 he
had a conversation vvith Beckstead and Beckstead explained that the corporation was not in a ·Condition to
pay any dividends. That when he transferred his stock
to Pearce he talked with Beckstead on the telephone
but no mention was made at that time as to the condition of the corporation. The better evidence in the
case would indicate that the reason f.or -so much United
Bond and Finance Corporation stock being on the market was the great depression, and that it was due to this
depression that the cor.poration could not pay dividends,
and the general need for ready money caused the stockholders to sell and trade their stock for whatever they
could obtain.
we submit to the c.ourt, that from all the evidence
in this case it appear~ that the stockholders who sold
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their stock ~placed it on the market because of the general depression and not because of any campaign carried on for the purpose of discouraging them. It
appears conclusively from the evidence that there was
no agreement or understanding betw·een the corporation
and any of the stocktraders. The stocktraders worked
independently .of the corporation. and were not representative of it in any capacity whatsoever. There is
no evidence in this record whatsoever of any general
activity on the part of the corporation or its officers
carried on for the purpose of dis-couraging stockholders.
The testimony of plaintiffs' witness, Arthur W.
Madsen, whose testimony commences at R. page 863,
exemplifies the manner in which these stocktraders operated. l-Ie testified that he worked for Pandolfo for
about three weeks, and that during that time he traded
certificates in the Tri-Base Oil C.ompany for any securities that he was able to obtain. He testified that he had
several lists of stockholders, among which was a list of
the Finance Corporation stockholders. This witness
could not remember of any transaction in which he had
obt~ained any Finance Coflporation stock for these certificates. This testimony indicates that the stocktrader
Pandolfo was out to .sell or trade ·certificates in the
Tri-Base Oil Company for any type of security for which
he could later receive money. This is the only direct
evidence in the re-cord fron1 stncktraders or representatives ,of stocktraders.
Financial statements of the Finance Corporation
were sent out to its stockholders each and every year.
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(R.163~-1685-1691)

Each of these statements reflected a
s·olvent corporate c.ondition, and a surplus over and
above all liabilities. These financial st~atements were
prepared by certified public accountants. Statements
covering the years from 1933-1938, inclusive, were introduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibit 27. Beckstead sent out circular letters warning the stockholders
of the Finance Corporation against exchanging their
stook. One of these letters is Exhibit 23.
Of one thing there can be no d.oubt as far as the
evidence in this case is concerned, and that is that if
there ever was a scheme or plan on the part of the
officers of the corporation to discourage stockholders
for the purpose of procuring stock, then that p·1an and
scheme has long since been abandoned. That no effort
has been made for several years to purchase this stock,
and that except for a few instanc.es no ·stock has been
purchased since 1936, and that there is no present danger
nor indication of danger that the corp.orate officers will
engage in this activity in the future. No representations
to any stockholders have been made since 1935 under
the evidence in this case which ·could discourage them in
the continued holding of their stock.

IL
1

OF

USE

·OF

CoRPORATE FuNDs IN ·THE AcQUIREMENT

OUTSTANDING

STOCK

IN

THE

uNITED

BOND

AND

FINANCE CoRPORATION.

The findings, the pleadings and pr.oof on this subJe<;t have been fully set forth under our discussion on
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the accounting order. So far as this bears on tne
appointment of a receiver, we call the Court's attention
to the fact that none of the money used by the corporation for the purchase of this stock was misappropriated
or converted by Beckstead or any of the other individual
defendants. There is no finding that they did. There
is no pr.oof that they did. The stock which was obtained
by the use of these corporate assets is now owned by
the Finance Corporation and fully and accurately accounted for in the records of the Finance Corporation
introduced in evidence at the trial. The conditions which
existed at the time the great bulk of this was purchased
we believe justified the directors of the corporation in
making the purchase of this stock.
The case of Pace VJS. Pace Brothers Co., et al., 91
Utah 132, 59 Pac. (2d) 1, was decided in June, 1935,
and this case for the first time ·established the law in
this state that the purchase by a corporation of its
outstanding stock is prohibited ~by law. Th[s case of
course was decided after the great majority of the stock
had been purchased by the corrp9ration.
We submit that the evidence would clearly indicate
that prior. to the announcement of the opinion in the
Pace case that the pra~tice of corporations in buying
in their own stock was considered lawful and was a
general practice among corporations doing business
here at that time.
e do not believe this Court, or
any Court, would hold that directors in the position
of defendants in this case. who purchased the stock of

''T
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tue corporation in accordance '"ith a general p·ractice
or custom \Vere guilty of 1nismanagement. It appears
conclusiYely from the record that this practice has
ceased, and that it ceased for all practical purposes in
1936. Further1nore, we are not prepared to admit that
the practice as followed by the corporation herein does
,·iolence to the holding of the Court in the Pace case.

III. TRANSACTIONs RELATING To
sTOCK CoMPANY.

THE BECKSTEAD LivE-

Heretofore in our discussion with respect to the
accounting order we have set forth in detail the findings,
the pleadings and the proof with respect to this phase of
the case.
We have called the Court's attention to the fact that
the -complaint charges Beckstead with the organization
of the Beckstead Livestock Company for the purpose
of diverting property of the United Bond and Finance
Corporation to his own use, and that in the ·Complaint
it is charged that upon the organization of the Livestock
Company the full stock issue vvas taken by Beckstead
without consideration and is no'Y held and claimed by
him, and that there is present danger that it \vill be
negotiated to bona-fide purchasers for value without
notice to detriment .of the Finance Corporation. This
charge is contrary to the finding, in that the Court seems
to find that the invest1nent of corporate assets in the
Beckstead T.Jivestock Company was an act of mismanageDlent. The Court found of course, as required by the
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evidence, that all of the stock of the Beckstead Livestock
Cornpany has from the outset been owned and is now
o\vned by the United Bond and Finance Corporation, and
that all property purchased with Finance Corporation
assets is now owned, possessed and controlled by the
Beckstead Livestock Company.
We subrnit to the C•ourt that if it had been found
that the directors of the United Bond and Finance Corporation organized this company with fraudulent and
unlawful intent, then under those circumstances their
actions would have amounted to mismanagement. There
is, however, no such finding, and no evidence upon which
such finding could have been made.
The only rna tter that can present an 1s·sue, as revealed by the evidence, ls on the question concerning
the wisdon1 of this investment. No contention was ever
made to the effect that the ranch property was worth
less than the consideration paid. The evidence would
seem to indicate that these investments are good investments and that there are good prospects for future
earnings and profits from this venture.
Courts, without any exception, from the very earliest
time have denied receiverships even where the judgn1ent
exercised by the corporate officers was not the best, where
it was exercised in good faith in corporate matters
and for greater reasons receiverships are denied where
there is doubt concerning the wisdom and the judgment which actuated the acts of the corporate officers.
The only evidence in the record on this question is to the
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effe-ct that the eorporate officers in good fa,ith believed
they 'vere acting for the best interest of the corporation
in procuring this property. They have managed it
wisely, efficiently and well. There is no showing that
a receiver could be of any benefit "\vha tsoever to the
corporation, its stockholders or these plaintiffs, in taking over this property. The uniform experience of the
Courts would indicate that a receiver could not operate
these pr·operties vvi th the efficiency and economy that
the board of directors ·can. We say confidently that
there is nothing connected with the Beckstead Livestock
Company which would require or justify the Court to
seriously consider the appointment of a receiver, and
certainly there is nothing which appears in the proof
or findings on this subject which could cause anyone
the slightest apprehension as to the destruction, loss or
waste .of corporate property.

IV.

BECKSTEAD's DoMINATION OF THE AFFAIRs

OF

THE DEFENDANT CoRPORATIONS.

Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that Beckstead
has dominated the affairs of these corporations since
their organization. This without ·question is true.
We believe that the findings truly set forth the result
of Beckstead's domination and contr.ol of the Finance
Corporation. It is found that stock in the amount of
$33'2,000.00 has been sold by the Finance ;Corporation.
(Finding No. 11) That in the course of the Finance
Corporation acquiring its outstanding stock $203,000.00
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of the corporation's stock liability has been discharged
by the ~se of $85,000.00 of corporate assets (Findings,
Nos. 19, 22, 36) and that the coJ1loration still has in
excess of $300,000.00 worth of property (Finding No.
42) and Beckstead himself is financially irresponsible
(Finding 35).
In the complaint it is alleged and charged that Beckstead has dominated the ~affairs of the corporation since
prior to 1931 " 7ith a scheme and purpose in mind of
unlawfully diverting the assets of the corporation to his
own use and benefit. The Court finds that the s·cheme
was not as alleged, but to use the corporate assets for
the benefit of his stockholdings. Neither the charge nor
the findings are supported by the evidence. The evidence conclusively shows that from the outset 'Beckstead
has held the majority of the voting stock and that he held
such majority prior to the time that one single share of
the outstanding stock was repur.chased.
In considering this matter of domination

the~

Court

must have in 1nind the question as to whethet or not
this domination \vhich can be 1n.ore accurately described
as manage1nent, has been for the benefit or detriment of
the corporation itself.

That the corporation's property

has been protected appears clearly from the evidence.
That its debts, obligations and taxes have been paid
likewise appears. The plaintiffs were willing to stipulate
that all of the apartment houses, the ranches, the livestock and other properties of the corporation are being
cared for with efficiency and a high degre.e of care and
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- skill and at the same time the plaintiffs .produce proof
~

'

:- indicating that none of the corporate property had been
~-

...

diverted to Beckstead personally or to any 1nembers of

~

his family or to any other person 'vhoinsoever.
From a consideration of the evidence, 'vhich indi-

~

cates that this corporation ca1ne into existence a short

]I

time prior to the great depression; that it survived

!

the depression, and is now in a solvent, flourishing,

condition, having a large surplus over liabilities of
any kind, we cannot understand how a C.ourt could
·- charge the activities of those responsible for this state
m of affairs with _misn1anagement or with wrongful d.om' 1na
. t•1on.
Every corporation which has ever been organi~ed
is dominated by those holding a majority of its oustand- ing voting stock. Ever:T investor in any corporate enterprise understands this to be the rule. Every investor
in this corporation knew at the ti~me he bought his
stock whether or not his stock carried voting privileges,
and if it did, he kn~w and understood that the cor-. p.oration would be run and managed by those holding
a majority of the voting stock.
r~

These plainti~s are not entitled to a receivership
, Iuerely because they do not hold a majority of the voting
~ stock of this corporation. The position of the minority
b
stoekholders \vill not lbe made ,m.ore secure by the appointmPnt of a receiver for the .simple reason that immedia tnly upon the discharge of the receiver those holding
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a majority ,of the voting stock will again take control
of the management of the corporate affairs.

V.

BECKSTEAD's

FINANCIAL

RELATIONS

WITH THE

DEFENDANT CoRPORATIONs.

It is found that 'Beckstead has :r;eceived from said corp·ora tion from 1931 to January 1940, a salary of $100.00
per week, and that commencing with said latter date he
has ·Caused his salary to become increased to the sum
of $6,000.00 per annum, the United Bond and Finance
Corporation to pay $250.00 a month and the Livestock.
Company a like sum. It is further found that Beckstead,
with the consent of the Board of Directors, has caused
the funds of the Finance Corporation to he invested in
certain residence property in Salt Lake City which has
been occupied by Be-ckstead and his family, and that
inadequate rent is paid therefor. It is further found
that the said residence property is the third so acquired
by Beckstead with funds of the Finance Corporation
for his exclusive use. (Finding No. 34) It is further
found that Beckstead 1s financially irresponsible. (See
Finding No. 35)
The only allegation with respect to Beckstead's
financial relation with the company is contained in paragraph (11) of paragraph (10) found on p~age (12) of
the complaint, vvherein it is alleged that Beckstead and
Boyd Evans are drawing funds in substantial amounts
from the United Bond ·and Finance Corporation under
the guise of salaries or compensation, and without right
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or authority to do so, and \Yithout rendering services or
o-iying·'-- consideration thert•for. There is no findin2· that
b
Beckstead reeeiYed money "·ithout legal right or au,,
' thority to do so, and there i~ no finding· that he received
this money ·without rendering serviees and g·iving consideration therefor.
<

L>

The balance of the findings with respect to Beckstead's relation \Yith the company relate to the purchase
of residence property by the Finance Corporation "\vhieh
were .occupied by Beckstead and his family, and that an
inadequate rent was paid therefor. There ~s absolutely
no allegation with respect to this matter, and hence it
is not an issue in the ease.
It is difficult to understand how a receiver could
- be of any benefit to the corporation, its stockholders
- or these plaintiffs in regard to this matter. We submit
that if the plaintiffs had 'been of the opinion that the
rent paid by Beckstead 'vas inadequate they would have
attempted to plead and prove this proposition. There
was neither pleading nor evidence offered to show that
the rent was inadequate. If the plaintiffs had believed
that the consideration paid B-eckstead for his services
to these corporations was excessive they should have
pr.oduced some evidence to that effect. They produced
none. If it should appear to the Court, regardless of
the lack of evidence, that the rent is inadequate or the
salaries excessive, these rna tters can be reached and.
rmnedied ·by a simple order of the Court which has before
it all parties and the evidence upon which to act. Surely
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there is no place here for a receiver, nor any reason
why one should be appointed.
VI.

STOCK IN

TAINED AND HELD

THE FINANCE

BY

CoRPORATION As OB-

BECKSTEAD.

This matter has been fully discussed herein in connection with our argument on the accounting· order.
We believe that that discus~ion c~nclusively shows that
the stock ·Obtained ·by Beckstead was obtained in each
instance for valuable consideration and was fully paid
for. In any event, all of this stock was obtained in 1927
and 1928, between twelve and thirteen years before the
commencement of the present action.
In this, as in the other 1natters hereinabove discussed,
there is 1io place for a receiver, nor any reason why
one should be appointed. If this stock is held and owned
by Beckstead in violation of law and as a result of a
fraud perpetrated upon the corporation, then there
should have ·been allegations, proof and findings .to that
effect.

There are none, and even if there were, there

see1ns to be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law
or in equity available to these plaintiffs, to-wit, an action
for the rescission of these transactions.

There is no

such action before the Court and no such relief sought
nor granted herein. It .cannot be said from the transac·
tions involving· t4is stock that there is any apprehension
of loss, destruction or waste of corporate property.
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'\'II.

!NYE5TOn.~ THRIFT CoMPA~Y.

(.A. )

FINDINGS

OF

FACT.

It is found that \Yhile Beckstead \Yas 1n complete
control of the United Bond and Finance Corporation
and acting with three employees of that corporation who
were controlled by him, and on September 22, 1931, he
~organized the In,?estors Thrift Company, using as the
funds of said new corporation (property which was
wholly owned by the United Bond and Finance Corporation. It is found that this corporation vvas organized for the purpose of trading its stock for .stock in
the United Bond and :finance Corporation, and that its
stock was so used. It is stated that in furtheranice of
this scheme of freezing out the stockholders of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation, that Beckstead
and Hill, one of the foregoing employees, caused to be
assigned to them individually and 'vithout coU:sideration,
as.sets, property and contracts. of the United Biond and
Finance Corporation which were thereafter assigned to
the Investors Thrift Corporation, and that for said
assets there was issued to Hill one share of preferred
stock and 7,998 shares of common stock in the said
Investors Thrift, and to Beckstead one share of preferred stock and 7,999 shares of eo,m•m.on. Hill becal!le
the President and Beckstead its general manager. It is
further f.ound that after many stockholders of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation had exchanged their
stock for stock in the Investors Thrift Company, Beckstead and his associates caused the said Thrift Company
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to be dissolved on July 28, 1938, and that a small amount
or percentage of the money invested by the stockholders
in the Investors Thrift C:ompany was returned to them,
and that the balance of said investment became lost to
them. Prior to the dissolution practically all of· the
stock of the Investors Thrift had been acquired by and
issued to the United B~ond and Finance Corporation.
It was also found that Beckstead had complete control
at all times of the Investors Thrift Company. (See Findings Nos. 11, 15 and 31)
(B)

PLEADINGS.

So far as .the Investors Thrift Company is concerned there is an allegation in paragraph (3) that it
is a corporation of ,the State of Utah, and that it was
organized and wholly dominated by Beckstead for his
use and purpose, ''as hereinafter mor~ fully set forth."
Then in the first paragraph of paragraph (10) it is
alleged that the Investors \Thrift was a corporation
which Beckstead had caused to be set up to further
his purposes of obtaining the stock of stockholder·s in
the Finance Corporation, .and to enable him to take over
to himself the assets held by the latter company, and
that after the stockholders had exchanged their stock in
the Finance Corporation for the stock in the Investors
Thrift Company that Beckstead fraudulently caused the
Thrift Company to be dissolved as .a corporation having
no assets.
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(C)

PROOF AND DISCUSSION.

The finding-s in this case do not disclose that there
was _any nrismanag-ement in the transactions between the
Investors Thrift C.ompany and the Finance Corporation.
It appears, that at the tilne of the dissolution of the
Thrift Company that it \vas almost entirely owned by
the Finance Corporation.
There is no finding of fact that the Finance Corporation lost any of the assets which were transferred
to the Thrift Company. There was no evidence that
the Finance Corporation lost any of this property. The
evidence on this subject discloses, and it was uncontradicted, that the Finance Corporation contracted to sell
hro apartment houses to Hill and .Beckstead. Hill and
Beckstead then transferred this contract to the Thrift
Company and received stock in the latter company. This
transaction occurred in 19'31. In 1933 all of these properties were re-transferred to the Finance Corp~oration
and Hill testified fron1 the cards containing a record of
this transaction, that the Thrift Company paid to
Finance Corporation a sum which exceeded the total of
all rents collected during the period of time within
which the Thrift Company held these apartments under
the contract aforesaid. This property was not misappropriated or diverted. .The Court ordered no accounting with respect to it and the books of the company
were in Court and fully disclosed the transaction.
These transactions oc-curred from seven to nine years
previous to the commencement of this action, and ·cerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tainly from this past conduct neither the Court nor the
plaintiffs can feel any apprehension that there will be a
waste, loss or destruction of any of the corporate assets
of the Finance Corporation. The evidence is clear and
undisputed that the Finance Corporation did not suffer
any loss or detriment as a result of the incorporation and
operation of the Investors Thrift Company. Evidently
the trial Court could not say in what way or in what
manner a receiver could be of any benefit to the corporation, its stockholders or these plaintiffs in regard to
these transactions. No accounting was ordered. There
is no present activity whatsoever, the Investors Thrift
Company having been disorganized several years ago.
It furnishes no reason nor support whatsoever for the
a.ppoint~ent of a receiver.
VIII. AsHTON-JENKINs IN-suRANCE

AGENCY.

The findings of fact, pleadings and proof on this
subject have heretofore been fully discussed. The evidence discloses that there wa.s no loss to the corporation
as a result of this venture. It occurred eight years
previous to the commencement of this action. There
is nothing involved in this transaction that can be
remedied or prevented by a receiver.

IX. AcQUIRING OF CoNTROLLING SToCK INTERESTS IN
THE AsHTON-JENKINS CoMPANY.
This matter has been fully discussed with respect
to findings, pleadings and proof in connection with our
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argument on the accounting order, and again we say that
there is nothing here which can be remedied, aided or
prevented or in any way affected by the appointment
of a receiver. This matte.r had occurred and terminated
eight years prior to the commencement of this action.

X.

CAxcELLATIONS

OF

PARTIALLY

PERFORMED

CoN-

TRACTs FoR THE PuRCHASE OF STocK AND SECURITIES

ON

lNSTALLl\IEXT PLA.~ .

..._\s heretofore pointed out this matter involves a
question of bookkeeping only. There can he no appre-.
hension from the manner in which these forfeited payments "\vere handled that there will be any loss, waste
or destruction of corporate p-roperty.

XI.

LEGAL AcTIONs PENDING AGAINST THE FINANCE

CoRPORATION.
(A)

FINDINGS OF FACT.

In finding No. 22 it is fou,nd that as a result of the
activity of Beckstead in obtaining this outstanding stock
that many of the said investors who gave up their investment certificates upon such representations have sought
to rescind said transaction, and have demanded a return
of their investment, and numerous actions have been filed
in Court for the recovery of said investment certificates
frou1 the United Bond and Finance Corporation and
said Beckstead. Beckstead has caused, and continues
to cause, said eorp:aration to resist the rescissions and
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to refuse to reinstate said investors 1n the ownership
of said stock, and by reason thereof has involved the
corporation in litigation.
(B)

PLEADINGS.

In paragraph (6) of paragraph (10) of the complaint it is alleged that beeause of the matters therein
set out, and the imposition upon various stockholders
under the plan and purpose and conspiracy of Beckstead to get control and dominate the affairs of the
corporation, numerous actions have been filed against
the corporation and against Beckstead~
(C)

PROOF AND DrscussiON.

It is true that at the time of trial certain actions
were pending against the ·United Bond and Finance
C~orporation.

At page 936 of the record is a stipulation
stated in the record ·concerning these suits. From the
stipulation it appears that at that time three suits praying rescission and which were at issue were then pending. That a complaint in another suit seeking rescission had been filed to which· demurrer had been interposed and the demurrer had not been disposed of.
Three suits for attorney's fees were mentioned in the
.stipulation. The three latter suits have .now been compromised, settled and dismissed. The three suits at issue
seeking rescission are still pending and have not been
tried, and the demurrer is still undisposed of in the
fourth suit. It appears also that Mr. D. A. Skeen, who
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is one of eounsel in this ac.tion, Is also counsel in the
three suits at issue praying rescission.

These suits

were mentioned in the cross examination of the witnesses, Hoffman, Jackson, Wilson, Petty and Thurman.

It appears that these suits have been pending for a
long period of tin1e. It appears from the evidenec that
the United B.ond and Finance Corporation has offered
rescission to the plaintiffs involved in these three S'uits.
We refer to the testimony of Beckstead beginning at
page 1651 of the record wherein he related an offer made
to these plaintiffs for rescission. He stated at page 1652
in answer to a question by his own counsel:
"'\\~ell

we issued stock certificates and I understand they \Vanted to rescind, that is what
Mr. Skeen said. So we took the certificates dovvn
to Lehi, 2\lr. Evaris and I, and tendered the .certificates and offered to put them in their original
position and they said they wouldn't do that
unless they talked with Mr. Skeen, HO I advised
them to call Mr. Skeen up and so they agreed to
call Mr. Skeen up and whatever ~fr. Skeen advised them to do they would do, but they would
not accept a rescission at that time.
·

Q. Ha.ve they ever requested a rescission
·sinee that time ~
A.

No sir.

Q. Did you have similar conversations with
people from Randolph~
A .. Yes sir.

Q.

And where did those conversations take

place'
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A. They·took place in the office of the United
Bond and Finance Co~poration in the Mcintyre
Building.
approximately~

Q.

And when

A.

That was a ·year and one-half ago.''

This offer of rescission was again related by the
witness Beckstead <?n recross examination commencing
a.t .page 1678 of the record. Similar testimony was given
by the witness Boyd Evans. (R. 1094-1095 ). Evans testified, in part, as

foll~ows

:

''A. I will have to give. you an explanation
along with that. These people that you have
just referred to, the two Thurmans and Hoffman
and the J acks~on people, were the instigators here
in a suit brought against the corporation under
the head of John Wilson and Mayme 'Vilson of
Park City, Utah.
Q.

For rescission wasn't

it~

A. For rescission, and these certificates here
evidenced the willingness of the corporation to
make settlement with these people ·and rescind
the transactions and an effort was made and these
people were contacted ·and an attempt was made
to place in their hands these certificates and put
them back in their original position 'vi th the
United Bond an~ Finance Corporation.''
At the time appellants' cause was presented to the
trial Court on its ·motion for new trial counsel for
appellants suggested to the trial Court upon authorization by their clients that this offer of rescission was
ori~nally made in good f.aith, had never been withdrawn,
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and the parties affeeted by the offer were invi ted to take
advantage of it at any time they felt so disposed.
\V e now say to the Court that the offer of rescis-

sion has not been withdra\vn and the parties to \Vhom
the offer was originally made may still receive its
benefits. This offer of rescission is a complete
vnswer to the charge made in the complaint that the
officers of the corporation were guilty of mismanagement
in resisting these suits for rescission and spending corporate funds. in an effort to defeat the demands of the
Etigants.
It may be pertinent to call the Court's ·attention
to the fact that this offer of rescission was made long
prior to the time \vhen the complaint in this case was
filed. These litigants do not need the aid of_ a Court of
equity nor of a receiver to become reestablished as
stockholders in this corporation. It is needless to say
that no purpose can be served in this respect by the
appointment of a reeeiver.
We suggest that the offe·r of re.scission _made in
good faith to these people has been rejected and the suits
allowed to remain untried for the purpose of bolstering
up this action for receivership.
Again we say that the actions against the corpor(:tion, as alleged and found and hereinabove discussed,
furnish no ground, reason or support to the order appointing receiver. The only judgment prayed for is
rescission. Rescission has been offered and for that
reason there is no possi'bility of any undue ·or unnecesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sary expenditure of corporate assets in opposition to
these la"v suits as alleged in the complaint, certainly
a receiver could do no more.
XII.
PRIATION

GENERAL CHARGES AND FINDINGS

OF

OF

MISAPPRO-

CoMPANY's AssETS.

In finding· No. 46 the Court finds "that since the
organization of said United Bond and Finance Corporation the said W. R. Beckstead has taken and received
in his own name and in the names of other individuals
and corporations for his o"\vn benHfit, money, property
and assets of the United Bond and Finance Corporation
in large and substantial amounts, which amounts cannot be determined without a full accounting; that no
legal action has ever been taken by the stockholders or
directors ·of said corporation authorizing or approving
said action, and the said W. R. Beckstead has never
rendered or made any accounting, or accounted to said
United Bond and Finance ·Corporation, to its stockholders and investors for the money, property and assets
Qf the said United Bond and Finance Corporation received and h~ld and ·controlled by him.''
It will be noted that this finding is not reflected in
either the conclusions of law or the decree, there being
no conclusion to the effect that the corporation is entitled to any judgn1ent or any relief based on this finding,
and the decree -contains no order whatsoever which in any
way indicates that this finding was considered by the
Court in making its judgment and decree. It is subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mitted that this finding is the only finding in harmony
with plaintiff's theory ns reflected hy the complaint.

By its co1nplaint the plaintiffs attempted to allege a
cause ·of action based on \Yrongful diversion and rnisR. Beckstead
appropriation of company's assets by
and other defendants. ''rhile the Court finds that Beckstead used corporate funds to purchase outstanding
corporate stock on behalf of the corporation the pleader
alleges that Beckstead used corporate funds to purchase
outstanding stock· for himself. In the complaint it is
alleged that Beckstead has made numerous sales and
transfers of Finance Corporation properties, and the
proceeds were received by others_ than the Finance .Corporation, and that· he has caused large sums of money
to be paid out for his own personal benefit without making any accounting. That many books of the corporation
have been destroyed and additional ones fraudulently
written up by Beckstead, all for the purpo.se of carrying out the scheme of misappropriation. The astonishing thing in this finding No. 46 is that it is made in the
face of the fact that no attempt whatsoever was made
by the plaintiffs to support any of these charging allegations. The record of this case may be searched in vain
for one scintilla of evidence which in the slightest degree
estalblishes and supports t_hese charges. ·This finding
without any question of doubt stands in the record unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. This Court may
rest assured that if there had been any sho,ving of the
taking of any property there w·onlu be a specific finding
on it.

' T.
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This record of 1800 pages may be searched in vain
· for evidence of any property which Beckstead has taken
in his own name or that of other individuals or persons
·other than in legitimate trans-actions wherein the
Finance Corporation received full consideration for the
property parted with by it .. We have searched diligently
to find any bases for this finding. There is none.
It is significant to note that finding No. 46 is· the
only finding which would indicate the presence in the
rec.ord o.f any evidence establishing the charges of
wrongful diversion and misappropriation by Beckstead
and the corporate officers, and yet there is no finding
whatsoever of any particular item of diversion. This
case "ras before. the Court for several weeks. The widest
soope on. the matter of proof that can be imagined was
permitted, and presu1nably the cause was tried on a
complaint based on the theory of wrongful diversion and
misappropriation. Yet not one finding in particular was
made by the Court.
There are a number of findings which apparently
are n1ore or less con.clusi·ons from the findings heretofore mentioned.
44.

We refer to findings Nos. 39, 42, 43,

It is found that the mismanagement of Beckstead

and his associates has become systematic and habitual
and has become interwoven in the general business of
said .corporation as heretofore and now conducted. It
is found that the United Bond and Finance Corporation
has property of a value in excess of $300,000.00; that
this property is in imminent danger of being lost and
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destroyed, materially injured and misn1anaged, and that
the United Bond and Finance Corporation is in grave
and imminent danger of having its remaining assets
, dissipated and pern1anently lost to Plaintiffs and others
similarly situated. All this, according to the findings,
b will happen unless a receiver is ap;pointed.
\Y"e submit that these general findings add nothing
to plaintiffs cause. There n1ust be some evidence and
some findings justifying the conclusion which is stated
in such bold terms.
We have taken up item by item all of the things
- which could possibly have any bearing at all upon the
_ subject matter of mismanagement or danger to corporate assets. \V. e submit that we have conclusively shown
that the findings and evidence relating to these several
iten1s do not show mismanagement or imminent danger
to corporate a:ssets. In connection with this finding
of systematic and habitual mismanagement it appears
that the Court in making this finding had in mind the
alleged plan of discouraging stockholders in order that
their stock might be purchased by the corporation at less
than its true value. We submit to the Court that if there
ever -was any discouragement or plan of disc:ouragement
it was entirely abandoned in the latter part of 1935, and
is in no sense habitual, and is not in any way influencing
the operation .of the corporate affairs at this time.
'Ve confidently assert that a careful and analytical
c~onsideration of this cause· as shown by the pleadings,
proof, findings and decree, lead irresistibly to one conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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elusion, and that is that the record reflects no beneficial
~or needful purpose for the appoint1nent of a receiver in
this case. There is nothing which has been made to
appear in the record of this case which would indicate
that a receiver could be of benefit or profit to the corporation, its stockholders ·Or these plaintiffs, or that
such appointment is necessary to prevent fraud or to
save the property of the -corporation from injury or
threatened destructi.on. The record would indicate, we
think that the greatest danger this corporation faces
is the danger of receivership. The law is well settled
and established by the overwhelming weight of authority
that a receiver will not be appointed where it appears
that receivership will not be of aid, benefit or profit
to the corpo:ra.tion and its stockholders and is not necessary in order to prevent fraud or save the property
of the corporation from injury or threaten~d loss or
destruction.
The record is devoid of any evidence upon which the
Court could make a finding that there is any present
danger whatsoever to the property of this corporation
or that there is any danger of insolvency or any danger
that the property will not continue to be managed in
a highly efficient and profitable manner.

There is no

evidence in this ·record which would support a finding
that the corporation should be dissolved as a going roncern and its assets liquidated and distributed. There
is no ·evidence in the reoord from which a Court could
make a finding that the present management of the
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corporation is not entirely honest and mindful of the
welfare and property rights of these stockholders.
The plaintiffs ha Ye neYer indicated or shown any
beneficial purpose for the receivership sought. They have
,made no effort to enlig·hten the ,Court as to the exact purpose for \Yhich they seek receivership. They have not indicated, and neither has the Court, w--hether the receiver is
to manage the corporation and operate it as a going concern ~or whether a dissolution and liquidation of the
corporation and a distribution of its assets among the
various stockholders is contemplated. No suggestion has
yet been made as to how or in what manner the receivership will aid ~or be necessary to the carrying out of the
accounting order.
1

The authorities establish and fully support the following propositions :
To justify the appointment of a receiver it must
appear that the mismanagement or misdeeds of the
corporate officers and directors has caused a well grounded apprehension that the corporate assets will be lost,
wasted or destroyed.
1.

2. That past mig.conduct or misdeeds do not justify
an apprehension of loss or destruction of the corporate
assets and hence cannot support the appointment of a
receiver.
3. Receivership must be for some useful purpose and must he in aid of the primary relief sought
and obtained, and will not be decreed ot?erwise.
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4. If there is an adequate remedy. in la"· or in
equity the a.ppointn1ent of a receiver is not justified.
·Such remedy is g~iven only as a last resort and in extreme cases.
1.
CAUSE

THE

A

MISl\1ANAGEl\iENT

JusT APPREHENSION

MusT
·OF

BE

Loss,

STRUCTION OF CoRPORATE AssETS IN ORDER

SucH As To
WAs.TE OR DEFoR SucH Mis-

I\IANAGEMENT To BE GRoUNDS FoR THE APPOINTMEXT ()F

A

RECEIVER.

It is stated 1n Section 77:27 of Fletcher's wo1:k on
Corporation's:

''It is the general rule that a receiver will
not be appointed unless it appear that the appointment is necHssary either to prevent fraud, or to
save the property from fraud or threatened destruction, at least in case of a .solvent corporation,
and such necessity n1ust be shown to exist. by
legal evidence, and must also appear in the pleadings by clear and unambiguous allegations of
fact.''
We refer the C·ourt .to the quotation from CoTpus
Juris heretofore set out in this brief which sustains this
general statement of the law.
The case of Inscho v. Mid-Continental-Development
Company (l{an.), 146 p·a,c. 1014, states:
'·'In no ca·se sh·ould a court take the property
and 'business of a solvent going corporation out
of the hands of the hoard · o.f directors and into
its own hands by the appointment of a re ceiver
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

165
at the suit of minority stoekholders unlPss th(?
right of plalintiff be free from reasonable doubt
and danger of loss or injury be clearly pToved. ''
It was held in the ease of IIand v. Dexter, 41 Ga.
454, that it is only in a strong ca·se w·hen the majority
are clearly vci.ola ting the chartered rights of the minority
and putting their interest in imminent .danger, .that a
Court of equity ,,. .ill at the instance of 1ninority stockholders of a corporation interfere with the management
of its affairs and appoint a receiver.
(~ollins

v. Willia.1nson, 229 Fed. 59,
that the rule is too well settled to require citation of authorities that the Courts of equity in the appointment
of receivers act with great caution in applying that extraordinary remedy and require a clear case of right and
present necessity to induce their interference. That the
extreme remedy of takci.ng and keeping property of corporations out of the hands of the managers, chosen by
the stockholders, except as a last resort, should not be
applied unleS's considered absolutely neeessary for the
preservation of the corporation property.
It was said in

To the effect that the danger of loss or injury to the
rights of the stockholders should be clearly proved in
order to warflant the a,ppointment of a receiver, and
that the power should never !be exercised in a. doubtful
ease see Watkins v. National B a;nk ( Kan.) , 3'2 Pa.c. 914.
In Jones v. VanHeusen~Charles Co. (19~0), 246 N.Y.
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holders' investment he in jeopardy by the acts of the officers before a re·ceiver ·could be appointed.
In Miller v. Albert·ina Realty Comp·a;ny, 190 N. Y. S.
407, the Court stated:
'·'!The rule now generally accepted seem·s to
be that mere mi~·conduct \\rlll not justify the appointment of a. receiver unless such an appoint-·
ment ·be necessary to preserve the pr·operty or
Tights of creditors or stockholders.''
This rule is well established as indica ted by the foregoing authorities, and we have heretofore conclusively
shown that there is no danger to the asset·s of the cor·poration or to the interests of the stockholders and it is
not necessary to atppoint a receiver to preserve the assets
of the corp·oration.
2.

A

RECEIVER V\TILL NoT BE APPOINTED BECAUSE

pAST MISCONDUCT

OF

OF

OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS.

From the f·oregoing discussion it is apparent that all
of the things of which plaintiffs complain occurred betiWeen five and

thir~een

ye1ars prior to the commencement

of this action. Under the arnthorities this conduct is too
remote upon which to base any apprehension of future
J:oss or destruction of corporate properly.
In the case of Kron v. Trenton Autom·otive Collateral Compa.ny (N. J.), 124 Atl. 757, it wa·s shown that
the past dereliction of the board of directors of the corporation had resuloted in enormous losses to the corpo·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

167
ration and that many of these transactions \Yere fraudulent. The directors at the tin1e of the action, with one
or t"~o exceptions, \Yere directors at the time of the
wrongful acts Inentioned. The Court found · that the
losses to the company "~ere in 1arg-e part, if not entirely
the result of gross negligence on the part of the directors,
and that they \Yere doubtlessly personally liable. It appeared from the evidence that the directors were attempting to and \Yere carrying· on the business at a profit;
that the corporation \Yas solvent and that for a year
prior to the eommencement of the action there had been
no negLige'nce, fraud nor other mis-c-onduct. The petition
f.or receivership was di'Smissed :on the ground that the
receivership \Yas unwarranted, there being no present
necessity to prevent a wasting or fraudulent diversion
of the cor'Pora te assets.
In Kean v. Colt, 5 N. J. Equity 865, it was held that
to authorize an injunction and appointment of a receiver
there must be a well grounded apprehension of injury
about to 'be eomrnitted, and that such relief would not be
granted where the misconduct alleged occurred, if at all,
several years previously. That is too long ago to be a
ground .of apprehension of impending mischief.
This principle is well stated by Pomeroy at 4 P·omel'oy Equity Juris prudence, 1542, as follows:
''''The prin·ciple must he borne in mind that a
receivership is a preventative and not a punitive
measure. Courts do not appoint receivers as a
punishment for past dereliction nor because of
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past danger. Receivers are apP'ointed because of
present conditions and well founded apprehension as to the future.''
Fletcher in Section 7·697, Permanent Edition of his
work on Private Corporations, states:
'' Furtfuermore, Courts do· not appoint receivers for eorporations merely because of past
acts or derelictions when no present or future
harm threatens because thereof.''

J!t is also stated in S·ection

77~24

of the. Saine work:

''Where the corporation is s.olvent, a re·ceriver will not be appointed bec,ause of past luisconduct and a mere apprehension, 'based thereon,
of future misdoing, where the present situation
and the prospects of the future are not such a.s to
warrant a re.eei vership. ''
We submit that under the principle of the foregoing
authorities

the appointment of a receiver in this

case was error requiring a reversal of the decree.
3.

A

REcEIVER

WILL

NoT

BE

APPoiNTED WHERE

THERE Is No DEFLNITE PuRPOSE INDICATED AND WHERE

IT

DoEs NoT CLEARLY APPEAR THAT THE RECEIVER WILL BE
OF BENEFIT To THE CoRPORATION ANn T~E SToCKHOLDERS.

In Section 7728 of ]ffietcher 's work on Private Corporations, if is stated:
''It i'S .ground for refusal that no good can be
accomplished by the appointment of a rec.eiv~r.
* * * And it is highly inequitable to appoint
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a receiver 'vhere it appears tha.t the ultimate result "Till be a sarrifice of the assets of the corporatiJon 'Yholly to the profits ·of counsel and re·ceiver
and to costs and expenses of such receivership.
It follows a·s a eorollary, from the foregoing, that
·because the appointment \Yill.do no harm ''Till not
of itself warrant the app:ointment, and it has been
said that 'there is no case in which the court a ppoints a receiver merely be:cause the measure can
do no hlarm;' a receiver should not be appointed,
except in cases \Yhere it is evident that such appointJilent \Yill serve s·ome useful purpose.''
We have heretofore dis-cussed the proposition at
1ength that retceivers are appointed only where it appears
that the receivership is necesary to or in aid of the primary remedy decreed by the Court.
Clark in the .Second Edition of his w·ork on Re·ceivers,
Volume 1, Pa~agraph 51, P·age 5-8, states:
'''The purpose ·of the appointment of a re-ceiver after judgment is to satisfy the judgment
in •one way or another.''
Nothing has been made to appear in this case either
from the pleadings, the pr·oof, the findings, the conclusions or decree how or in what manner the receivership
herein decreed can be of :any possi1ble aid to the accounting ordered as the primary relief. There has been n~o
showing \Yhatsoever as to how or in what way the accounting .can be effectuated more ae.cur·ately or more completely or effectively with a receiver than without. Certainly the receivershijp cannot in any way 'b~nefit the corporation, its stockholders or these plaintiffs. It appears
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conclusively that this receivership has no beneficial purpose whatsoever.
Clark in his work on reeeivers, volume 1, paragraph
49, states:
''~There

is no case in which the Court appoints
a receiver 1nerely because the measure can do no
harm, and a Court will not appoint a receiver on
the ap:plieation of those who do not require it.''
A case whi·ch illustrates the relruct1ance of a Court
of equity to appoint a receiver for a. solvent going corporation at the instance of a minority stockholder on
the .ground of mismanagement ·or fraud where no beneficial purpoS"e is ma.de to appear from either the pleadings ·Or eVJidence is Miller v. Kitchen, 73 Neh. 711, 103
N. W. 297. The appointment was sought on the ground
of fraud and mismanagement on the part of the officers.
The low·er Court found that the majority stockholder
had ·eon trolled the affairs of the company for his own personal interests without regard f.or the interests of the
other stockholders; that no st·oekholders' meetings had
been called; that he had leased his own property to the
corporation for large and extrava~ant rentals; that he
had :carelessly permitted the hooks of the company t·o
be lost or destroyed and had failed to keep accurate accounts; that he had received l1a.rge sums of money, for
which he had not accounted and had ·caused to be conveyed to himself real estate of the company f.or a grossly
inadequate consideration, and had sold to t:he c.ompany
property belonging to himself at .an excessive price.
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Complaint "~a·s also made of excessive salary rec.eived by
said majority stockholder. The Trial Court appointed
a receiver and the cor-poration and the individual defendant appealed. The act of the Trial Court was reversed and receiYer discharg·ed, the Court taking the
vieiW that \YhateYer wrongs had been suffered by the
, plaintiff and other stockholdeTs by reason of the wrongful acts of the majority stockholder nlight be as fully
remedied without the app·ointment of a receiver. as they
could be if one were appointed, and that the appointment
- of a receiver \Yould be highly detrimental to the business,
- which \Yas the operation of a hotel.
The language of the Court is very pertinent to the
issues in this case. We quote :
''If a receiver were appointed as the plaintiff
prays, for how long should his appointment eontinue "l The petition does not ask for a di~solufion
of the corporation or the winding up o£ its affairs,
and the only purp·ose for which the appointment.
seems to be pra~yed is that the eonduct of the business may be taken out of the hands of the officers
of the corporatio~, who may be elected by a majority of the stockholders, and kept indefinitely in
the h1ands of the eourt. Since the defendant holds
a majority of the stock he has the power to elect
sueh officers as he may desire to conduct the corporate affairs. This is a right and privilege given
·him by law, and s·o long as these officers honestly
and faithfully carry out their trust, neither the
plaintiff nor any other sto-ckholder has a right
to complain. If a re-ceiver is appointed, there
must be an end to the receivership .sometime, and
whenever that time should come the property
would inevi taibly go in to the hands of officers
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selected by the majority stockholders, and the
plaintiff would be in no better condition then than
now so far as control of the mana.gHment is ooncerned. The ease is not one where the cor·porate
assets or property is being lost or destroyed. *
* * In the instant ease, the plaintiff, so far a~
now appears, can be gran ted all the relief for
which he prays, without taking the property into
the hands of the -court by the appointment of a
receiver; and it is not clear 'but that the interest
of the pl~a!intiff, as well as of all the other stockholders in the corporatri,on, would be injured by
the coilr_t wresting from the legally elected offi·cers of the corporation the power of control of
the eorporate affairs granted them by law."
In Argenbright v. Phoenix FVnarnce Compritny of
I ow a (Del.), 187 Atl. 124, the stockholders of several
cor·porations brought .suit against said corporations, alleging that the assets ·Of the defendant corporations had
been wflongfully sold to the Phoenix Finance Company
which was also a .corporate defendant. After a full consideration of the allegations of the complaint the Court
stated:
"\The bill fails to show any purpose to be
sought by the appointment of receivers.· Until
a .CJase is alleged wherein the utility of a receivership is at least prima facie demonstrated, the
court ·oug4t not to entertain a. bill for the appointment."
In Akers v. Corbett (Fia.), 190 So. 28, an action was
commenced by a stockholder owning half the stock
against the -corporation and the managing officer applying for an aecounting and receivership. It appeared that
the differences between the plaintiff and defendant were
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irreconcilable; that the ac.counts were con1plica.ted and
extensiYe. The Trial Court app·ointed a receiver and
ordered an accounting. An appeal \Yas taken. The pleadings and eYidenee and decree were considered. The
Court held that the judgment of the Court in ordering
an accounting \Yas proper, but that there was no show" ing or evidence produced \vhich "\vould indicate that a
receivership would in .any \vay aid or was neeessary to
~
~ the account. Therefiore, the order of the Trial Court
"' appointing a receiver was vacated and set aside and the
Court said:
~

''Another error assigned is the lack of finality in the final decree. A receiver was appointed
to take charge of the hotel property, but to what
end and for \Yhat purpO'se ~
''It is said by the authorities that appoint·ment of a receiver is to effe:ctua te a right granted
a litigant and is not in itself a right. Clark on
Receivers, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 59.
* * *
''It is an ancillary act by the court to aid in
the enforcement of a right granted to a party to
the cause. High on Receivers, 4th Ed., p. 10.
I~

~:.

.

'''Being an ancillary, as distinguished from
a primary, proceeding, it loses its signific.ance unless its purpose in relation to the .adjudication of
the principal issues is established.''

In the case of Cook v. Cook (Mass.), 170 N. E. 455

~ at 458 the Court remarked:

~

~

''The plaintiff has not made out a case for
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pointment of a receiver * * * is merely ancillary to other relief. * * * Ordinarily a receiver will not be ,appointed in actions against
direetor:s or officers of a corporation for misconduct in its management. * * * Nor will such
an appointment be made when a receivership
would amount in effect to a dissolution of the corporati,on. Richardson v. Clinton Wall Trunk
M:anuf. Co., 1S1 Mass. 580, 582-583, 64 N. E. 400,
401. ''
And the appointment of a receiver for a solvent
manufacturing corporati,on, at the instance of a

mrinorit~y

stockholder (\vho was also employed in the lbrusiness),
on the ground of fraud and mismanagement, was denied
in S:chuster v. Largman. (1'93,2), 308 Pa. 5·20,

}6~2

Atl. 305,

where the allegations in this regard "\Vere general rather
than specific, the Court saying: ·
"A re-ceivership and dissolution of the corpor,a tion is a radical remedy to be invoked only
in case of legal necessity. * * * Here the
complaining party's interest·s are not imperiled
by any alleged fraudulent manipulation of the
assets. (As .in Schipper Bros. C~oal Min. Co. v.
Economy Do1nestic Coal Co. (19'23), 277 Pa. 356,
121 Atl. 193) or internal dissension so violent as
to render corporate action impotent (as in Hall
v. City Park Brewing C·o. (1'92'8), 2'94 P. 127, 143
Atl. 58'2). A court of equity cannot intermeddle
\Vlith the internal manage.ment of a corp.oratio11,
except under special circumstances. * * * In
the ea!se before us the c:omplaint charges fraud
and 1nismanagement. The allegations are not of
that specific nature which w·ould call for the in~
terposi tion of a court of equity.''

1
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So, in Carson v ..A.llega·ny lVindow Glass Co., (1911,
C. C.) 189 Fed. 791, it 'vas held that a receiver should
not be appointed at the instance ~of a minority stockholder of a solvent manufacturing corporation, sought
not for the purpose of \Yinding· up its affairs, but for
the purpose ·Of managing the company for. the interest
of stockholders for an indefinite period, on the ground
that the majority stockholder, who was also president
of the company and who was interested in a gas company, had, through his influence in the manufacturing
company, secured its approval of an improvident contract made by him with the gas company; since, if the
contract were un,vise and improper, a receivership -could
not of itself rescind the same, and was unne-cessary to
secure redress for the wrongs alleg~e.d, and, if efforts
to induce th~ company to act were unsuccessful, relief
could ~be had through proper proceeding·s instituted by
one or more of the stockholders.

And in Metzger v. Knox, (1912) 77 Mise. 271, 136
N. Y. S. 681, affirmed without .opinion in (1912) 153 App.
Div. 911, 137 N. Y. IS. 112·9, it was held that a case calling
for the appointment of a temporary receiver at the
instance of a stockholder of a manufacturing company
was not shown on the grotmd of waste ~of funds due
to the improper payment to the president of the company of a large salary (although the prospectus put out
by the president had stated that the officers ·Of the
company were to receive no salary) the leasing by the
company from the president of lofts in a building owned
and controlled by him, the permitting of another comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pany (the stock ,of \vhich was owned and controlled by
the manufacturing company) to use part of the factory
building- and compete in the trade, and a continuing
breach of contract -contained in the bill of sale of the
manufacturing business from the president to the company,-where the corporation was a .prosperous concern,
paying dividends on both the preferred and the common
stock, and g-reat injury might result from the appointment of the receiver.
And it was held In Frost v. Puget Sownd Realty
Associates, (1910) 57 Wash. 629, 107 Pac. 1029·, that
subscribers to an investment company ·could not obtain
appointment of a receiver on the ground of n1isappropriation of funds through wrongful payment of commissions, where the -corporation was solvent, was carefully managed, and there was no probable loss which
could be av~oided by receivership.
An excellent statement of the law Is found In 19
Corpus Juris ·Secundum at pag-e 1168:

''In the absence of insolvency, or threatened
insolvency, the courts. are very reluctant to appoint a receiver for a corporati~on on the ground
of fraud or mismanage1nent, and in accordance
with the general rule already stated in Section
1461, the appointment of a receiver will not be
made when it is not necessary for the preservation. of the .property of the corporation and the
protection of the rights of the stockholders. At
least where other adequate remedies exist for
the acts complained of, the c-ourts will refuse to
appoint a receiver n1erely because ,of past or presently continuing or threatened fraudulent acts
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or n1isn1a.nagement on the part of the officers or
dirertors of the eorporation, except perhaps in
cases \Yhere insolvenry has resulted therefrom,
.or is threatened. * * * ''
It is not clear. whether or not plaintiffs desire the
appointment of a liquidating or an operating receiver.
It is clear, ho\\yever, that the appointment of a. receiver
means the civil death of this ·corporation. In receivership its credit \viii be destroyed, and experience is uni.f.orm to the effect that the expenses incident thereto
soon sap the life blood out of such concerns.
In State ex rel. Hadley v. People's United States
Bank, 197 1fo. 57 4, 94 S. W. 9·53, it \Vas stated:
"It is true it has been held that a receivership does not dissolve the corporation-that the
corporate entity is left in esse (an empty shell)
for future use; but such holdings are somewhat
by w·ay of metaphor, since, reduced to its ultimate
elements, such a receivership is the civil death
of the corporation, and nothing less. Hence the
need of extren1e caution.
4.

A

RECEIVER WILL NoT BE APPOINTED WHERE THE

PLAINTIFFs l~AVE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY EITHER AT

'OR IN

LAw

EQUITY.'

16 Fletcher's Cyc. Corporations,
as follows:

Secti~on

7714, states

'' :Jfisconduc.t or ·mismanagen1ent ought not
to be ground for a receiver where there are one
or Inore other adequate remedies, and the Courts
so hold where the question has been squarely presen ted to them.''
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The same work at Section 7729 states as follows:
"A receiver will not be appointed for a corporation where there is another adequate
remedy. In other words, a receivership should
not be awarded unless absolutely necessary; and
there is no necessity where there are other adequate remedies. And a receiver should not be appointed at any stage of the .pr~oceedings if any
other remedy will afford adequate protection to
the party applying therefor.''
It is further stated:
''An adequate remedy lby lis pendens precludes the appointment of a receiver, as does
such a remedy by -contempt proceedings, by accounting, by stay of pr~oeeedings, or by attachment or execution, or by an injunction.
''Refusal to allow stockholders to examine
books of the company is not ground, since there
are other adequate remedies, such as lby mandamus.''
The purchase of its own stoek by the United Bond
and Finance Corporation seems to have been the matter
of paramount importance with the Court.

Regardless

of its importance, in view of the authorities herein cited
such practice furnishes no

gr~ound

for receivership, be-

cause if such practice is detrimental and not to be
tolerated there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
:by injunction, whi,ch remedy is sufficient to furnish
the corporation, its stockholders and these plaintiffs
ample and complete protection.
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It is stated 1n Section 7722
Corpo-rations :

~of

Fletcher's work on

"The n1ere fact that a corporation has acted
ultra vires is not a ground for a receiver, especially since there are, ordinarily, other adequate remedies.''
In Kahen v .....-llaska Jttnk Co., et al., 111 Wash. 39,
189 Pac. 262, 10 A. L. R. 141 (1920) the Court upheld
an order refusing to grant an application £or the appointment of a receiver \Yherein the officers and directors
·were engaged in certain activities which plaintiffs contended were in violation of law~ The Court stated that
the receivership, at best, is an exceedingly harsh. re·medy,
and that if a corporation does or threatens to do some
ultra vires act, the milder remedy of injunction will
prevent the evil, and cites numerous cases to uphold
that proposition.
It was held in Curtiss v. Dean d!; Curtiss, et al., 85
vVash. 435, 148 Pac. 581, that the fact that. a majority
stockholder has caused his salary to be increased is not
a ground for appointing a receiver.

If the increase

is illegal it may be enjoined and book payments may
be recovered.
To the same effect see Horejs v. American Plu1nbing
& Steam Company, et al., (Wash.) 297 Pac. 759.
Although it appeared that the directors ·of an electric light company had, by mismanagement and by
dealings in which some of them were representing their
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own individual interests rather than the interests of the
company, involved it in -contracts, partly executed, which
ought to be set aside either as fraudulent or ultra vires
and it was shown that, unless the C-ourt interfered in'
behalf ·Of stockholders, the directors niight, before the
next election of directors, furt?er involve the company
in contracts amounting to waste and endangering the
trust fund, it was held in United Electric Securities Co.
v. Louis-i.afJta Electric Light Co., 68 Feel. 673, that
relief by injunction was sufficient, and that a receiver should be appointed, - especially where the
financial condition of the company was such that a receivership would probably result in insolvency,-provided the directors should satisfy the Court that the
existing financial difficulties could be_ met under · the
proposed injunction.
And in Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., (1895, C. C.)
70 Fed. 646, the Court refused a 1notion f.or appointment
of a receiver, sought by a stockholder, but ordered
an injunction restraining the directors from carrying
out the plan contemplated, where, over objection by a
minority, a res·olution was adopted at a stockholders'
meeting authorizing the board of directors to purchase
,shares of the company's stock, and it appeared that a
purchase of the stock was to be made by a transfer of
nearly all of the assets and property of the corporation
to a few' favored stockholders, without an equal ex·change in value, in fraud ·Of the rights of minority stockholders, wl1o protested against such action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

181
It ,,~a~ h8ld in _E~dtcards u. Bay State Gas Co., (1898,
C. C.) 91 Fed. 943, that a receiYer should not be appointed for a corporation, at the instance of stockholders, in order that the recevier Inig·ht institute legal
proceeding-s to recover pr·operty of the corporation which
it \Yas alleg·ed had been wrongfully abstracted by the
corporate n1anagement, since the stockholders who vvere
seeking the receivership might then1selves proceed in
equity for the same purpose by making all of the wrongdoers, including the offending officers, parties defendant.

So, where a stockholder in a steel comp·any brought
an action- against the holders of the majority of stock
in that and another corporation, alleging that the defendants, through their control of the two -corporations, had
fraudulently conspired to bring about an agreement
between the two companies by which the other corporation was to take over the business of the steel company, in consideration of a certain. guaranty of dividends; that the plaintiff had been induced to vote in favor
of this agreement by reason of misrepresentations made
to· her by the defendants; that the consideration for such
transfer of property was appropriated by the defendants; and that the terms and conditions of the transfer
were unfair and inequitable to the steel comp-any and its
stockholders, and would not have been made except for
the conspiracy and fraudulent intent alleged,-it wa.s
held in Devine v. Frankford Steel & Forging Co.~ (1903)
205 Pa. 114, 54 Atl. 578, that, while an injunction was
proper restraining removal of machinery, the dismantling of the plant, or otherwise materially changing its
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method of operation until final hearing, the appointment
of a receiver pendente lite was not warranted.
And in Barrett v. Green River & R. 8. Livestock
Co., (19·2i2) 28 Wyo. 379, 205 Pac. 742, it was held that
allegations in a petition by one claiming rights as· a
minority stockholder, to the effect that if the defendants
were left in possession of the corporate books, records,
and .property, evidence would be concealed and the com:pany's income used to embarrass the plaintiff in proving his case, 'vould not justify the appointment of a
receiver pendente lite; since, if there were danger that
evidence would be destroyed or concealed, the law provided other and more appropriate means for its production and preservation. The complainant in this instance
sought the determination of the ownership of the capital
stock, an accounting, and an injunction, the action being
brought against persons who claimed to be owners of
all of the stock.
The fact that the owners of a majority of the stock,
holding all of the offices, have .paid themselves larger
salaries than they should, and have blended their private business with the business of the corporation, and
failed properly to account for money of the corporation
thus commingled with their own, is held in Enterprise
Printilng & P;ub. ·C-o. v. Craig, (1924) 19 5 Ind. 309, 154
N. E. 309, denying rehearing in (1924) 195 Ind. 302,
144 N. E. 542, not a ground for the appoint1nent of a
receiver or dissolution, as these remedies are not necessary to obtain an accounting on behalf of the corporation, the business being successfully managed.
1
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It '"as held in JJ arcuse v. (i-ulleftt (iin ~lfg. Co.,
(1900) 5~ La. Ann. 1383, 27 So. 846, that there was no
necessity f.or the appointn1ent of a receiver to institute
actions to recover fron1 the officers and directors of the
corporation, "'"ho held a majority of the stoek, property
of the eorporation 'vhich a stockholder charged them
with having illegally diYerted and appropriated to themselves as salaries, since the individual stockholder might
himself bring such an action by making the corporation,
and the directors against whom relief was sought, parties. And it \Yas held, also, that the stockholder had an
adequate remedy by an action in his own name, and
that there was no necessity for the appointment of a
receiver to obtain relief, where he charged that the
directors had in bad faith, unjustifiably, and to the
prejudice of the small holders, devoted its surplus earnings to the extension of its .plant and business, instead
of declaring dividends, and that they would continue
to do so.
So, in Bordages v. Burnett, (1920) Tex. Civ. App.,
221 S. \Y·. 326, it was held that a receiver should not he
appointed for a corp·oration, at the instance of minority
stockholders, since an injunction would properly conserve their interests, where the .plaintiff sought an injunction and the appointment of a receiver ·On the ground
that the president of the corporation, who owned a
majority of the stock, had obtained for himself an exorbitant salary; that he paid an unreas-onable rent for the
building occupied by the corporation, which he owned;
that he continually diverted the funds of the company
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to invest in stock in another 0orporation; that he pur.
sued an arrogant and oppressive conduct toward the
plaintiff, and controlled the corporation throughout in
his own interests.
The want ·of merit in plaintiffs' case in view of the
authorities herein cited becomes at once apparent when
the various matters found_ by the Court are each con.
sid~red in eonnection with the time when the act
took place and its present effect upon the affairs of the
corporation and the aviliability of adequate remedies
to prevent any ~ontinuance of the act necessary.
We confidently assert that there is available to these
plaintiffs and to all stockholders of the United Bond and
Finance- Corporation, adequate and sufficient remedies
at law or in equity to protect them against any practice
or any sy~stem or scheme of 1nanagement followed by the
corporation that does not meet with the full approval
of the Court.

THERE IS A FATAL VARIANCE. BErrWIEEN THE COMPLAINT AND T'HE FIN·DINGS.

The case plead by the plaintiffs is entirely different
from the cause as found by the Court.

This becomes

apparent from a comparison of the complaint with the
findiNgs. By its complaint the plaintiffs attempt to
allege a cause based on the personal wrong doings of
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ally diverted and 'vrongfully misappropriated the property of the corporation to his own use.
The Court refused to find that \\'. R. Beckstead has
been guilty of personal 'Yrongdoing; refused to find that
he has personally misappropriated or wrongfully diverted the assets of the corporation to himself, but finds
that the corporate assets and money have been used in
the management of the corporate affairs in such a way
as to squeeze out stockholders and to secure and perpetuate Beckstead in the domination of the corporation.
The theory upon which the complaint is drawn ap.pear& some,vhat in the general allegation which constitutes the first nine paragraphs thereof.
In the fifth paragraph it is charged generally that
the corporation acquired and became the owner of
pr·operty of the value of approximately $500,000.00 "but
that by schemes and artifices and fraud perpetrated by
said defendants as more fully is herein.after set out,
much of the property which is in truth and fact the
property of the defendant corporation, stands in the
name of defendant, W. R. Beckstead, and the defendant,
Stella C. Beckstead, and corporations owned and contr·olled by said W. R. Beckstead and friends and relatives, and by persons dominated by him,'' and that said
defendant, W. R. Beckstead, is now engaged in. a systematic diversion of the assets of said corporation into
the names and possession of corporations controlled
by him and of friends and relatives and individuals
dominated by him, and is using the said property and
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proceeds and income therefrom for his personal use and
benefit.
The particular charges of misappropriation are contained in paragraph (10) of the complaint.
In the first paragraph of paragraph (10) it is
·charged that Beckstead discouraged stockholders, organized various companies and associations and traded
stock in these coq}orations and associations so organized by him for stock in the United Bond and Finance
Corporation, and ''he, the said W. R. Beckstead, took,
acquired and appropriated for his own personal use and
benefit United Bond and Finance C·orporation stock so
exchanged by Montana stockholders.''
In the second paragraph_ of paragraph (10) it is
-charged that the Tri-Base Oil Company, which was
neither corporation, partnership nor organization, but
was a fictitious entity, was organized to carry out and accomplish the purposes of Beckstead. That Beckstead
caused money and property of the defenda~t corporation in a substantial amount in excess of $100,000.00 to
be turned ·over and delivered to the organizer of this
company for use in acquiring the stock of stockholders
in the United Bond and Finance Corporation, and that
the stock so acquired "was, is, and has been willfully,
wrongfully and illegally appropriated to the use and
boenefit of the defendant, W. R. Beckstead, together with
the inc-ome therefrom.''

In the third paragraph· of paragraph (10) it is
alleged that W. R. Beckstead, with the use of $50,000.00
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m Finanee Corporation funds and assets procured a
ranch and certain personal property in \\!yoming, and
took the title in his O\Yn name, and that he ha.s ever
since taken and receiYed the rents, issues and profits
therefrom. That after the procurement of the ranch
he caused a corporation to be organized under the laws
of the State of ,,. . yoming known as the Beckstead Livestock Company with an authorized capital stock of $50,000.00. That the property so wrongfully acquired was
transferred by Beckstead to the coDporation, and in
consideration of such transfer 50,000 shares of stock
was transferred to Beckstead, and that said stock is
claimed by him as his .own personal property. It is
alleged also in paragraph (1{!) that the defendant Beckstead has caused numerous sales and transfers of real
estate and personal property of said corporation to be
made and the proceeds to be received by others than
the

def~ndant,

lTnited Bond and Finance Corporation,

and has wrongfully and fraudulently paid out large sums
of money belonging to the coDporation for his own
personal benefit.

It is also charged that many ·Of the

original books and records and papers of the defendant
corporation have been willfully, wrongfully, deliberately
and illegally destroyed and other records fraudulently
written up.
It is also charged that the defendant Beckstead is
drawing funds in substantial amounts from the United
Bond and Finance Corporation under the guise of salary
or compensation without legal authority. to do so and
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without rendering service or giving consideration therefor.
It was upon thes~ charges and these allegations and
defendants' denial of each of them that this case was
tried. The burden was upon plaintiff to prove this cause
as alleged.
All of these allegations charging fraud, conspiracy,
diversion of assets and mismanagement were denied
under oath, the burden

rest~d

upon the plaintiffs to

sustain and prove the charges upon which their complaint was based.
It was stated inK ratz v. Moser, (Ky.) 65 S.. W. (2d)
330:
''The appointment of a receiver is an extra·ordinary remedy, and although upon motion for
such appointment the court may look to the pleadings of the plaintiff, it must also look to those of
the defendant, and if the equitable grounds asserted ·in the petition for the app-ointment of a
receiver are fully denied t4ere is nothing left to
sustain the motion, and before a receiver can be
appointed under such circumstances the plaintiff
must by evidence disprove the answer and sustain
the grounds asserted by him for the appointment.
Elkhorn Hazard Coal Co. v. Fairchild, et al., 191
Ky. 276, 230 S. W. 61." .
It will be noted that these charges are definite and
certain with. few exceptions. Yet not one was f.ound to
have been established by the ·Court. · There is no finding
of fact indicating that the Court found any of. these
charges to have been sustained by the proof. In fact,
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the Court refu~ed to 1nake such finding. The Court made
findings on the subject 1uatter of each of these charges
referred to but on a theory entirel~T different' from that
alleged. ''"'"ith reference to the stock purchased the
Court found that the stock was purchased with corporate
funds and \Yas no\Y o'vned by the corporation and therefore found that it had not been wrongfully diverted and
misappropriated by B~ckstead as alleged.
''Tith reference to the Beckstead Livestock Con1pany
the Court found that the United Bond and Finance C·orporation no\Y O"\vns all of the stock of that corp·oration,
and of course found in effect that Beckstead did not own
or claim any of it. While the C·ourt did find that the
title to the ~larks property was originally taken in
Beckstead's nan1e, it was found that immediately upon
the .organization of the Beckstead Livestock Company
this .pr·operty was conveyed to it by Beckstead, thus
finding in effect that the allegations of the complaint on
this matter were untrue.
No finding was made upon the Tri Base Oil Company allegations for the very good reason that

t~ere

was

no evidence to support the allegati·on. It should be noted
that the Court after refusing consistently to make any
findings to the effect that Beckstead was guilty of personal wrong doings made a general finding to that effect
in finding No. 46. As heretofore p·ointed out this finding
is not reflected in either the conclusions nor the decree.
There is a very good reason for that. The finding is
contrary to the theory upon ·w·hich the other findings are
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made and there is no evidence whatsoever to support it.
While the plaintiffs complained of Beckstead's personal wrongdoings and of schemes and artifices used
by him to' misappropriate and divert the property to
his own name, the plaintiffs having failed to support
these allegations, the Court found without the support
of any allegations whatsoever that corporate funds· and
assets had been used in the scheme to freeze •out stockholders and to perpetuate Beckstead in his domination
of the corporate affairs, and thus made findings 0ontrary
to and wholly at variance with the cause as alleged.

POINT VII.
THE OOURT C.OM1MI·T'TED REVEIRSI:BLE ERROR 'IN FAILI'NG TO F'IN·D ON M.AT:ERIAL I·SSUEiS RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS
IN THIS CASE.

The answer of the defendants in this case was a
general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint.

No findings of fact were made upon the great

majority of material and essential issues thus raised.
At the trial plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence
whatsoever on several of these important issues, but
the defendants after their motion for dismissal had been
denied introduced evidence entirely disproving the
charges so made, and upon each of these issues the Court
made no finding whatsoever.
If we ·Consider the number of issues raised upon
1vhich no findings were made it more fully establishes
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·_,

the proposition that the case pleaded was not the ·case
found and the Court relied upon other and different
facts than those alleged in making the decree which was
entered herein. \r e propose to point out the many
issues raised and upon whir h no finding \vas made.
In paragraph ( 5) of the complaint at R. 4 it is alleged
that by schemes and artifices and fraud perpetrated
by the defendants much of the property which is the
property of_the Finance Corporation stands in the name
of Beckstead and his wife, or -corporations owned and
controlled by Beckstead and friends and relatives - and
persons dominated and controlled by him. This allegation was denied but no finding whatsoever was made
on this issue.
In paragTaph (6) at R. 5 it is alleged that Egbert
Pandolfo acted \vith and for the defendant Beckstead in
carrying out his plans and purposes in the domination
and control and dissipation of the assets of the Finance
Corporation, and particularly in dealing with the stockholders of the said corporation within the State of Montana.

This allegation was denied and no finding was

made upon this issue.
In paragraph (10), R. 7 it is alleged that Beckstead
''took and acquired and appropriated· for his own p-ersonal use and tbenefit United Bond and Finance C'orporation stock'' exchanged for Investors Thrift Company
Stock and American Keene Plaster and Cement Company Stock. This allegation was denied by the answer
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of the defendants and no finding was made by the Court
on this issue.
In paragraph (10) R. 7 it is alleged that the Tri
Base Oil Company was operated by Pandolfo mainly
to carry out and accomplish the purpose of Beckstead in
diverting and converting the assets and income of the
Finance Corpnration. This allegation was denied and
no finding made upon the issue.
In paragraph (10) R. 7 and 8, it is alleged that to
accomplish the foregoing purpose Beckstead caused
money· and property of the Finance Corporation in
excess of $100,000.00 to- be turned over ~nd delivered
to Pandolfo, and that Beckstead acquired for his own
personal use and benefit the Finance Corporation stock
obtained by the use of the Tri Base Oil certificates. It
is further alleged that the stock and its income was
appropriate-d to the use and benefit of Beckstead with
intent to permanently deprive the Montana investors
of their funds, investment and property. These allegations were denied by the answer and no finding was
made.
I

In paragraph (10) R. 9 it. is alleged that Be-ckste.ad
entered into the possession of the property in Wyoming
purchased by the use of corporate assets and appropriated it to his own use and benefit, and that he has taken
and received the rents, issues and profits therefrom and
has wholly failed to account therefor. to the Finance
Corporation. These allegations were denied by the ans,:ver and nn finding was made upon the issue.
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In paragraph (10) R. 10 it is alleged that the Beckstead Livestock C·ompany is a subterfuge and a device
for holding for Beckstead some of the properties of the
Finance Corporation 'vhich Beckstead had fraudulently
and illegally diverted from the company to his own
personal use and benefit. This alleg-ation was denied in
the answer and no finding was made upon said issue.
It is further alleged in paragraph (10) R. 10 that
the title to the ~Iarks p·roperty, the Carter place and the
\rebb ranch, together with the livestock and personal
property an:d improvements thereon, has been fraudulently and illegally withheld from the Finance Corporation. This alleg·ation was denied and no finding made
upon the issue.
In paragraph (10) R.. 10 it is alleged that Beckstead
holds 50,000 shares of &tock in the Beckstead Livestock
Company and that this stock is sulb.jec:t to being negotiated or transferred and placed beyond the reach of the
Finance Corporation. This allegation was denied and no
finding was made upon that issue.

.

In many places throughout the complaint, and in
particular in paragraph (10) R. 10 it is alleged that the
whole purpose of the officers and directors since the
f.ormation of the Finance Corporation has been to divert
and convert the assets and inco1ne of said corporation
to their ·own uses and benefit. This allegation, as well
as the others, was denied by the answer of the defendants, and there was no finding whatsoever made upon
this basic and ilnportant issue.
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In said paragraph at R. 10 it is alleged that the
rights of the stockholders of the Finance Corporation
have been ruthlessly trampled and their demands for
information and redress ridiculed. This allegation was
denied by the answer and no finding was made upon this
ISSUe.

In paragraph (10), R. 11 it is alleged that the
property theretofo.re described in the complaint, owned
by the Finance ·Corporation and held for the benefit of
Beckstead, has produced a substantial income and Beckstead has failed to account to the corporation for such
income and he has failed to pay the expenses incurred
in pr~operly looking after said property or to pay the
taxes thereon, and that he has permitted the taxes on
said property and other substantial properties owned
by the Livestock Company to become delinquent and
said property is now being advertised for sale for taxes,
and that by reason thereof the property and assets of
the corporation are in danger of being encumbered and
lost to the corporation. These allegations were denied
by the answer and no finding was made upon such issue.
In paragraph (10) R. 11 and 12 it is alleged that
Beekstead has ·caused numerous sales and transfers of
real estate and pers·onal property of the Finance Corporation to be made and the proceeds to be received
by others than the Finance Corporation, and that Beckstead has fraudulently paid out large- sums of money
belonging to the corporation for his own personal benefit,
and wholly without making any record or accounting
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from the Finance Corporation. This is denied by the
ans\Yer and no finding is n1ade upon that issue.
In paragraph (10) at R. 1:2 it is alleged that many
of the original bo-oks, records and papers of the defendant corporation have ,been deliberately and illegally
destroyed, and that other and additional records have
been fraudulently written up Qr made by Beckstead or
at his direction so as to sh{)W ·only such information as
he desired, and that the Finance Corporation has not
kept and does not now keep or have complete or accurate
records ·of its business transactions or of the disposition
of a large part of its property and assets. These allegations are denied in the answer, and no finding is made
upon the issue thus raised.
In paragraph (10) at R. 12 it is alleged that the
plaintiffs have made numerous attempts to obtain a
statement or accounting of the business and affairs of the
Finance Corpo-ration and to obtain access to the books
and records of said corporation, but they have been
unable to obtain such state·ment or accounting or to obtain access to such books and records. These allegations
are denied in the answer and no finding is made upon the
Issue.
In paragraph (10) at R. 12 it is alleged that Beckstead and Boyd Evans are drawing funds in substantial
amounts from the Finance Corporation under the guise
of salaries or compensation without legal right or authority to do so and without rendering or giving considSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eration therefor. This allegation is denied by the ansv,'er and no finding is made upon that issue.
It is further alleged in said paragraph (10) at R. 12
that by reason of the do1nination of the affairs of the
Finance Corporation the defendant dire·ctors have not
and are not taking proper or any steps to recover the
property and assets of the Finance Corporation and to
protect them from dissipation and loss. This allegation
is denied in the answer ~nd no finding is made upon
the ISSUe.
In said paragraph (10) at R. 13 it is alleged that by
fraudulent cunningly devised and systematic looting of
Montana stockholders and other fraudulent schemes,
the defendants have diverted and distributed the controlling interests in said corporation and the controlling
stock therein to themselves, and have divested the corporation of much of its assets and distributed the assets
to themselves individually and to friends and relatives.
This allegation was denied in the answer and no finding
was made upon the issue.
In paragraph (11) at R. 13 it is alleged that the
Finance Corporation is in grave and imminent danger of
'insolvency. This \Vas denied by the answer and absolutely no finding ,,~as 1nade upon the very important
issue thus raised.
In paragraph (13) at R. 15 it is alleged that Beckstead has fraudulently drawn and taken large sums as
salary and expense allow·ances to himself and those associated 'vith him, and has "rholly 'refused to render an
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accounting therefor to the Finance Corporation. This
allegation was denied in the answer and no finding was
made upon the issue.
In paragraph (13) at R. 15 it is als·n alleg~d that
Beckstead acting throug-h his wife and other officers and
associates, is now holding large and substantial assets of
the corporation by means an-d in a manner unknown to
the plaintiffs. This matter was denied in. the answer
and no finding was made upon such issue.
It was also alleged in paragTaph {13) at R. 15 and
16 that Beckstead has employed numerous agents and
attorneys to appear in the name of the Finance Corporation, when in truth and in fact the appearan-ce is to
protect the said Beckstead in his illeg-al and wrongful
diversion of the assets of the Finance Corporation, and
that Beckstead has paid ·out and transferred substantial
property and assets of the corporation to various · attorneys and threatens to ·further transfer property and
funds of said corporation to said attorneys as apparent
consideration and compensation for services rendered
to said corporation, but that said expenditure was for
his ·own defense and for his. sole use and benefit. These
allegations were denied by the answer and no finding was
made upon the issue thus raised.
In paragraph (14) of the answer ·of the defendants
at R. 81 it is alleged t.hat the Finance Corporation and
the Livestock Company were then and at all times since
their incorporation have been solvent and. going eoncerns.
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The plaintiffs filed a reply R. 85 in which they speci.
fically deny the allegations of ·said paragraph (14) in
defendants' answer. Upon the issue thus raised there
was no finding made by the Court.

ID

J

It is submitted that if the allegations upon which
no findings were made were stricken from the complaint,
the remaining allegations would be entirely insufficient
to state any cause of action whatsoever.
In considering these issues upon which no find.
ings have ·been made it at once be-comes apparent that the

:i~

,basic allegations upon which the plaintiffs relied for re·

_!r

lief have not been incorporated in the findings of the

_:t

C'ourt, and as far .as the record herein is concerned have
been left undetermined and undecided, this shows beyond
any doubt that the judgment for plaintiffs is not based
upon the cause as plead. That failure of the Court to
find on material issues is fatal to the judgment rendered
i~ supported by Courts generally and the ·Supreme Court
of the State of Utah in particular.
In Doe v. Doe,· 48 Utah 200, 1'58 Pac. 781 (1'916), the

c·ourt states :
''We have, heretofore, many ti~mes referred
to the statute requiring s.pecifi.c and direct findings of ultimate facts -on all the material issues
and a separate statement of eonelusions of law,
and held that, until there are findings on all the
material issues raised 'by the pleadings, the findings are insufficient to support the judgment; and
that the findings should be sufficiently specific and
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cided, \Yithout resorting to the evidence or the.
pleading-s.''
In Thon1as v. Cla.yton Piano Comp·arn.y, 47 U. 91, 151
Pac. 543 ( 1913), the :Court states :
''The court should find the facts upon every
issue, either affirmatively or ne,ga.tively, as the
evidence may ·be, and thus give the defeated party
an opportunity to assail the finding as not lbeing
supported by the evidence.''
In Petty v. St. George Ga.rage Company, 60 U. 12·6,
206 Pac. 720 (1922), the defendant had filed an answer
and counterclaim and no findings had been made upon
the issues raised. The C.ourt stated:
''The defendant's answer raised a material
issue, and, unless findings were waived, it became
the duty of the trial .eourt to make such findings.
Implement Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 6, 88 Pac.
670; Erverett v. Jones, 3:2 Utah 489, 91 Pac. 3i60;
W estminister Inv. Co. v. Mc'Ourtain, 3'9 Utah 544,
118 Pac. 5·64."
Mendelson v. Roland, 66 U. 487, 243 Pac. 798 (19·26),
also holds that findings on material issues are necessary.
It is a

funda~menta1

principle of law recognized by

all Courts that a judgment is a legal determination of

those issues which are raised and presented hy the pleadings, .and that the judgment rendered must be ·upon and
within the issues r·aised by the pleadings, and must be
supported by findings which ·come within the issues so
raised.
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In
the

So~ules

~c.ourt

v. Q,lar~toson, 28 U. 74, 76 Pac. 1067 (1904),
states as follows :

"·The defendant in an action can oniv be
called upon to answer the material allegatio~s of
the com•plaint, and upon such allegations the iss·ues are fo~med, and in the absence of any amendment to the pleadings, as in this case, judgment
must he rendered upon .such issues only. A party
cannot declare on one thing and re.cover on another. Peay v. :Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 331, 40 Pac.
206. That in every action the plaintiff must, in
his eomplaint, give the defendant fair notice of
what he claims, is an elementary rule of pleading; and if, at th~ trial, he finds a deviation in his
evidence from his allegatio~s in the complaint,
· he should amend, if the variance is not such as to
preclude an amendment, so tha.t when the judgment is announced it will \be secundum allegata
et probata. A~mong· the reasons for this certainty
of pleading· is, so that the judgment when rendered, will be a bar to any subsequent suit for
the same claim. 11 Ency. Pl. and Pr ., 872, 878,
879; 2~2 Ency. Pl. and Pr ., 602, 603; 1 Chitty, Pl.,
255; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 331, 40 Pac.
206; Vance v. Whalon, 7 Utah 44, 24 P'ac. 672;
Idaho Co. v. Insurance Co., 8 Utah 41, 29 Pac. 826,
17 L. R. A. 586; Turner v. Insurance & Trust Co.,
10 Uta.h 6~1, 3:7 Pac. 9i1; Taylor v. l{eeler, 50 Conn.
346; Brayton v. Jones, 5 Wis. 117; Eib v. ~1artin,
5 Leigh 13·2. ' '
In Tuckfield v. Crager, 29 Utah 472, 82 Pac. 860, the

Court states as follows:
'·'As pl,aintiff made no claim to the 1.8 feet
of ground in her complaint, nor in any way challenged defendant's right to maintain his wall
thereon, he was not. called upon, nor did he have
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any opportunity, to plead the equitable defenses
mentioned by Mr. Jones, if any existed in his
favor. \\!bile these questions are not raised by
the pleadings, yet the ·court, by· going outside of
the issues to determine the title to the 1.8 feet
of ground referred to, has adjudicated them so
far as they may haYe any bearing on defendant's
rig·ht to maintain his "~an on his piece of ground,
and they are here referred to for the purpose of
inviting attention to the injustice which might be
done in this as well as in other cases of like
c.haracter, should any arise, if \ve should affirm
the judg,ment and thereby establish a practice permitting· a. court to find on issues not raised by the
pleadings. Besides the rule is elementary that
the findings and judgment must conrorm to, and
he within, the issues made 1by the :pleadings. In
11 En c. Pl. and Pr. 868, the rule is stated as follows:

'' 'A court cannot properly put upon its record a judgment which is not a proper sequence of
the pleadings. It is a general rule that the judgment must conform to, and be supported by, the
pleadings in the case. · A recovery must be had,
if at all, u.pon the facts alleged, and facts proved
but not pleaded will not support the judgment.' ''
In Pug·mire v. Oregon Short Line Ra.ilroad Co_·mpa;ny,
33 Utah 27 (1907), the Court states as follows:
"'The very purpose of written pleadings on
the part of the plaintiff is to advise the defendant of the nature and extent of the claim made
against him, and thereby give him an opportunity
to prepare to meet it at the trial if he so desireR.
This doctrine is well illustrated by Mr. Pomeroy,
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in his work on Code Remedies, at section 554, in
the following langua.ge:
'·' 'The very object and design of all pleading hy the plaintiff, and of all pleading of new
matter by the defendant, is that the adverse party
may be informed of the real cause of action or
defense relied upon by the pleader, and may thus
have an opportunity of meeting and defeating
it if possible at the trial. Unless the petition or
complaint on the one hand, and the answer on
the other, fully and fairly accomplishes this purpose, the ple,ading would be a useless ceremony,
productive only of delay, and the parties might
!better he permitted to state their demands orally
befiore the court at the time of the trial. The requirement therefore that the cause of action or
the affirmative defense must be stated as it a.ctu~ally is, and that the pr:oofs must establish it
as stated, is involved in the very theory of pleading.' "
This general rule is ably stated in Volume 33,
·commencing at page 1139, as foll·ows:

Q. J.,

''A .court oannot properly .put upon its record a judgment whieh is not a pr'Oper sequence
to the pleadings. The judgment must conform
to and be supported by, the pleadings in the c:ase.
It is a general rule that a recovery must be bad,
if at all, upon the facts alleged in the pleadjngs,
a.nd facts proved but not pleaded will not support
the judgment, although found by verdict or finding, proof of a state of facts different from that
alleged constituting a variance. A judgment must
also be sus~ained by the evidence adduced, in connection with facts admitted by the parties in the
pleadings or otherwise. Facts pleaded but not
.proved or admitted on the trial will not support
a judgment. In other words, the judgment must
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conform to both the pleadings and the proofs, and
be in accordance with the theorv of the action
upon ·w,.hich the pleadings .are fran"led and the C'ase
was tried. This rule is of universal application,
and \Yhether the action or suit is at law, in equity,
or under the code, the judgment must lbe secundum
allegata 'et prohata.. A judgment inconsistent
with admitted or c-onclusively established facts
is erroneous and will be reversed.''
This statement is supported by innumerable decisions from the various sta.te and federal ~Courts, including our own Supreme Court.
There can be no doubt or question as to the variance
between the case a.s plead by the plaintiffs and as found
by the Court. Neither can there lbe any question of doubt
whatsoever but that the judgment as made by the ·Court
is based upon the cause as found by the c·ourt and not
upon the cause a.s plead by the plaintiffs, there being no
findings upon the vital issues rai~ed by the pleadings.
PfOINT VITI.
THE TRML OOURT COMMITTED R:IDVER'SIBLE ERROR IN
THE CONDU:CT OF THE TRIAL.

(a) By reason of the C·ourt 's personal prejudice
against the Defendants and Defendants' cause, Defendants were not given a fair and impartial trial,
and the said preju-dice of the Court influenced it
in making and entering its judgment against Defendants.
(b) ·By o~erruling Defendants' objections t·o irreleV'ant, incompetent and immaterial evidence.
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(c) By denying Defendants' motion to dismiss
1na.de at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case.
(d) By permitting Plaintiffs, over Defendants' objection, to amend their Complaint.
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case defendants n1ade
a m~otion to dismiss on several grounds, each of which
appea.rs .from the record, pages 1'217 -12!20.
At that time there was no evidence in the record
with respect to any transactions which had occurred subsequent to December, 193'5. The motion to dismiss should
have been granted upon the grounds and for the reasons
hereinahove discussed and !briefed in our argument .on the
proposition that the decree of the Court is not supported
by the pleadings or the proof and is contrary to law.
The arguments .made therein are adopted in support of
this assignn1en t of error.
We submit that the Court committed reversible error in ·overruling defendants' ohj.ections to irrelevant,
incon1peten t and imma teri,al evidence, and in failing and
refusing to afford defendants a. fair and impartial trial.
Appellants contend that the Court was personally
prejudiced against the defend,ants and their cause to
the extent that he did not fairly and impartially try the
issues presented and that this personal prejudice of the
C'ourt prevented him from ruling fairly and impartially
on moti'Ons and objections interposed during the trial,
and that the judgment of the Court was affected by thiR
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personal prejudice of the ·Court against the cause of the
defendants.
During· the trial the plaintiffs "·ere pern1itted ~_o introduee much irrelevant, incompetent and imm~terial
testimony, testimony of eov.ersa tions 'bet,veen persons in
no \ray connected \Yith the .cause of action, nor with the
defendants, or any of then1, under the promise that the
missing links \Yould be supplied and that the testimony
\Yould be ''·connected up.'' As indicating the li berality
with \Yhich the Court permitted plaintiffs to pr·osecute
their case, \Ye call attention to the record at page 441:
1

Mrs. ''Tilson, a \Yitness for the plaintiffs, was asked
.eoneerning a man by the name of G. A. Paradis, then follo"~s

certain questions and answers '"ith respect to pur-

ported transactions betw·een the witness and Mr. Paradis
and objections
overruled.

mad~

by defendant, \Yhich objections were

The follo,ving is taken fron1 the transcript at page
444:

"1Mr. Roberts:

In eonnection with the conversation, your H·onor, she has testified to we
move to strike out statements allegedly made by
Paradis, to the effect that Beckstead sent him, as
being hearsay and incompetent.
The C·ourt: :I have consistently ruled that
the conversations made a.t 'this time remain in the
record, upon the assurance they will be connected
up.

Mr. R.olberts:
for the record-

I realize that, your Honor, but
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The Court: You may save your record, but
the motion is denied.''
We shall not burden the Court with the citation of
the numerous instances .contained in· the record where
hearsay, incompetent and irrelevant evidence was admitted over defendants' objections on the promise that
it would be ·connected up. Defendants were denied similar privileges, as is shown by the record at pages 636
and 637.
One of the ·main witnesses called by the plaintiffs
was 0. P. Pearce.

He testified at length to conversa-

tions between himself and Beckstead and between himself and others who were in no way connected with the
defendants. His testimony as to many of these conversations \\ras objected t·o but allo\ved on the theory that
these conversH tions \Vere had while he was acting as the
representative and agent of the United Bond and Finance
Corporation and of W. R. Beckstead. Beckstead clailned
that Pearce never \Vas an agent or employee of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation or of Beckstead but that
P:earce bought stock and investment units on his own
behalf and then sold these securities to the corporation,
and that each deal was handled separately. Pearce testified that he worked ·On a commission basis of $5.00·per
unit for all United Bond and F'inance Corporation stock
procured. In the course of Pearce's cross examination
('R. 636) eounsel for the defendants requested him to
figure up what ~is com1nission would he on a certain given
a·mount of United Bond and Finance Corporation stock.
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The follo,ving- is taken from the record (Pag-e 637) :
'·' ~lr. Adair: I can't see the purpose of this.
There is no testimony here that he only a.cquired
eighty-seven of preferred.
~tr.

Black:

There will lbe.

~Ir.

Adair: \\' e are _setting up a set of figures_here, a stra\Y man, that are Mr. Black's and
not ours.
The Court: I am going to sustain the objection, because I don't think we are getting anywhere 'vith this type of examination.
Mr. Black: Your Honor, the witness is on
the stand now, and I want to determine hovv much
he would have earned on the basis of these figures
here.
The Court : You are assuming something
that is contrary to the record. That may not be
the record of what he sold, and unless that is
established as being the record, there is no use
of computing it.
Mr. Black: Your Honor, this is the thing,
there has been a lot of testimony here on the
promise of connecting it up. I will promise the
court that I will p-roduce competent evidence to
compute it.
Th~ Court: All right, then you may call Mr.
Pearce back to the stand, and we vvill eompute it.
The objection is sustained.''

Later in the trial and before plaintiffs had rested
and before defendants had had an opportunity of laying
the foundation required by the C-ourt, counsel for plaintiffs indica ted that Pearce, vvho resided in Richfield,
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Utah, desired to return home. ( R. 7'51) Thereupon counsel for defendants called the Court's attention to the
fact that their cross examination of the witness had not
been completed and that they had not had an opportunity
to supply the required foundational testimony and stated
that they were willing to pay the "ritness the statutory
fees during the time he was required to wait until the
foundational testimony could be produced but the Court
ruled that unless defendants would pay this witness his
fees and expenses that he would not be required to remain availa1ble for ·cross examination, and the witness
was excused.
An instance of the Court's bias is recorded at page
618. Pearce had testified that his agreement with Beckstead to the effec;t that he would pick up United Bond
and Finance Company stock for that company at $5.00
per unit had been made after the time he went to Park
City and picked up the 'Vilson stock.
For impeachment purposes the attention of the witness was called to a deposition taken in Jan nary, 1939,
wherein he testified that the agreement vvas made before·
he picked up the Wilson stock.
The following· is taken from the record a.t page 620:
'·' Q.

After this conversation-

! am now reading from the second 9-After this conversation in Mr. Beckstead's
office, and he gave you a list of those conversions
to be made in Utah, what, if anything, did you do!
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A. ,,~ell, I 'vent out and converted them.
Q. Take each instance separately; where did
you go first, and 'vho went with you, if anybody'
...-\...
City.

Q.

Mr. Beckstead went

"~ith

me, to Park

Did you make those ans,vers ~

The Court: Is it necessary to read thiR deposition, unless it is ror purposes of impeachment'?
Mr. Black: I want to. kno"\v when they made
this agreHment. He says now they didn't make
it until after the deal out" to \\Tilsons.
Mr. Adair:

But this doesn't show-

The c·ourt: Bu,t these questions and answers
are .merely ~on:firmatory of the testim·ony the witness has given.
Mr. Black: N-o. Your Honor, he says they
didn't make it until after that; in the deposition
it ·says they made it ·before.
The Court:

Wh.ere does it say

that~

Mr. Black: I just read it, if your Honor
was :following me.
The Court:
hear that.

I was following you, ·but I didn't
·

Mr. Black:
with me.

I am sure your H-onor will agree

The Court: . I mean this half statement here
you just read.
Mr. Black: I just read it to fix the time that
it was, after the conversation they went to Park
City. Here he is talking, and to that conversati·on at B~eckstead 's office, and I called his attention to that.''
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The charge of reading a. ''half statement'' is posi-

~~

tively unfair as surely appears fr,om the record. The
attitude of a trial Court is clearly shown and indicated
in his rulings on ohj ections made in the course of the
examination of Frank ·C. Rich.
as a wit:J?-ess by the plaintiffs.

~rank

C. Rich was called

In the fall of 1935 he

worked for a short time as a representative of the Sn1ith
Brokerage Company.

It appears from his testimony

that in the latter part of ~October he and his partiner, A.
W. S:mith, were given $150.00 !by Beckstead and proceded on their way to Montana, and that they were able
to pick up one unit of United Bond and Finance
Corporation stoek. Thereafter they drew drafts, payment of which was refused by Be-ckstead. It appears
that at the very time the drafts were being drawn Rich
and his partner were engaged in ·organizing the Montana
(Sitockholders Protective Association. This Protective
Association seemingly was promoted by Rich and Smith
for two purposes-one to enrich Rich and ~S1nith, a.nd
the ·other to cause trouble for the Finance .C·orporation.
The stockholders who joined were invited to pool their
stock and contribute money to be used by Rich and
Smith in the pr·~secution of the activities of this group.
Rich while still engaged in promoting the program of the
Protective Association became an investigator for the
Utah Securities Commission for the sole purpose of investigating the Finance Corporation and its officers, and
in the trial of this case the Court denied him no opportunity whatsoever to tell fully of his investigation.
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All rules of materiality, competenc-y and relevancy were

disreg·arded ·by the Court.
Comencing- at page
lowing:

7~)2

of the record we find the fol-

dQ. ..~..\nd w·hen you went back to see Mr.
R.obertsA.

Yes sir.

Q. (Continued) \\T ere you given the authority, or 'Yere you assisted to obtain an examination ·of those books at that time~ Now, wait
until he makes his olbjection.
~Ir.

R.oberts: I object to that as immaterial,
irrelevant and ineompetent, and calling for a eon·clusion, and leading and suggestive.
The Court:
J ohnso~, please.

Read the question again, Mr.

(The question was read by the reporter.)
The Court:
A.

The objection is overruled.

No sir.

Q. Now, did you have any further
the county attorney's office~

A.

visi~ts

to

No sir.

Of this county, in that connection. Now,
where next did you go~ With whom-or did you
.make any further-withdraw that question. Did
you do anything further about examining the
bo-oks, or attempting to get access to examine the
books of the United Bond and mnance, other than
these t"'"o trips to the rounty attorney's office,
Q.

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What next did you

do~
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Mr. Roberts: We object to that as being immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and not within
the issues, and we make that objection on behalf
of each defendant separately.
The Court:

The objection is overruled.

A. I can't state the sequence, but I went to
the United States Attorney, f can't think of his
name right now.
Q. ·Shields, isn't it~
A. Shields, D·an B. iShields, to the Postal
Inspector~ Mansfield, at the Post Office, and to
Ezra ~Gull at the Capitol.
Q. And did you lay your complaint before
Mr. Gull at the Capitol~ ,
A. In its entirety.
Mr. Rolberts: We object to that as being immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and ealling for
his conclusion.
The Court : The objection is overruled, and
the answer may stand.
Q. Now, 'vha.t, if anything, was done by Mr.
Gull after you took this rna tter of being refused
to exa~mine the books up with hin1 ~
Mr. R. oberts: We object to that as being immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and no showing
that this witness was with Mr. ~Gull when he was
doing vvhatever he was doing, and is leading and
suggestive.
The Court:

The ·objection is overruled.

A. Mr. Gull called for Mr. Mansfield and
me to come there together.
Q.

A.
region.

l\fr. Mans£eld is

who~

United 1Stated Postal Inspector for this
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Q. And did you g·o there'?
.A.. ,,~ e did.
Q.

What ,,,.as done at that time?

A. ,,~e ·spent an entire day going over the
affairs, complaints, and S·O forth, in connection
with the United Bond and Finance, and the In·vestors Thrift.
Mr. Roberts: We move that be stricken of
this witness. It is relating no conversation of
any kind.
A.

I will relate conversation.

Mr. Adair:. Do you want conversation?
Mr. Roberts: I am making my objection to
the court. or my motion.
The ·Court:
to strike.
Mr. Roberts:

The objection is really a motion
It is a motion to strike.

The Court: · And it will be so regarded, and
it willlbe denied.

Q. Now, do you know how many, or approximately how many complaints there were, of stockholders, at that time, that were reviewed by don't answer until he makes his objection-that
were reviewed and gone over by Mr. Gull, Mr.
Mansfield and yourself at that time?
Mr. Roberts: We object to that as being immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and calling for
his conclusion, ·and is hearsay.
The :C'ourt:

The objection is overruled.

A. Many files, there \Vere fifty or more, and
there were over one hundred in Mr. Gull's files
that were gone into at the sa1ne time.
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Q.

N·O·W, were you at any time in the e:mploy

of the-what is

it~

The Court : 1 think it is the Utah Securities
Commission.
1

·Q. The Utah 1Securities
A.

Commission~

Yes sir.

Mr. Roberts: We object to that as being immaterial and irrelevant, and make it in the form
now of a motion to strike.
The C!ourt: :The motion is denied.
A.

Yes sir.

Q. And when, with reference to the time
that you and Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Gull were
going over these matters, "rhen with reference to
that~

A. February 27, 1'9:3'6, im·mediately after Mr.
Mansfield, immediately after the eonference between Mr. M'ansfield, Mr. ·Gull and myself.
And were you assigned by the Utah Public ~Service CommissionQ.

·The Court: !Se-curities Commission.

'Q. Securities Commission, were you assigned to any duties in connection with the examination~

A.

I was.

Q.

Into the affairs of the United Bond and

Finance

Company~

\A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And the Investors Thrift Corporation.

Mr. Roberts:
to oibje·c:t to this.

'
We have got to find a chance
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The Court: The answer may go out, for the
purpose of the objection, if there is {)ne.
Mr. Roberts: Yes,. 've object to it on the
grounds it is immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent
and calling for a conclusion and too remote.
The Court: The objection is overruled. N o"r,
the question may be answe_red .
. A..

Yes sir.

And in that connection did you talk-in
connecti{)n with your investigation what persons
did you interview1
Q.

Mr. R.oberts: We object to this as being immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and not within
the issues, and app·arently----well, we make that
objection on behalf of each defendant separately.
The

~Court:

The objection is overruled.

A. 'Several people whose names I have on a
report which I issued to Mr. GulL"
The activities of this witness were all antagonistic
to the interests of the United B:ond and Finance C·orp·oration and Beckstead. He was nevertheless permitted
to detail conversations ·between himself and others not
in any way remotely connected with the corporation or
any of these defendants.
We call the C·ourt 's attention to the following which
appears at R. 807:

''Q. 'Well, what did you say to Mr. ~Jones,
and what did he say to you at the time you made
this investigation~
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say, and not within the issues of this case, and
we make that ·objection on behalf of each of these
defendants separately.
The Court:

The objection is overruled.

A. I said, 'Mr. Jones, my name is Rich. I
am employed 'by the Utah Securities Comn1ission
as this letter will evidence. I shol}ld like to ask
you a few questions.' To 'Yhich ·Mr. Jones replied: '\Vhat business have you got asking me a
few questions~' I said, 'Mr. Jones, there are
rumors of sales being made of stock of your eompany, to people h9lding stock of the United Bond,
and Investors Thrift C:o~lpanies, and I am here
with what I consider to be sufficient authority to
be answered.' To which Mr. Jones replied, 'We
will see about that,' and picked up th~ phone and
called Ezra Gull, to which Mr. Jones replied, 'You
·
come back tomorrow.'
Q.

Did you come back

tomorrow~

A.

I did.
Q. And what OCC\lrred then o?
A. 11r. Jones saysMr. Roberts: We object to this as being irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent, and hearsay, and not within the issues of this ease, and
we make that objection on behalf of each of thr
defendants separately.
'The Court: ·The 0 bjection is overruled.''
I

1

Then follo"\\rs a lengthy answer purporting to relate
the conversation betwen Rich and Jones. According to
Rich's own testimony he visited Jones as an officer of
the American Keene Plaster and Cement Company and
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tion. Jones never purported to speak for or in 'behalf of
the United Bond and Finance Corporation, but this
seemed to ·make no difference \vhatsoever to the Court.
In the cross examination of the \Vi tness Rich, his
attention \vas called to a letter \vri tten over his signature
to all stockholders of the United Bond and Finance Corporation. The letter \vas received in eviden~e a.s Exhibit
10. On redirect examination the following took place
(R. 950):
"'Q. Mr. Black has asked you about an exhibit to the stockholders. What occasioned the
sending out of that exhilbit~
that~

Mr. Black:

Which exhibit is

·The Court:

D-efendants' exhibit '10.'

Q.

What occasioned

it~·

Mr. Black: That is immaterial, your Honor,
as to what occasioned it.
·The Court:

The objection is overruled.

A. The mail has been used by the United
Bond · and Finance C'ompanyMr. Black: This, your Honor, now, is a
statement of a conclusion, a statement of some de-.
cision that was reached in the mind of this witness, and enough has been said to indicate that,
and I object to it as ·being im·material, irrelevant
and incompetent.
Mr. Adair: ;I think, if his investigations disclose thatYr. Black:

They didn't disclose anything.

The Court:

The objection is overruled.
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A. Mr. Mans~field, the Postal Inspector for
this region, suggested that I do so on behalf of the
stockholders of the United Bond and Finance
Company.
Mr. Black: Now, your Honor, I move to
strike out the answer as hearsay; it is incompe. tent, irrelevant and immaterial.
The C'ourt : The motion is denied.
Q. And had you, at that time, made an investigation and talked with various stockholders
in Montana of the United Bond and Finance Company~

A.

I had.

Mr. Black: We object to that as immaterial,
irrelevant and incompetent.
'T:he Court: The ohjection is overruled, and
the answer may stand''
The Court's willingness to aid and assist plaintiff
is illustrated by the following from the examination of tlie
witness, A. ·w. Madsen. (R. 864) Madsen according to the
testim-ony at one time was employed by the Tri-Base Oil
Company or Eg,bert Pandolfo. He was never at any time
associated with any of the defendants in any capacity
whatsoever. This testimony was also permitted under·
the promise of counsel to connect it up.

'I' Q. And in that connection, did you have,
or were you furnished any list of investors in the
United B-ond and Finance Corporation~
Mr. Black: ·That is olbj ected to, your l-Ion or,
as being im·material, irrelevant, incompetent, ~nd
has nothing to do with any present issue before
the court, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
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The Court:

There i8 no foundation laid.

Mr. Black:

No foundation laid.

Mr. Adair: \V e will have to connect up the
trading of stock in Mr. Pandolfo's enterprises
with stock in the United Bond and Finance C·ompany.
The c·ourt:
nection'?

You intend to make that con-

Mr. Adair: \\T e intend to connect up Mr.
Pandolfo's trading, the merchandise he traded,
with the ·United Bond and Finance Company's
stock, and with our list ·of investors.
The Court: Upon that assurance, I will overrule the objection.
A. I was furnished, by Mr. Pandolfo, a list
of various securities.

Q. Did the list include-! mean----Strike that
all. Were you furnished with names of investors
in the United Bond and Finance C·orporation ~
Mr. Black: We object to that, your Honor,
on the same grounds.
The Court:

The same ruling.

A. Well, yes, along w~ th, of course, other
securities. N·ot just the United Bond and Finance.

Q. Did you, while working for Mr. Pandolfo,
trade or exchange other securities, -or purp.orted
securities for shares of stock in the United Bond
and Finance, in Montana~
Mr. Black: Just a minute. We. object on
the ground the question is irrelevant, immaterial,
ineompetent, and no foundation laid, and no connection is shown between Pandolfo, or this witSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ness and any of the defendants before the court T
It has no bearing on any issue before the court.
·The 1Court : I will make the same ruling, upon the assurance of counsel that the testimony will
be connected up.

A. I made some deals and trades for securities, with Pandolfo, I don ~t remember ·definitely
whether any of them were United Bond and Finane~ accounts, or not. We 'vere working on any
securities that represented a value, and it has
been so long ago that I don't rememiber any definite deal made through Pandolfo or for Pandolfo
on United Bond and Finance accounts.
Q. Well, what sort of n1erchandise were
you trading, ~or securities were you tradin~f
A.

We were-

Mr. Black: I ohject on the ground it is irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent.
The Court : The objection is overruled.

A.

We were-

Mr. Black: And may I finish my objection
-and no showing made that any of these tran~
actions involved the United Bond and Finance,
or its stock.
'The Court: ·That objection may appear as
having been made before the ruling. You may
answer.
A.

May I have that question again.

Mr. Adair:

Will you read the

q~estion?

(The question was read hy the reporter).

A.
tracts.

What was known as an oil resale con-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~21

Q. And in w·hat association or con1pany, or
name; " . hat assoc.iation, corporation, or name,
\\·as it!

'T

Mr. Black:
e object to that question on
the g-round it is irreleYant, immaterial, incompetent, and no sho,ving that it had any ·connection
"~ith the l:nited Bond and Finance Company, or
any of the defendants before the court.
The Court:

The

~objection

is overruled.

A. Tri-B·ase, of Montana, that company "\Vas
known as.

Q.

Tri-Base, and do you kno"\v "\Vhether
\\·as a corporation or not·?

it

Mr. Black: Just a minute, your Honor. That
calls for this \Vi tness' conclusion.·
Mr. Adair:
he knew.
~fr.

Black:

I am asking him whether or not

No foundation laid.

The Court: He may testify to its reputation
a.s a corporation.
Mr. Black: He didn't ask him. I object to
it as being irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent.
The ·Court: I assume that is what the question called for.
Mr. Black: Just a minute, may I ask
tion on voir dire ~
The Court:

a ques-

You n1ay voir dire the witness.

V10TR DIRE EXAMINATrON

(.By Mr. Black):

Q. Did you ever discuss with an~hody in
Montana the question as to 'vhether or not the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

222

Tri-Base of Montana was a corporation or part:..
nership, or any other kind of an association~
A.· No.
Mr. Black: We object on the ground the
witness himself admits he doesn't have any information on the question.
The

~Court:

A.

Yes sir.

The Court:
A.

Did you hear it discussed f
By other individuals f

No sir, nothing definite I remember of.

·The c·ourt: Did you hear other individuals
express their opinion, do you know, in respect to
Tri-·Base Oil~
A.

As to whether it was a corporation?

'The Court:
A.

Yes.

I don't know that I did, no.

The Court: Did you hear others-did you
know its general reputation in the community as
being a ·corporation or not f
A. Well, of course, 'I knew it was an organiz.a ti~on ·of some kind. However, as to whether
it was incorporated or \vhether it was a partnership, or on what basis it was operated, I don't
know.''
Of course this testimony \vas never connected up
as promised, in fact no attempt \vas ever made to do s·o.
In many instances during the progress of the trial
when plaintiffs were having difficulty developing their
testimony, the Court took over the witness and proceeded
with the examination.
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The Court's attention is directed to the record at
page 892. The witness C'hristensen was being examined
by counsel for the plaintiff:
,., A. I don't know. I didn't know the man
Paradis. I don't kno\v that I have ever seen him.
'The fact that his name ,,~as on this card doesn't
mean much to you.

Q. Why doesn't it mean n1uch to

you~

Mr. Black: Y·our Honor, that calls for a
conclusion, and for his own personal reason, and
has no materiality. We object to it on those
grounds.
The ·Court: Where did you get the information that went into the card, with reference to
agents·~

Mr. Black: Your Honor, may our record
show we object on the ground the witness doesn't
show he ever made the ·card. Without the foundation being laid, this question is objected to.
The Court : Very well, the objection will be
overruled. You can answer.
A. Y.ou asked me vvhere the information
came from?
'The ·C~ourt : That was placed on the card, in
relation to agents.
A. I don't know, your Honor. As far as I
remember, I never made one of these cards. I
can tell you the general \bookkeeping behind it,
probably.
The Court: That is what the question required. I didn't ask you if you made the cards.
Where the information rame from placed on these
cards.
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Mr. Black: Your Honor, may we
obje-ction on the ground the witness
didn't make the cards, and that there
dication he was present, or associated
company when they were made, or had
to· do with it.

have an
says he
is no inwith the
anything

'The Court : Well, that is all very well and
good. The objection doesn't in any way meet
any information that is required by this question.
I am asking atbout a method of bookkeeping. This
man. was secretary and treasurer. You may answer.''
It seemed that every damaging inference which
could possrbly he drawn from the evidence, or lack of
evidence; against the cause of the defendants was so
drawn by the ,Court.
:Exhibit A-4, a letter from one Pogliano to the Finance Corporation \vas received in evidence. Exhibit B-4,
a copy of a letter from the corporation to Pogliano was
also re-ceived. B·oth bear the same date. These exhibits
were ·called to the attention of the \vitness Boyd Evans,
and the following took place (:R. 1106) :
'' Mr. Adair : !Well, the thing is that first.
a stockholder writes, on October 16th, at Livingston, and oil the same day they write from Salt
Lake, to Mr. Pogliano, evidently; the two letters
pass·ed in the mail; the stockholder wants to call
off the ·deal, and don't want the transfer made,
but the transfer is made, and the United Bond
acquired the stock of the stockholder.
The Court: Isn't it possible to dr~w an inference from ';B-4' that it ma.y have been written
subsequent to the receipt of 'A-4' ~
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Mr ...A. dair: I think they are both the same
date.
The Court: They arc dated the same day,
but the date may be ·w·rong.
~Ir. Bla:ck: I don't see ho"· an inference can
be dra,vn, your Honor, one \Yay or the other.

The Court: Well, it seems that 'B-4' is in
response to something; it didn't come out of thin
air.
A. \Y. ell, it is in response to this pest, Jack
Oldroyd, that "'as annoying us about these certificates."
During the course of the trial on the order to show
cause in Sept. 1940, motion was made by plaintiffs' counsel to hold up the payment of certain money on a draft
which had been received by the Beckstead Livestock
Company for the sale of its lambs. The Court ordered
that this money be impounded, and the remarks of the
Court show that he had apparently made up his mind
to impound this money before the motion was made, and
this regardless of the fact that at that time taxes were
due on the property of the corporation, and the money
was needed for other corporate purposes.
:b..,rom the judgment roll it appears that this money
was impounded for many .months, in fact, until after the
trial Judge left the ·bench, and after the corporation had
incurred charges for penal.ty and interest on delinquent
taxes, and had .been otherwise damaged by this arbitrary
and capricious order of the Court requiring that this
money be impounded. These matters were all called to
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Judge ~Schiller's attention and he refused to have the
money released in order to save the company the penalty
and interest on taxes, continually saying "he would decide the case tomorrow.''
The positive injustice of this order is further shown
by the faet that the plain tiff had never shown any danger, reasonable or otherwise, that any of the money
would be wrongfully used in any manner whatsover.
(:R. 1369')
During the course of the trial questions were asked
Mr. Beckstead in connection with the transaction involving the purchase of the insurance business or agency
from Ashton-Jenkins and from Lauren W. Gilbbs. Beckstead stated that he did not know where the written contract was.
At R. 1856 it appears

th~t

Judge Schiller sent some-

one to the Clerk's office in order to obtain these contracts-this without any request or statement on the part
of plaintiffs' counsel, and he informed plaintiffs' counsel that he had sent upstairs for these exhibits. In this,
we submit the Judge vvas playing the part of eounsel
for· the plaintiffs. (R.. 1586-1'5'90, et seq.)
·On the redirect examination of Mr. Beckstead, (R.
1647), he was heing ·questioned a~bout the manner in which
the American Keene Plaster and Ce-ment Cnrnpany stocJl{
had been handled as between the Cement Company and
the Finanee Corporation. C·ouns·el for the plaintiffs objected on the ground that it was repetitious to go into
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this matter again, and the c·ourt in commenting upon
this objection said that Beckstead had testified on direct
examination what he did "'"ith the stock ''and his conflicting statem'ent has been introduced on cross examination.'' The objection w. as overruled and counsel for
defendants ":-as permitted to go into the matter a little
more fully; and then at R. 16·48, without any o:bjection,
the Court makes the voluntHer statement: '',Now, we have
got three stories in the record with respect to this stock.
\That is the Court going to believe~''
Aside from the fact of show·ing the court's prejudice, we might point out that there "\vas one story
told and only one in connection with this stock, and the
Court's volunteer statement shows either that he was
confused or highly and greatly prejudiced. He grappled
on to Beckstead's statement that the American Keene
Plaster and Cemlent ,Company stock "\vas taken to the
office of American Keene Plaster and ~Ce.ment Company
as being in direct conflict with previous testimony with
respect to its stock. This statement was in harmony with
Beckstead's former testimony and the testi,mony of
Pearce and Grant Crandall to the effect that the stock
was delivered to the ~Secretary of the American K~eene
Plaster and C·ement Company with instructions to issue
it as directed thereafter.
At another point in the trial Beckstead was being
asked on redirect examination a?hout the commencement
of his transactions with the Ashton-Jenkins Company
and the Court interrupted and, without any cause and
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\vithout any objection before him, turned to Beckstead
and said ('R. 1657, et seq.): "You kne\v at the time you
rnade that transaction that Ashton-Jenkins was very
shakey, just on the verge ·of receivership, didn't you Y"
,Such an accusation coming fron1 the trial Judge
show··s the utter impossibility of defendants receiving a
fair ·and impartial trial of their cause before him.
Another manifestation of the Court's prejudice appears at R. 1692, et seq. It appeared that the respective
counsel had completed their examination of ~Ir. Beckstead and the Court directed son1e qu·e;stlons to the
installn1ent payn1en ts on preferred and common stock,
and the Court asked 'vhy the installments on s·ome of
these harl ceased, and Mr. Beckstead replied that some
of then1 ·ceased along in depression times, and then the
Court asked him why they had ceased paying other than
because of financial reasons, if he knew.
The only implication one can draw from this question is that the Court !believed in his own nund that there
were reasons other than the inability of the purchaser
to keep up his payments, and that these reasons refleeted
upon the honor, honesty and integrity of the defendants
to this

~ction.

He then asked Mr. Beckstead whether he had conferred with the holders of this stock, and Beckstead said
that people had come into his office on this matter; and
then after all this the Court said : ''In other words, they
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that

~lr.

Beckstead could do vYas to say that it \Yas not

necessarily that they w·e re un \villing, but that they \Vere
financially unable to carry on.
Commencing- at R. 17 56 is recorded an examination
of Crandall by the Court on his own motion. Respective
counsel indieated they had completed their examination
and abandoning his position as Judge entirely and assuming without question the less dignified position of
counsel for the plaintiff, he examined Crandall a.t some
length on a subject which had not been mentioned by
either plaintiffs or defendants's counsel, but was based
upon some inaccurate information which he, the Court,
evidently had.

He asked Mr. Crandall if he and Mr.

Jones and the Cement Company had been engaged for a
number of years in a very extensive litigation over the
title to the property of the Cement Company. Mr. Crandall acknowledged that there had been some litigation,

and then the Court by his question, indicated that this
litigation·was in process at the very time of the exchange
of the Cement Company stock for the Finance Corporation stock, and one of his questions was as follows :
''They claimed that you and Mr. Jones had stolen this
property, did they not~'' And this from a Judge who is
trying a law suit. The positive unfairness of this conduct on the part of the trial judge we leave for detertnination to this court.
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The f.ollowing is taken from the record at page 1756:

''Q. Mr.
Jones, and the
engaged, for a
litigation over
company1
A.

Crandall, have not you and Mr.
company you now represent, been
number of years in very extensive
the title to the property in your

We have had some.

And wasn't that in process of litigation
about in 1934 and 19351
Q.

A.· No, I think it was along about 1937.
Q. ~Tell, the suits had been filed against you,
had they not, ·claiming that you did not own this
property~

A. Well, let's see. There was one suit filed
by the, some of the old ·Owners of the property.
Q. Yes, they claimed that you and Mr. Jones
had stolen this property, did they not~ That is
putting it bluntly.

A.

Not me; I wasn't involved in it.

Mr. Jones, at least, but you we.re involved as a defendant in that action, were you
Q.

not~

A.

Yes.

Q. And that was pending about the time
that this stock, this 6800 sha.res and this 5000
shares were transferred or issued to Mr. Beckstead and the United Bond and Finance Company~

A.

Well, I don't remember the exact dates.

Q. But that was approximately the date,
was it not7

A.· Probably so.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

231
Q. And there had been several trials had
there in respect to the ownership of that property~

A.

Just the ·one.

Q. Hadn't there been a suit filed down In
Sanpete County~
A. No sir.

'T

Q.
asn 't there a suit filed down there
which was transferred up here~
A.

No sir.

Q. In which the Mt. Pleasant Bank was
involved f
A. No sir; the State Bank of Sevier.
Q. \\~ asn 't that filed originally in Sanpete
County~

Mr. Black:

Sevier County.

A. ·Sevier County.
Q. (By the Court) Sevier County~
A. Yes.
Q. The original owners of this property
were seeking to recover it about that time~ ·
. A. Well, it was later than that, your Honor;
19-36, and along in there.
Q. Well, there were some suits filed~
A. Yes, there w,ere some suits filed.

Q. So that very materially affected the
worth of this stock at that time. The title to
your property was in doubt~
A.

It probably would, yes.

Q. The reason I know about those matters
is becaus.e those suits were partially handled in
my court.
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~lr. Black: We had better put in the record,
then, the outcome of the suit, your Honor.

The C·ourt : Well, I don't know the outcome,
because I ·didn't decide the suit.''
After this -examination by the Court, counsel for
the defendants asked Mr. Crandall about the outcon1e of
this litigation, and Mr. Crandall fixed . the date upon
which the case \vas decided as some time in 1937 or 1938.
Then again the Court comes forward as adv·ocate
and stated that he thought the case had been tried once
and then retried, and asked the question: ''Didn't
Judge McKinney try it once.'' Crandall stated that had
been years before and before the American l(eene Plaster and Cement Company had been incorporated. And
then again in comes the Court and says: ''But it involved
y;ori and Mr. J·ones ~''
Then at R. 1760 the Court stated that he had just
sent upstairs for the file in which l\1r. Jones and Mr.
Crandall and others were sued. The Court then states
that the suit was filed in July, 1935. Thi~ case according to the Court was decided in February, 1937, and
then the Court made this remark: ''It wasn't ever tried
<>n its merits. It 'vas dismissed upon the motion of the
.American Cement and Plaster Company with prejudice;" and then later he says: ''No, the suit was dismissed without prejudice; I was in error. But the one
year has expired since the time of its original filing.''
The American Keene Plaster and Cement C·ompany
stock was acquired by the United Bond and FinanOf
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Corporation in 1934 and before this action suggested
by the court was ever filed.
The trial Court tried this case in g-reat haste, and
was continually cautioning counsel against the use of
time, as of course appears clearly from the whole record.
A few instances will be cited. Commencing at page 1091,
the following appears :
The Court: N O\Y, gentlemen, we have simply
got to do something about this matter. I have
got to a point w·here I don't know what we are
going t.o do. How n1uch more have you got after
you get through \Yith this witness, Mr. Adair~
At R. 1661 the Court again shows his desire to get
through with the case, and states that the case must
be completed on the following afternoon, and whether
counsel would have an .opportunity to argue this matter
to the Court seemed to be of no concern or importance
to the Oourt.
These instances of the Court's anxiety to rush the
trial of this case are cited in support of the contention
appellants now make that they did not have a fair and
impartial trial and could not have a fair and impartial
trial before the trial Judge, and is significant in connection with an occurrence that took~ p~ace several
months later. As indicated by the judgment roll and the
re0ord in this case, the trial Court took this matter
under a4visement, and thereafter in accor·dance with
the rules of the Third Judicial District Court, plaintiff
requested the cause to be set down for trial on its
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merits, and accordingly the cause was set down for trial
on its merits for D·ecember 17th. Prior to the· 3rd of
December the plaintiffs appeared and req:uested a special setting for the trial of this caus·e for December 3,
1940. This request was granted over the objection of
defendants and the cause was set down for trial upon
its merits before the Judge, whose anxiety in September,
on the ground that he had accepted a position with the
University of Utah, did not permit time f.o·r the proper
ordinary trial of this cause.
The trial Court committed reversible and prejudicial
error in the conduct of the trial by permitting plaintiffs
over objection of defendants to amend their complaint.
It appears from the reoo·rd in this case that after
both parties had rested and after proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law had been served upon appellants by plaintiffs and objections interposed thereto,
and after the arguments on the objections had been concluded, the plaintiffs moved for permission to amend
their complaint. The motion was obje-cted to and resisted by appellants, but their objection thereto was
overruled and the plaintiffs 'vere granted permissi,on
to amend their complaint.
An ef(amination of the -complaint as originally filed·,
will indicate that the cause of action was based entirely
upon the relations between the officers of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation and the Montana stockholders, and the case was tried upon the complaint as it
was filed. The effect of the amendment was to change
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

235

entirely the theory as originally presented, and as
amended the cause 'vas based, among other things, upon
the relationship bet\Yeen the officers of the Finance Corporation and the stockholders generally.

The ainend-

ment could not be justified upon the theory that it was
permitted in order to n1ake the allegations corresp·ond
w·ith the proof, nor upon the principle that the .case
had been tried upon the theory as expressed in the
complaint as amended. Pla:intiffs attempted to prove a
cause based on the allegations ·of the ·original complaint,
and that only. This complaint, changing as it did the
whole theory of the cause of action and the whole theory
of the defense, was unfair, unjust and inequitable, and
appellants submit that the Court was not justified 1n
permitting this amendment.

THE. COURT COMMIT·TEU RE;vER:SIBLE AND P:REJUDICIAL

ERROR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO VACATE
AND SET ASIDE THID ORDER .AJPPOINTING REICEJV·ER.

POINT X.
THE COURT COM;MIT·TED REVERSIBLE: AND PREJ.UDI:CIAL
ERROR IN OVERULING DEF'EN·DAN·T'S' MOTION FOR NEW TR.IAL.

The arguments which we have hereinabove set forth
support and sustain a.pp·ellants in these assignments of
error, and we shall make no further argument upon
them.
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CoNCLUSION.

In conclusion we desire to briefly mention the present condition of the Finance Corporati·on in connection
with the charges of misn1anagement.
The present condition of the corporation is accurately reflected in the evidence in this cas·e, and particularly in the audit as of the c}ose of the year 19·39.
The eo-rporation placed in re-ceivership was organized just prior to the beginning of the great depression.
In its very infancy it was forced to face a condition
which caused numerous well established corporations to
suffer insolvency . and complete dis·o·rganization. That
this corporation survived heroically is shown beyond
question by the audits hereinabove referred to. The
~orpora.tion, which has been placed in receivership because of alleged mismanagement, at the time this suit
was filed had assets in excess ·of the total amount of all
stock ever sold by it. At that time it ·could have paid
every stockholder 100 per cent of his investment; could
have paid all its de hts and obligations of every kind
and character, and still had a surplus in the neighborhood of $129,000.00. From the evidence it conclusively
appears, in fact plaintiffs have ~tipulated, that the properties of the corporation are heing managed with an
exceptionally high degree of · care and efficiency, that
there are no outstanding unpaid or delinquent taxes,
debts or ·other obligations. It is stipulated that competent real estate men in Salt Lake City who are acquainted with the properties of the corporation would
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testify as to the exceptional care with which these
properties are being handled. The evidence is to the
effect that there \Yere no Ya~ancies in the apartments;
that rents were being collected; and that furniture and
furnishings are well cared for, and that everything is
being done that could be done to preserve and ope·rate
these apartments at a profit. The ranchers from Wyoming who live in the vicinity of the Beckstead Livestock
property and holdings, and who are well ~cquainted
with the conditions in that part of the country, testified
that the ranches were in excellent condition. That
splendid impr·ovements bad been made upon them since
their acquisition by the Beckstead Livestock Company.
They testified that the sheep were of better grade than
other sheep in that vicinity. That the l~mb crop was
better than the average. They testified that the finest
cattle ~n. the country w·ere on the Beckstead Livesto.ck
Company holdings. Their testimony is to the effect that
the ranches and the livestock are well cared for, and that
this pr.operty is being managed and operated with efficiency. This evidence entirely disproves any claim of
mismanagement or danger o{ loss and destruction to this
property and indicates, of course, that because of skill~
ful management the corporation is now in a. solvent and
flourishing condition, a condition which fully and completely protects the investments of every stockholder.
Surely the greatest present danger to this ·co-rporation
is reeeivership and not mismanagement.
In conclusion the appellants respectfully su'bmit that
the judgment and decree of the trial ·Court appointing
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a receiver should be reversed and that said decree should
be vacated, set aside and held for naught, it conclusively
appearing that said judgment and decree is not sup-ported by the pleadings nor by the evidence nor by
findings of fact and conclusions of law which are in turn
supported by pleadings and evidence, and that said
judgment is contrary to law; and upon the further
ground that it .conclusively appears that the findings of
fact made by the Court, upon which said decree is based,
are not supported by the evidence nor the pleadings,
and that there is a fatal variance between the case as
plead and the case as found, and that the Court failed
and refused to make findings upon the important material issues raised by the pleadings, and upon the further ground that the defendants were not afforded a fair
and impartial trial.
Respe-ctfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, wALLACE
BRIGHAM

E.

&

BLACK,

RoBERTS,

Attorneys for the Appellants.
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